


January-March 1986

Military Intelligence

Technical Intelligence





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Staff

Editor: Capt. Stephen P. Aubin
Departments Editor: SSgt. Richard L. Bretz
Art Director: Thomas Daley
Illustrator: Sp4 Donald L. Nelson
Plans and Administration: Mildred A. Karch
Typographer: Hermelinda Rodriguez



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Thomas Daley

A Joint Message from the Commander



Periodically, CSM Retter and I will team up on articles that have broad significance to the MI Branch as a whole. This article on the Pre-Assignment Orientation Course represents one of those occasions.

As we enter into the Army Year of Values, the Intelligence Center and School is turning its attention to providing our most senior noncommissioned officers better support and training.

Values clearly find their roots in the past performances of not only Military Intelligence soldiers who have fought and died on past battlefields in Europe, the Pacific, Korea, and Vietnam, but also those who have done our bidding as intelligence agents. The very first presentation of the Congressional Medal of Honor included Sgt. Maj. Marion A. Ross, 2d Infantry, who had fought and escaped from behind the lines of the Confederate soldiers. This soldier performed an intelligence and direct action mission that earned the highest recognition that our country gives for valor. Building upon these values of service and country is a duty and responsibility shared by each member of the Military Intelligence Corps.

During the many visits with our units in the field, CSM Retter and I have, on numerous occasions, heard from our sergeants major that there is a pressing need for some form of structured training before taking on a significant share of the responsibilities and the many duties of our field grade commanders and our senior intelligence staff officers. Additionally, there has been an indication that Military Intelligence senior noncommissioned officers were not properly equipped to assume the responsibilities associated with tactical unit assignments. The reasons for this observation can be found in the career development profiles of many of our noncommissioned officers. We must recognize that the multifaceted intelligence career field forces many of our noncommissioned officers to follow a path of strategic assignments within the three disciplines of signals intelligence, human intelligence, and imagery intelligence. Yet, upon selection to sergeant



Maj. Gen. Julius Parker Jr.

major, many of them are then chosen to fill the senior noncommissioned officer positions within tactical units. In order to aid our sergeants major in making the transition, and to properly prepare non-MI sergeants major destined for MI field units, the Intelligence Center and School has developed the Pre-Assignment Orientation Course (PAOC).

The PAOC represents a concerted effort by CSM Retter and me to place the proper focus on the most important resource of the Military Intelligence Corps, its noncommissioned officers. I am convinced that this initiative, which has my wholehearted support, will ultimately improve the competency, assertiveness, and soldierly qualities of all of the sergeants major who serve within the MI Corps, especially at battalion and brigade levels. I am comfortable that we can strengthen the values held by the members of the Corps through the dynamic development of training programs that allow our senior members to be better equipped to lead and teach the younger members within our ranks.

Preparedness is our shibboleth. Therefore, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School has a formidable responsibility, i.e. the training of officers, warrant officers, and enlisted soldiers to perform the intelligence mission and to determine how our intelligence units will be manned, organized, equipped, and, most importantly,

HOME OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE



CSM Robert H. Retter

and from the CSM



exchange of ideas between the senior officers and non-commissioned officers of the Corps. The execution of the PAOC will also allow our sergeants major to share the experience of enhancement training at the Home of Intelligence. This opportunity has never been available before.

The PAOC is tailored to meet the needs and concerns of sergeants major and does not attempt to replicate the PCC/SOTIOC program of instruction. The PAOC is not a leadership training course. Rather, it is an opportunity for sergeants major to orient themselves toward the total mission and structure of Military Intelligence and to receive instruction on the most current Army intelligence doctrine and training techniques. It exposes the students to the various training materials provided by the school. But perhaps most importantly, it provides a forum for the exchange of ideas and previous lessons learned by the members of the class. As mentioned by Maj. Gen. Parker, the course stresses technical competence, but it also addresses the social responsibilities and the Army family team building aspects of the profession of arms. The course provides an overview of sergeant major duties in both tactical and strategic intelligence assignments.

The results of the pilot course, which was conducted the last two weeks of January, were extremely encouraging. With some minor adjustments, the PAOC will be ready for its first iteration on 14 April. It should also be noted that command sergeants major who are non-MI are currently programmed to receive an additional two days of instruction at Fort Devens upon completion of the Fort Huachuca phase of the PAOC.

That scarce resources are being earmarked for the PAOC, in spite of growing budgetary constraints, reflects not only the absolute need for the program, but also the commitment of the Intelligence Center and School to support this overall effort. That to me reflects a total commitment by Maj. Gen. Parker to ensure that our senior noncommissioned officers are as ready as we can make them to execute the most serious mission of all: the preservation of peace through preparedness for war.

how we will fight in all intensities of war. I believe we owe our best effort to our soldiers and to the Army in general. We must demonstrate that fact by ensuring they are indeed capable of executing the intelligence mission. The PAOC is one way of exemplifying my commitment toward that achievement. The PAOC, in my view, elevates senior noncommissioned officer training to an equivalent level with the Pre-Command Course which prepares our officers to assume command of the Army's most important asset, its soldiers. The PAOC says by deed that leadership preparedness is important at all echelons.

Having set the stage, CSM Retter, the individual responsible for this initiative, will explain the PAOC program and its direction. ***Toujours en avant—Always Out Front!***

The PAOC, as briefed to General Richardson, commander, TRADOC, is designed as enhancement training for sergeants major. Its intent is similar to that of the Pre-Command Course (PCC) and the Senior Officers Tactical Intelligence Orientation Course (SOTIOC). The PAOC is structured as a two-week course of instruction. It will be conducted concurrently with the PCC/SOTIOC classes. By conducting the classes concurrently, the school will be able to take full advantage of guest speakers who are programmed to speak at the school. This approach also provides another opportunity for interaction and the

LEAD BY EXAMPLE

Behind the Lines

As the recent public concern about the mismanagement of areas within the defense procurement process would suggest, the United States is still grappling with the age-old issues of technology versus military need and quality of weapons systems versus quantity. Just how the proper balance can be struck is one of the most elusive and politically-charged questions of our times.

Regardless of which side you take, there are some questions which are even more fundamental than "who authorized the expenditures for over-priced toilet seats." One of the most important questions involves the relationship of technical intelligence to strategic planning. As a corollary, there is the issue of whether technological innovations will drive strategic planning or whether the strategic plan will provide the engine for the development of new technologies.

As Secretary of Defense Weinberger unveiled the FY 1987 Department of Defense budget, it became clear that the Secretary has placed a lot of weight on strategic planning and on the idea of "competitive strategies." The concept of competitive strategies involves an intelligent effort to force an opponent into making investments in areas where the United States has a distinct technological advantage. In many respects, the Strategic Defense Initiative exemplifies such an approach.

However, such an approach cannot work unless the United States has a good and responsive technical intelligence capability. Author William Howard has presented an overview of this complex area. Howard examines the question of technical intelligence from the tactical to the national level. This is an area which affects the soldier on the ground as well as the United States' overall strategic approach to weapons development. We draw attention to this subject with Howard's short overview in the hope that his emphasis on the importance of technical intelligence might lead to further study and inquiry. As the recent procurement scandals illustrate, the American propensity to look for quick results often belies the more pressing need of thinking through the outcome.

Stephen P. Audi

Editor



Dear Editor:

In his article "Special Trust and Confidence: The Dilemma of Leadership" (*Military Intelligence*, July-September 1985), Maj. Holden-Rhodes cites a list of nine leadership skills which appeared in an article by Maj. William Guthrie entitled, "Be, Know, Do" (*Commanders Call*, March-April 1985). Maj. Holden-Rhodes criticizes the order in which the skills are listed, specifically the placement of "Management Technology" near the top of the list and "Soldier Team Development" near the bottom.

This is an incorrect reading of the list. The Center For Army Leadership stresses both in doctrine and training that all the competencies are equally important. The referenced list was not intended to be used as a rank-ordered statement of the most and least important leadership skills. A more useful way to view the nine leadership skills is portrayed in the "Leadership Competencies" arch.

The nine competencies of the arch are founded on the time honored leadership balance of mission and troops. The Center for Army Leadership emphasizes that leaders at all levels employ the nine skills. How much each one is used varies with the level of responsibility of the leader and the particular situation at hand. The nine competencies, it should be noted, are the basis of the leadership core curriculum now used in the TRADOC school system.

In discussions and arguments about the competency arch, a valid case for establishing a cornerstone in the arch is often made. The strongest arguments rank either "Technical/Tactical Competence" or "Professional Ethics" as the most important of the nine competencies. Readers are encouraged to review

the Guthrie article in its entirety and FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*, dated October 1983, for the current doctrinal foundation on leadership.

Capt. Neil F. Buono
Center for Army Leadership

Dear Editor:

Congratulations to *Military Intelligence* magazine for publishing "The Creative Leader," by Lt. Cmdr. Anthony Kendall in the October-December 1985 issue.

It is an excellent article that should be read by every soldier in the Army—both officer and enlisted.

Moreover, readers are urged to pay close attention to the elements that hinder creativity, in particular the definitions of conformity and nonconformity. It is my belief that the Army will be well served by the nonconformist, as defined by Lt. Cmdr. Kendall. Terrorist activity, AirLand Battle doctrine, expected fiscal and personnel constraints, and the fast-moving train we're on will not permit a substitute for creativity. However, a well defined mission/objective and a secure boss—who is receptive and does not feel threatened by innovativeness, creativity and problem solvers—are absolutely essential to permit creativeness. To quote from the article, "... nonconformists are not rebels. Creative, nonconformist officers do not strive for the superficial goal of change for its own sake or for notoriety. Generally, they are not martyrs, but pragmatists who seek

change to improve the organization."

I strongly urge the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School to make this article part of the reading list for all NCO/officer personnel going through the school. Additionally, this article should be given to all officers attending the commanders course at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

Again, my congrats for an excellent article.

Lt. Col. Felix F. Trinidad
Defense Intelligence Agency

Dear Editor:


Michael Evancevich presents an apt condensation of Afghan-Soviet relations in his book review (*Military Intelligence*, April-June 1985). However, two areas detract from his assessment of **Red Flag Over Afghanistan: The Communist Coup, the Soviet Invasion and the Consequences** by Thomas Hammond. First, one is misled concerning events leading to Amin's assumption of power. Secondly, lessons Hammond presents to analysts and decisionmakers on consumption of strategic intelligence were not addressed by Evancevich.

The review indicates that the Soviets assessed the internal security situation in Afghanistan as precarious enough to warrant removal of Taraki as President. Amin ostensibly launched a subsequent coup for the removal of Taraki.

Author Hammond presents a different version. President Taraki was only the figurehead of an unpopular government actually controlled by Amin. When in the Soviet Union, Taraki and Soviet officials supposedly laid groundwork to remove Amin. However, Amin eventually politically outflanked Taraki in a counter-coup. This viewpoint was corroborated by unclassified information provided by U.S. government sources.

An elementary lesson easily forgotten by analysts and decisionmakers follows. Predicting the intent of another—here, the Soviet Union—is uncertain. "Nothing is unambiguous," opined a former intel-

(Continued on page 41)



Technical Intelligence: The Critical Gap

by Lt. Col. William L. Howard

In the Southeast Asian Conflict, the 1972 North Vietnamese offensive marked the first large-scale use of tanks. Because of inaccurate intelligence assessments, South Vietnamese forces were inadequately prepared to stem the progress of the North Vietnamese armored columns. The surprise appearance of armored fighting vehicles on the battlefield demonstrated the devastating psychological effect they can have on an unprepared force.

The North Vietnamese also unleashed two miniature weapons with considerable success. The Soviet AT-3 Sagger guided anti-tank missile was used against South Vietnamese armored vehicles, communications bunkers, and even small outposts. In addition, the SA-7 heat seeking surface-to-air missile was employed and became an even more serious threat because it could disrupt allied control of the air over the battlefield. While samples of these weapons undoubtedly fell into the hands of the South Vietnamese, nothing was done with them because in September 1969 technical intelligence units in Vietnam had been inactivated, and by October 1971 the 55th Military Intelligence Detachment, a corps support unit with a technical intelligence capability, had also been inactivated.

Two years later, the Middle East erupted in another war. The October 1973 war between the Arabs and the Israelis represented the first time that modern Soviet vehicles were employed against modern free-world vehicles. The surprise appearance of the Soviet AT-3 Sagger missile had devastating effects upon the Israeli forces. A massive amount of American aid was needed to sustain the Israeli armed forces. Once again, the element of the surprise introduction of a weapon on the battlefield caused great confusion until the capabilities of the weapon were understood.



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Until recently, the words "foreign technology," when used by the military, generally applied to fielded foreign weapons systems. Intelligence assessments were limited to comments such as: a Soviet weapons system is a marked improvement over its predecessor or it appears that X-nation is about to field a new system. Policy decisions were then made to ignore the system, develop an American version, or develop a countermeasure. To discuss every system, its origin, its history, and its foreign ancestors would require many volumes and serve little purpose. There is, however, a value in discussing the technical intelligence organizations and procedures in use and their impact on doctrine, training and weapons development.

Briefly reviewing the origins of our technical intelligence operations, during World War II there were field collection teams which sent captured materiel to the rear where a reverse engineering analysis was performed and the results incorporated in intelligence assessments of enemy forces. At the same time, and almost completely isolated, were other engineers and scientists working to develop new items of military equipment. Throughout three complete war-peace-war cycles, there has been a lack of trained technical intelligence people in the initial phases of the conflict, and once the conflict was over, a mass exodus of people from both the areas of field support and basic weapons research and development.

Two major events occurred in the 1960s and several events occurred in the 1970s which have gone a long way to rectify those problems. The creation of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the establishment of the U.S. Army Foreign Science and Technology Center were the major events of the 1960s. These organizations provided centralized control of the Defense Department's intelligence gathering operations and means of distribution of foreign scientific and technical data to the arsenals or design bureaus. There was, however, limited distribution to the field and almost no knowledge of foreign weapons systems by those people most likely to encounter them, the combat troops! During the 1970s this began to change. By 1975, a great deal of the technical intelligence information

gathered from Vietnam and the Middle East was declassified. The technical intelligence company was expanded to a battalion-sized unit and located at Aberdeen Proving Ground. They travelled about the country providing foreign weapons displays and training throughout the Army. At the same time, the Army established the Red Thrust Detachment at Fort Hood, Texas, with the mission of training field units on the techniques of fielding an effective enemy opposing force for use in training exercises. This force would look like, and operate like, a Soviet-style force. The Maneuver Training Commands, established in 1973, formed the focal point in the Reserve system and various corps headquarters in the United States formed the focal points for the active forces. By 1979, the basic system was providing effective training at the local level and, by 1981, the National Training Center at Fort Irwin saw the merger of both technical intelligence and Opposing Forces with the fielding of two Soviet-style maneuver battalions which provided a more realistic maneuver enemy. Surplus American vehicles had been modified to look like Soviet-designed equipment and a technical intelligence company, detached from its parent unit at Aberdeen Proving Ground, provided static displays of the actual Soviet equipment.

But while some improvements have taken place in the training arena, the weakest point of the system was, and still is, the design and development of new weapons. The U.S. research and development (R & D) establishment has failed to appreciate the value of information and insight gained from the exploitation of foreign technology. The often uncertain and precarious existence (and, at times, non-existence) of the technical intelligence effort attests to this serious deficiency in the system.

Many intelligence systems were hard hit in the 1970s because of various scandals. There was almost no technical intelligence field collection effort and very little use was made of the wealth of scientific data that was available on weapons design by the Soviets.

By mid-1976, U.S. Air Force Intelligence had prepared an unclassified report on the Soviet military. The chapter on the technological chal-

lenge noted that the United States had enjoyed technological supremacy over all nations over the previous 25 years, especially in R & D associated with military power. However, Western Europe and Japan were closing



the technological gap in certain areas: The United Kingdom in VTOL fighters; Sweden with its Mach 2-plus fighters; France, in a series of first-class advanced military aircraft, as well as in nuclear-armed ballistic missiles and submarine-launched ballistic missiles; West Germany, in several modern military aircraft and ground equipment; and Japan, in certain areas of electronics. In a very real sense, the United States was suddenly being challenged in many areas as the technological leader of the Free World.

The United States held, and still holds, a lead in basic military technology over the Soviet Union in most areas important to national security. But the magnitude of that lead, so crucial in maintaining military security and in relieving Western nations of the burden of matching Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces in purely numerical terms, has greatly diminished as the Soviets expanded their technological effort, making substantial improvements in the quality, not just quantity, of their weapons systems. Given their emphasis on steady military production, large numbers of substantially improved weapons systems continue to be deployed throughout the Soviet armed forces.

It is now well-established that the Soviet economy exists as two quite distinct economies, one civil, the other military. And while the civil economy has continued to falter, the quality and quantity of new Soviet weapons being deployed reveals the relative health of the military economy. The most important concern for the West lies in the capabilities that will emerge in future Soviet weapons based on the extensive investment in the military economy.

Behind these overt indications of advanced technology in military systems are a variety of scientific efforts and the development of Soviet foundation technologies which support future military capabilities. The challenge to the West lies in unlocking the

secrets surrounding Soviet military R & D priorities and unmasking Soviet laboratory and design efforts. Without such knowledge, the possibility of a technological surprise will continue to loom as the most dangerous



element of the Soviet challenge. The seeds of technological surprise lie in R & D innovations. The Soviets have learned that a reactive policy in military technology is not enough to give them superiority, and they are working hard to gain the initiative in many areas. Soviet R & D innovations are significant and indicative of efforts to exploit basic research advances and develop new military applications.

Soviet secrecy prevents the United States from obtaining information on many Soviet R & D efforts and especially on Soviet decisions to initiate prototype development. Those decisions typically precede the appearance of a prototype in testing (or in a Moscow May Day parade) by about three or four years. The Free World must be concerned about what is not known—about what the Soviets may be doing with new technologies which would have military potential. The extent of our knowledge is determined by U.S. intelligence capabilities and, as systems become more sophisticated and complex, we must improve our collection of technical intelligence to support the development of countermeasures in our weapons systems.

Consequently, the United States must continue to maintain a reasonable margin of technological superiority in areas important to its military strength, both to offset its incomplete knowledge of Soviet technological progress and to provide hedges against unanticipated new threats or failures in any of its major weapons systems.

The standard hue and cry of the past, that American technology would offset the Soviet advantage in numerical superiority, no longer applies. The importance of technical intelligence cannot be understated as the United States competes with the Soviet Union for weapons technology which will help ensure its national security. Today, when the entire defense procurement process is in question, plagued by scandal from

within and among defense contractors, the system itself must be reexamined. The current system must change and it will require a radical change in thinking by the nation's military leaders. There are many problem areas which need to be solved.

The first major problem area is the disjointed organization of the system itself. The Foreign Science and Technology Center belongs to the U.S. Army Materiel Command, but operates under the supervision of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The Threat Analysis Center belongs to the Intelligence and Security Command as does the Technical Intelligence Battalion, but again works under the supervision of the Defense Intelligence Agency. Completely separate from all is the National Security Agency and its analytical elements which, fortunately, are at least colocated with their collection effort. The Central Intelligence Agency is still another completely separate intelligence organization. In theory, the analysis of foreign science and technology is provided by one agency to the other agencies where it is incorporated with each of their collection efforts, from which an analysis emerges. Unfortunately, the theory does not always find its way into practice. In some instances, sensitive intelligence data or procedures are included in reports prepared by the Foreign Science and Technology Center. This restricts the dissemination of the reports to those who are cleared for access and thus many engineers and scientists are eliminated from receiving useful and current information concerning the threat, hence the development of countermeasures is delayed. For the same reason, the information does not get to the troops in the field. The Technical Intelligence Battalion receives some of the information and some of it is passed out at the National Training Center, but this is not fast enough for a large-scale combat operation.

To overcome this deficiency the Army should establish technical intelligence field teams. The size and composition of these teams could vary depending upon the size of the organization they were to support. The smallest practicable team would be four people in light vehicles. This team would provide the initial contact

between the field elements and the technical intelligence system. Each team would support a separate brigade.

A ten-man team would be more realistic for a division-sized unit. This team would serve as a collecting point and as a liaison between the field and the division intelligence system. This team would have specialists from each of the technical services represented and would also provide an evacuation capability to corps headquarters.

At corps headquarters, a slightly larger organization would be required. In addition to technical specialists, administrative and logistical elements would be needed. This would be the lowest level at which classified or sensitive information would be kept. In addition to the collection and analysis duties, this team would also be assigned a training mission to provide foreign materiel training to incoming replacements.

At the field army or theater level, a technical intelligence battalion would be the main support of the theater commander and his staff. This unit would have access to both the intelligence community and to the scientific community through direct contact with the Foreign Science and Technology Center and, thus, could provide guidance to the theater intelligence effort.

There should also be a technical intelligence team or detachment at the major arsenals or commodity command. This team would be a duplication of the team at division level and would provide expertise in foreign technology applicable to that command and some expertise across the entire spectrum of military equipment.

The officers assigned to these units would have the opportunity to work in an engineering lab environment as well as a field environment. With this experience factor, they would do a better job after a few assignments. In the event of an armed conflict, there would be a backlog of personnel available who were experienced. At this point, the reader might be asking, isn't this a description of the system which already exists? The answer is yes, in part, in that the organizations exist, but with one notable exception. In the depot organization these positions are filled with Civil Service people who have no real interest or concern over whether or not the equip-

ment works in the field. The prevailing attitude is, "Don't make waves."

The next major problem area is the officer corps itself. The first aspect of the problem is the promotion system, and the second is that there is no career structure for technical intelligence officers. The promotion system places greater emphasis on short-term success in the form of the officer evaluation report. To compete, the officer must constantly change jobs, duty stations, and get to the proper military schools. In the process of changing jobs, each time he must get glowing officer evaluation reports, even if he has done nothing. With lead times for weapons systems anywhere from 5 to 10 years, what could anyone hope to accomplish in 6 months?

The lack of a career structure places the technical intelligence officer in a hybrid role, in neither technical service nor intelligence. The technical service career system places greater emphasis on a scientific and technical education and an orientation in repair, supply, and procurement. The intelligence service career places greater emphasis on historical trends, political developments, and education that supports this knowledge with assignments that are closely related to the diplomatic field. The basic aspect of military intelligence, that of combat intelligence, was, in the past, largely ignored and left to the combat arms officers whose education or experience may have had no relation to either technical service or intelligence service. The ideal education for an intelligence officer should consist of a background in history and science with a bit of political science and practical engineering.

Another major problem in the technical intelligence arena is the application of new and emerging scientific and technical processes to the military. In several studies, there have been two terms—the "needs" driver and the "technology" driver. In simple terms, the needs driver is expressed as, "I have a job to do, go get me a tool." The technology driver is expressed as, "I have this marvelous device, now go find a job for it." Gordon Ingram's M10 submachine gun was described as a tool in search of a job, since the world already had similar weapons. The problem in this area is peculiar to the scientific community. The desire to search out the

truth of physical phenomena often leads to a device or development with a military application. Wernher Von Braun's desire to build rockets to travel to the stars would have been considered science fiction in the early 1930s; however, when Hitler's military quickly realized the military potential of such rockets, the V1 and V2 rockets were born. In his memoirs, Truman Smith, the U.S. air attache in Berlin in the 1930s, pointed out that one of the failures of his office was the failure to adequately recognize the potential of these weapons. But since American efforts in rocket research were not communicated to the military in a formal manner, Smith probably would not have recognized the input technologies in any case.

Another aspect of this problem is the "will not to believe"; in simple terms, it could be stated as follows: "since I can't conceive of this happening, I therefore choose to ignore all data on the subject." The Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency has done an excellent job of ensuring that new technologies and scientific processes do not get overlooked; however, it does not have an independent intelligence service and thus is forced to rely on the military systems or independent contractors who may or may not have their own intelligence operations and who are often more interested in a sale than in improving a system.

In some cases, the private intelligence operations or market research elements of certain contractors provide information on foreign technology faster than the military system. However, the majority of the major defense contractors do not have anything closely resembling a foreign intelligence office and, of necessity, are forced to rely on whatever the major commodity command supplies them on the threat. In many cases, the current intelligence reports are labeled "non-contractors," which means that design engineers end up working to develop weapons which will only be able to defeat obsolete weapons.

Just from this brief overview of some of the problem areas within the technical intelligence arena, it should be clear that a critical reexamination of this important field is long overdue. Unfortunately, under conditions of peace, and with limited pressure on the military, there is little emphasis to

do very much other than "maintain the state of readiness"; however, when a conflict erupts there will be a rush to get technical information to the rear and play catch up. By then, it will be too late. Action must be taken during



peacetime to have the necessary people and organizations in existence and trained for immediate deployment.

In addition, a concerted technical intelligence program would go a long way toward providing more precise direction and purpose within the R & D process and, ultimately, the defense procurement process.

Technical intelligence is too valuable a source to be ignored. Soldiers need to know in advance what they will be facing on the battlefield and, more importantly, how to counter it. Moreover, technical intelligence will continue to be of central importance to the U.S. efforts to apply advanced technology to improving its overall military posture and, consequently, its national security. As the Strategic Defense Initiative unfolds, the United States can ill afford to repeat the mistakes of the past. ★

Lt. Col. William L. Howard was graduated from the Citadel in 1964 and was subsequently commissioned in the Ordnance Corps. He is a graduate of the Tank-automotive Maintenance Officer Course and the Command and General Staff College. Howard served as commander of the 11th Military History Detachment in France and with the Combined Materiel Exploitation Center in Vietnam. He also served as a company and battalion commander at Fort Polk, La. In 1978, he transferred to Armor and was an instructor at the Armor School in all phases of the Armor Officer Advanced Course. As a Reserve officer, Howard has been attached to DIA and INSCOM. Howard has also served as a consultant on Soviet armor and anti-tank weapons at Battelle Memorial Institute and has worked for Leatherwood Industries. He is presently a member of the Individual Ready Reserve.

■BEGIN,

Surprise!

TRANSLATE

A B O R T

■REPEAT . . .

■by Robert Garian

A recent article in *Government Computer News*, entitled "U.S. Know-How Leaks Out, But Little Is Gathered Back," makes a case for a "better foreign information acquisition system and a vigorous national effort to exploit the world's technical information." (A.A. Aiens, August 30, 1985) This is, of course, an excellent idea that has been pursued for some time. However, there is one considerable problem. As the author points out, "Even if we were able to establish a new and successful program to gather the world's technical knowledge in those areas where we are deficient, who would we have to translate the documents properly?"

The good news is that the capabilities are there, but the bad news is that there is no real support for the effort except by the military and intelligence communities, and that support has too often collapsed. One such collapse involved over 200 professional translators (and support staff), many with advanced degrees in science and engineering and years of abstracting and translating experience.

The scenario goes something like this: We are most rudely awakened by what we thought was a *Tortoise* in the technological race. The *Tortoise* somehow manages to put up the first satellite or builds a computer having a flex-

ible architecture capable of 200 million floating point operations per second. The decision is made to avoid such "technological surprises" in the future. The answer is to initiate the formation of a translation and abstracting effort covering the available scientific and technical literature of the *Tortoise's* country. So far so good.

Once the funding is available, qualified people are sought. But how many people speak *Tortoise* and understand satellite or computer technology? Eventually, somehow, a translation unit is formed and the translators who have been brought aboard are assigned specific technical areas along with, perhaps, a non-*Tortoise* speaking technical analyst who is to "exploit" the information. Still good.

Eventually, the translations start to pile up and the manual information storage and retrieval become noticeably inefficient making it clear to everyone that automation is required. At this point, the translation team manager seeks agency support for the required automation, otherwise he sees the total effectiveness of the effort declining. Now things are not so good.

Even if automation was considered from the beginning, the funding agency will claim that the cost per item translated or abstracted has been higher than expected and that there are real doubts as to when or if a computer system can be obtained to support the work. Or, if a system is finally installed, it will be a limited one

and probably difficult to maintain.

Notice that something is missing here . . . Why is this work being done in the first place? Because it is important to have as much good technical information as possible if we are to maintain a lead over, or even keep up with, our competitors. Falling behind will clearly have great economic and military consequences. Then why have things been allowed to go sour? Several reasons come to mind.

As far as translators are concerned, they are often treated as middle-men, obstacles, by some of the managers and technical personnel of the funding agencies and contractors. Somehow, these managers and technical personnel disregard the fact that they themselves might be unable to read a single word in *Tortoise*. It would seem that there is little regard for learning language, even when it is applied to highly technical materials.

Those who use the translations tend to underestimate the difficulty of translating these materials, yet feel themselves justified in emphasizing the difficulty levels of their own work with the materials that the technical translators provide. They are often in a position to take the credit for what is actually a product of some translator's diligent search and painstaking translation. All this is, of course, very bad from the translator's point of view and ultimately, by the ripple effect, for all concerned.

There is another problem that arises all too often. Where is the chap who

championed the establishment of the *Tortoise* Translation Group (TTG)? He has moved on, of course. And his replacement may not, and usually does not, have the same interest and enthusiasm as the originator. Very soon the morale will decline (as it would in any organization), even if the project continues for some time.

That translations can sometimes take a considerable amount of time is another reason for decline in morale. The funding agency complains to management and management responds by stressing increased production—not better information—causing a predictable decline in quality. And, of course, declining quality then makes the entire effort seem less and less justified to the very people who initiated the downward spiral. As a result, the pride and enthusiasm for doing something important is lost; bickering over monthly statistics sours the workplace. Meanwhile, valuable foreign scientific and technical information is lost.

But the root problem within the boom-bust cycle of technical translation projects is the lack of understanding of what the **long-term** goals of an all-out technical information gathering, translation, abstraction, and dissemination project should be. The short-term goals are clear in the beginning because the original threatening stimulus is clear. With time, the sense of importance and urgency is lost—until the next technological surprise loops us back to the beginning of our scenario.

The only way to gather and exploit the know-how of the world is to treat the entire effort as the complex research, translation, and dissemination effort that it really is. It should be recognized that the translator comes closest to understanding the substance and intent of the material that he or she is working with. It is vital that technical translators be given additional training, be encouraged to attend conferences, so that they can be exposed to current problems and the state of the art, and that they be given a chance to express their hard-won understanding of the author's purpose, approach, and results in a way that can be captured in an evolving data base. Eventually, the data base may become part of a knowledge base (data base + a mechanism

for making inferences).

A complete and serious approach to the exploitation of foreign science and technology would contain the following elements:

- The TTG should maintain a high-quality, evolving data base to control and organize project acquisitions, exploitation, and dissemination of foreign technical information. In other words, automate the housekeeper as much as possible.

- There must be an on-line *Tortoise* dictionary containing all known technical terms, acronyms, eponyms, and units of measurement; in other words, every scrap of information that a translator may need to carry out his work. Much of a technical translator's time is spent in searching for this information.

- There should be an on-line author/subject file for retrieving authors associated with certain subject areas or subject areas associated with certain authors.

- There should be an on-line theoretical file that helps answer the question: "What are the theoretical approaches being applied to the current problems?" After all, this is where the future "surprises" will come from. This is the goal which is always ignored because "nobody understands that stuff anyway."

- There should be a data base for each subject domain that can be used to maintain a list of achievement claims which permits automatic checks for consistency with other claims, and thus provides valuable information as to the state of any particular art in *Tortoise*-land.

- All of this information should be kept current and it should be used for making objective analyses which could then be used by the decision-makers.

- There should be additional software for producing "genealogical trees" that trace the intellectual impact of certain authors (citation analysis) and provide the locations of their ongoing research.

- There should be a special hardware nomenclature file that contains any known specifications. This may allow a certain amount of automatic comparison of hardware and provide information on trends in complexity of construction, sensitivity, and departures in design.

- The overall emphasis should be on quality and accuracy of selected reported information. A monster data base full of inaccuracies and poorly translated materials is not the way to win the race. In terms of quantity, we should not forget that some of the most complete abstracting services in the world are foreign and available for exploitation.

- The translator, who is not yet a computer, should be used and recognized for what he does best: draw attention to relevant and sometimes technologically remarkable facts that we can use to preserve our present technological advantage or, at least, to avoid the ultimate surprise.

While some of these capabilities may already be available, the time is past when the United States can afford to ignore the rest of the world's contributions to science and technology. The recent challenges from Japan in computers and artificial intelligence, Soviet anti-satellite research, and the decline in the enrollment of American students in graduate engineering courses at a time when the enrollment of foreign students is increasing at U.S. universities, all make it very clear that we are becoming more and more dependent on an international flow of scientific and technical information. Translators are a valuable resource. They should be recognized for trying to tap the valuable information and knowledge that is being generated in various parts of the world, information and knowledge which would otherwise be lost.

The combination of technological "hemorrhaging" and the loss of opportunities to take advantage of foreign technology puts the United States at a double disadvantage with respect to other countries, a disadvantage which can only result in an ever increasing loss of power, because knowledge is power. ★



Robert Garian has over ten years of experience in scientific and technical translation, specializing in Soviet computing. Presently at the Library of Congress, he is also the founder of the Wordware Group, a software firm in Arlington, Virginia. He is the author of DAGNY, an automated system design tool, and Block-Solver, an artificial intelligence program.

CEWI RESERVE COMPONENT

Doing the Undoable

by Lt. Col. Gordon Fowkes

During the 1985 G2/MI Commander's Conference at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, a senior MI general officer remarked, "I don't believe RC CEWI is doable." Not only is it doable, it has been done. In June 1985, an ad hoc battalion task force consisting of four MI and ASA companies, known as Task Force 304, successfully demonstrated the feasibility of CEWI within the Reserve Component (RC) during its participation in Starburst 85, a 49th Armored Division field training exercise (FTX) with full division participation for the full two-week annual training period at Fort Hood, Texas. The unit evaluations averaged a rating of 2 (equivalent to a "B") on the U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) Forms 1-R (the RC report card).

The battalion task force consisted of the following units: Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 304th ASA Battalion, Pasadena, Texas, (Headquarters and Service); 351st ASA Company, San Antonio, Texas, (Collection and Jamming); 404th ASA Company, Austin, Texas, (Collection and Jamming); the 900th MI Company, Austin, Texas, (Counterintelligence [CI], IPW, and Imagery Interpretation [II] support); and elements of the 344th Military Intelligence Detachment, Waco, Texas, (DTCO Support).

Task force training conformed to the guidelines established by FORSCOM. In other words, it was done by the book, according to the Battalion Training Management System (BTMS). The battalion training effort focused on the wartime mission and was performed in the field under the normal chain of command.

Since no battalion ARTEP or doc-

trine existed that fit the structure of the task force, a five-paragraph field operations plan (OPLAN) was developed to assign missions and establish a basic doctrine for training purposes. The OPLAN would also provide the framework for a fighting capability should the battalion be mobilized. The mission essential task list was derived from the commander's analysis of the wartime mission expressed in ARTEP and soldier tasks with standards modified by the short time-fused requirements inherent in the division's role within the AirLand Battle. The primary focus of training was aimed at those tasks which supported the meeting engagement followed by a hasty defense or hasty attack by the division.

Since the units had no collective training in the five years prior to 1983, a division command post exercise in the fall of 1983 provided a vehicle to assess the training needs of the battalion. Field management and survival skills were quickly identified as major weaknesses. To overcome shortfalls in the planning and decisionmaking process, a series of staff exercises was conducted. These exercises were aimed at developing practical skills, such as writing operations orders. All directives for field training were published in the five-paragraph field order format to familiarize the units with tactical orders.

The most effective training which occurred during weekend drills was conducted in the field. Field training nearly doubles the amount of available time for training and reduces the manpower drain (details, etc.) that garrison life normally produces. In keeping with the principles of performance-oriented training, the train-

ing focused on recreating, to the extent possible, the conditions soldiers or units would face in war. This training included inputs such as tasking, films, prisoners, tapes, and transmissions, based on ARTEP requirements and soldiers manual tasks. Only those core and primary tasks which support the identified wartime mission were exercised.

Realistic training requires a lot of preparation, but it is worth the effort since the only kind of learning that sticks is that which is actually done (as opposed to seen or heard). Even substandard performance is useful as an ineradicable data base of experience which can be drawn upon by leaders as a part of the instructional process. The complexity of the training experience must be aimed at a level slightly above that which the troops can handle with ease. They must have to reach for it. Commanders were encouraged to push the level of complexity to the point of failure, then back up, retrain and try again. We set high standards which were consistently exceeded.

A number of exercises were conducted which helped prepare the units for participation in Starburst 85. Annual training in 1984, conducted at Camp Bullis, Texas, focused on basic field and combat skills at the individual through company levels and on section technical and operational skills. "Outside" trainers, including the 142d MI Battalion (Utah National Guard), 142d Rear Area Operations Center (Texas National Guard), 95th Maneuver Training Command, and maintenance, administrative, and communications teams from the Readiness Group, Fort Sam Houston, Texas, provided support.

The battalion continued its preparation for Starburst 85 by conducting intensive staff training and field exercises during weekend drills at local training areas in November 1984. In March 1985, the full battalion conducted exercises at Fort Hood, Texas. Training in an SI environment was initiated at the REDTRAIN bunker owned by the 504th MI Group during the March FTX. Emphasis was placed on the development of unit SOPs for moving to the field, operating once in the field environment, and on team building.

During Starburst 85, the main battalion training objective was to exercise the core tasks which support the mission of providing intelligence, electronic warfare, and OPSEC support to the division. These tasks also included ground-based direction finding and intercept capability at the company and battalion levels, the provision of IPW and CI support to brigade operations, and the exercise of imagery interpretation support to the corps under conditions a fully deployed division would expect to encounter in the Airland Battle.

On the first day of the Starburst 85 exercise, company units from the battalion moved from their home stations directly to field locations on the east end of Fort Hood. The location became known as the Grid Square and served as the base location for annual training. The battalion field trains were located in the Grid Square.

Actual field training commenced the following day with a tactical roadmarch and reoccupation of the Grid Square in a more tactically feasible array. Training continued for the next 11 days with around-the-clock operations until the middle of the second week. During this period of time, the entire 49th Armored Division was deployed in the field at Fort Hood conducting tactical training, including battalion and company ARTEPs, and tank and artillery firing. The division, with the exception of the Divarty TOC, moved twice to new locations in the field. The conditions under which the battalion operated duplicated the wartime conditions of mobility and dispersion on the friendly side of the battlefield. In addition, the operations of the division provided a target rich environment for EW training.

The 900th MI Company deployed

CI/IPW support teams to each of the brigades and established a division POW cage in the Division Support Command (DISCOM) area. The 900th also successfully completed an ARTEP externally administered by the 95th MTC. While there was not much PW "play" in Starburst 85, the company provided demonstrations and conducted classes and surveys upon request by all the brigades down to company and battalion levels. Imagery interpreters conducted analysis of hand held imagery shot of field locations of the 49th Armored Division in response to requests from the G2 for camouflage inspection. The 900th also provided file imagery for technical training.

HHC, 304th ASA Battalion, operated as a headquarters and service company, providing base defense of the Grid Square, operating the field trains and the battalion operations center (BOC), and controlling the first field SCIF certified for the conduct of SI operations in a field environment by the Reserve Component. The technical control and analysis element (TCAE) and the operations center of the 351st ASA Company conducted SI operations on a 24-hour basis for ten continuous days in order to exercise intercept, direction finding, and jamming capabilities. Intercept and jamming missions were performed by request for a signals security survey by the division G2; the results of intercept missions were sanitized by the battalion tactical SSO in the format intended for use under wartime conditions. The BOC/TCAE jumped twice under tactical conditions and required less than two hours to set up the last time (using tentage).

The 351st conducted two operations, one collateral (unclassified) to focus on team building, and the other in SI-level intercept and jamming operations against the 49th Armored Division under the tasking control of the battalion TCAE. Jamming and limited imitative deception were performed (only on request and only to a 50% degradation level) by using AN/PRC 77 and RT 524 radio transmitters on tactical maneuver and fire support units involved in field training, including ARTEPs. Substantial headway was made in the development of team spirit and *esprit* within the company. Substantial work in the

NCO development program is still needed. The battalion command sergeant major and Readiness Group personnel devoted much time to training and assisting the 351st.

The 404th ASA Company focused on direction finding (DF) operations and successfully completed a company ARTEP conducted by the 522d MI Battalion which included support of maneuver battalion "force on force" operations. Personnel from the active component units were impressed by the professionalism of the 404th. The company did, however, lack sufficient SI cleared personnel to go beyond the collateral level and conduct proper intercept operations.

Minimum essential support needed to sustain operations for the two-week period was provided by the 522d MI Battalion which supplied 7 AN/KY-57 Vinson FM secure systems, two AN/TYK-5 data analysis central vans for the SCIF, three AN/TRQ-30 intercept systems, and two communications and electronics maintenance vans. The 522d also served as the active component sponsor of the field SCIF.

Spare parts, particularly for EW and communications equipment, were sorely needed. Active component CEWI units have found that the replacement of whole components for EW/communications equipment has proven to be a better solution than a prescribed load list (PLL) for such low density systems. No communications and electronics spare parts were stocked by the 172d Support Group; funding may have been a major contributing factor.

Critical shortages of qualified communications electronics (CE) maintenance personnel were partially relieved by the addition of four persons from the 172d Support Group who were happy to find "real" broken equipment to work on. The 522d also provided technical support and CE spare parts to keep the systems up. However, organizational maintenance personnel relied too heavily on the 522d and had to be restricted in order to make our system work.

Critical shortages of SI cleared personnel limited full SI operations to "Team Red" of the 351st and a few HHC TCAE personnel. Many of the TCAE personnel had performed

(Continued on page 40)



UNMATCHED SPURS:

A False Step in Soviet Doctrine?

by Capt. Ralph Peters

According to a well-known homily, a long-handled spoon is a desirable utensil for supping with the devil. Correspondingly, as the analyst attacks the devilish problem of identifying constants and projecting trends in Soviet military doctrine, he had best equip himself with a long perspective on Russian history. When we approach Soviet doctrinal evolution through the shortcut of recent decades, we soon find ourselves stumbling between infernal contradictions. But, when we survey the Soviets across a landscape of Russian centuries, distinct patterns and recurrent tensions begin to manifest themselves, and Tartar horsemen ride out of the oriental gloom, thundering across the steppes then fading from sight, only to suddenly reappear astride the mechanized stallions of an Operational Maneuver Group.

The Soviet military resembles other national armed forces in that it has been shaped largely in reaction to historical experience and partially by the more subtle, yet nonetheless pervasive, power of national myth, under the stricture of available resources. The contemporary threat to the Soviet Union, perceived or actual, is of a lesser degree of importance than Soviet spokesmen, apologists, or our own more nervous critics of international affairs would have us believe. A

nation's military summarizes that nation's yesterdays.

This is annoyingly clear in our own case. As noted by Russell F. Weigley, the U.S. Army bears conflict in its own bloodlines, with the heritage of long frontier service evident in its adulation of ambitious maneuver, but never quite reconcilable with the industrial mass beneath which it has smothered its more formidable opponents.

In the Soviet model, there are piquant similarities. Just as the cowboy of the plains bears some superficial resemblance to the cossack of the steppes, so much of current Soviet doctrine reflects an obsession with rapid movement over impressive distances. More often than not, the invaders of Russia came mounted, from the east. In its Eurasian vastness, Russian offensive might remained latent to the degree it was not sustainably mobile or even capable of timely concentration. And the successive floods of fierce mounted warriors, Mongols and their mysterious detritus, left lasting eddies in the Russian mentality. The irresistible momentum of the mounted swarm remains a powerful warfighting image for the Soviet.

The other invaders, those who descended from the west and the north, were different. While some of them came on horseback, mobility and

speed were less crucial to their military superiority than were organizational and technological superiority. Although these invaders, too, eventually perished in the snows or disappeared in the vastness, either slaughtered or assimilated, they marked the Russians with a sense of cultural inferiority that haunts contemporary Soviet behavior not only in the military but in every competitive sphere. Belatedly, under Peter the Great, the Russians began aping European military institutions in earnest. Possessed of a great and peculiar strength of will, they soon exceeded the capabilities of their mentors in a limited number of fields—such as military bridging. On New Year's Day, 1814, Czarist engineers mounted an assault crossing of the Rhine to support the passage of the less-technologically-proficient Prussian Army. Today, the Soviets retain the finest combat bridging capability in the world.

Yet these different stimuli to the evolution of military doctrine have never been fully reconciled within any Russian or Soviet military establishment. They have proven antithetical more often than complementary. Perhaps, in similarity to the Russian character itself, haunted by ghosts both European and Asian, these stimuli are finally irreconcilable, fated to remain unmatched spurs. But the

issue is more than just a philosophical nicety, for the Soviet military is currently making a grand effort to meld these divergent heritages together into an invincible bond.

There is one other factor in this doctrinal equation, one which has alternately aided and hindered the performance of successive Russian and Soviet military establishments: the obsession with control, with the reliable obedience of men and the subordination of things. It has long been taken for granted that this mania for perfect control inhibits individual initiative. But the price is even greater than generally realized, the conflict more pervasive.

Ideally, the Soviet commander would like a force arrayed in Western technological splendor, classically disciplined and perfectly responsive to orders, yet capable of racing violently across the battlefield as a modern counterpart to the blood-drenched horsemen from out of the Asian darkness.

The logic of our own military experience tells us that so ambitious and hybrid a goal probably cannot be realized without significant compromises. But, importantly, the Soviets are making conscious efforts that clearly reflect their cultural conditioning, and it remains uncertain as to just how much or how little they will finally achieve. The efforts themselves, however, can be illuminated by historical paradigm.

Peter the Great's sieges of Azov in 1695 and 1696 provide an interesting example of these inherently different approaches to warfighting in conflict and in convergence. Peter had tailored a European-style army from bolt cloth, and he intended to prove the superiority of the Western way of war by applying his regiments to the conquest of the fortress city of Azov. To augment his regulars, Peter contracted a swarm of rather less orderly cossacks. Advised by European siege experts and engineers, who proved disappointing to him in more ways than one, Peter expected to carry the city with discipline and the genius of European tactics, while his cossacks supplied operational security.

Peter's colorful team had a bad first season. His imported experts argued about the art of war and even betrayed him, while his proud ranks of regulars died miserably below the fortress

walls. Only the wide-ranging cossacks brought him any success.

Peter withdrew. A budding systems analyst, he recognized key problems in the need for coordinated joint operations and better logistics. The following year he returned to Azov, equipped with more men, a more resilient supply system, and a small miracle of a freshwater fleet to close off the water approaches to the fortress. This time, Peter conquered. Yet, to his likely annoyance, it was a series of wild cossack initiatives, some of them explicitly contrary to the commander's intent, that finally gagged the fortress open for Peter's regulars.

The Europeanization of the Russian military nonetheless continued at a doubletime. For, if the unruly cossacks had unlocked Azov for Peter, it was the disciplined bayonet that cleared and retained it, if only for a few decades. Regiments of the line equalled staying power, and Russia was expanding with every intent of staying on, a perfect ancestor to the Soviet Union, unlike Gogol's beloved cossacks who made a wild time of it in somebody else's neighborhood, then left their brief conquests, intending, perhaps, "to return for another glorious raid in the Spring," but lacking the taste and discipline requisite to empire.



And the myth-inspiring cossack was ultimately unlike the human mule of Russian serfdom. It was only after centuries of cossack rebellion and Czarist punitive expeditions, culminating in the near-run thing of Pugachov's revolt, that Imperial Russia finally co-opted the cossacks into its service. The spunky flamboyance of the cossacks could not, finally, resist demographic logic and Great Russia's iron will to empire. Useful as light cavalry in war and gendarmes in periods of internal turmoil, the cossacks were nonetheless little more than auxiliaries to the endless ranks of obedient peasants who washed the centuries of Russian glory with their blood. Yet the vanquished cossacks may yet have their revenge, for their ghosts have apparently seduced many a Soviet military man with mythic images of glorious mounted attacks

for which the average Russian has always been ill-suited.

Indeed, over the next centuries a clear pattern emerged that still undercuts today's aggressively offensive Soviet doctrine. Time and time again, from Kunersdorf to Sevastopol, from Borodino to Kursk, the Russian soldier proved himself an absolute master of the stubborn, calculated defense. Even in defeat, well-ordered Russian defenders often exacted a price from the attacker that eventually bankrupted his campaign. On chosen ground, by light of day, the Russian soldier would stalwartly face any foe, and he would die in place rather than turn from his duty—as long as the threat was a straight forward comprehensible one. Hitting the Russian head on seems to bring out the best in him.

But that same Russian soldier has often proved spectacularly inept in the broken attack or on fluid battlefields where mental agility and initiative were prime virtues. If the U.S. Army has sometimes been accused of thriving on confusion, the same cannot be said of the Russian, either Imperial or Soviet. At Austerlitz and Galicia against the Central Powers, at Tannenberg and at the hands of the Japanese and Ottoman Turk, the Russian soldier's combat effectiveness—even his fundamental willingness to fight—decreased rapidly as the level of battlefield confusion increased. The opening stage of Operation Barbarossa was no anomaly: it was exemplary.

While it would be dangerous to generalize to the extent of saying that all you have to do to whip a Russian is mix him up, there is certainly some value in recognizing that the Russian has normally confronted "known" dangers with a courage that has frustrated his enemies, while unexpected blows have routinely caused disproportionate unit disorganization and individual responses ranging from panic to apathy. While surprise may generally be the single most decisive of the principles of war, it seems especially so when it has been achieved against the Russian—except when a sluggish enemy allowed him time to recover.

Then, why, the analyst asks, are the Soviets so obsessed with offensive operations? If their soldiers make better defenders than attackers, why

don't they weight their doctrine toward the defense?

Again, the answer lies in the grim night of Russian history. At first consideration, the Russian military experience would seem to prove Clausewitz' dictum that the defense is inherently stronger than the attack, especially as the attack is prolonged in time and space. This, coupled with the defensive talents of the native Russian soldier, would lead to the seemingly logical conclusion that any Soviet commander who knows his national high ground would invariably prefer the defense. Further, this defense would initially be very elastic, opening with a long delay that traded space for time and dissipated the attacker's successive waves of strength before attempting to present him with a breakwater Poltava or Stalingrad. Only after the attacker's tide had begun to ebb, following this great defensive battle or series of battles, would the Soviet force pass over to the counterattack.

But their justly-famous strategic defenses have been terribly expensive for the Russians, and never more so than in the most recent instance. The cost in human misery and physical destruction paid by the Soviet Union during its Great Patriotic War was so great that no Soviet would ever choose to pay it again, given an alternative. The Soviets have worked very hard for all that they have today and they are interested in preserving it.

Secondly, Soviet military theorists have studied both their own antecedents and classical military theory in depth. Neo-Clausewitzians, they recognize that, while the defense may be inherently stronger and their national character better suited to it, defensive operations alone cannot ultimately win wars. The most that strictly defensive operations can achieve is to exhaust an aggressor. But the defender must eventually make the transition to the offensive if he seeks victory. Further, the attacker sets the terms. And the Russians have had hard luck playing military games by rules that others have imposed. The Soviets have been sold on the criticality of retaining the initiative the hard way. And they have arrived at the position that, if war is inevitable, then it should be fought on some-

one else's soil; and, if only the offensive delivers the final victory, then the price might as well be paid at the outset. They view a swift offensive victory, however bloody, as ultimately cheaper than a prolonged war of attrition that might leave their nation in ruins yet again.

Convinced that the most desirable way to wage war is offensively, the Soviets have attempted to identify prime techniques of execution



through the dissection of historical examples and field experimentation. Yet, behind the clinical abstractions and dour faces of their military elite, there is romance at play as well. The Operational Maneuver Group (OMG), bogeyman of the NATO analytical community, offers a classic example of rational doctrine formulation hot-wired by cultural predisposition.

While the OMG probably has not found its final shape organizationally, its conceptual role seems clear. Highly mobile, combined arms subunits, controlled by a streamlined "high-tech" headquarters, will be committed to aggressively exploit a gap (perhaps specially created) in the enemy's defenses, riding deep into the operational rear, destroying high-priority, pre-identified targets and targets of opportunity. The goal is to thoroughly disrupt the enemy's operational defense, both by inflicting real damage and by forcing the defender to over-react, diverting critical combat power from the fight at the line of contact (however ragged that line may be) to play hide and seek with the dispersed OMG subunits. It is the classic raid repackaged for the electronic age, yet flavored with the myths of old Russia.

Of critical interest, the Soviets probably have not solved the many critical support issues involved in sustaining army or front-level OMGs. But they are sold on the concept, and the organization is refining itself.

But there are weaknesses behind

the OMG's seductive glamour. If the enemy commander in whose sector the OMG is committed proves level-headed, he may find that the OMG subunits are actually inflicting relatively little damage. Instead of diverting critical combat units on a high-speed armored chase, he may recognize that the most effective way to neutralize an OMG is with attack helicopters and fixed-wing aircraft. And, if this wise commander has

established a healthy defense in depth from the outset, he has already effectively countered the worst aspects of the OMG threat. Further, there is a strong possibility the OMG will rapidly suffocate itself, too ponderous to sustain its effective forward motion far from its operational base. The OMG, for all its armored punch, shares many of the same general vulnerabilities of airborne forces. Finally, an OMG gone static would constitute little more than enhanced range training for attack aircraft, or even for long-range artillery systems. While an OMG could pose a serious threat, should the Soviets get it all exactly right, there is an alternative model of events in which an OMG would prove little more effective than Stuart's squandered ride during the critical operational phase of the Gettysburg campaign.

Stuart's swashbuckling, ineffectual jaunt brings us back to the odd romance of the OMG. For behind the analytical facade of the Soviet military theory rides history mis-remembered in the best traditions of the Old South. The OMG concept, for all its theatrical grandeur, may not be fully realizable in battle. But, considering the grip the unrefined notion swiftly gained on Western analysts, it is easy to imagine how uncritically it may have been accepted by the Soviets. The OMG concept *sounds* like a winner—especially to those who do not have to roll up their sleeves and make it work. It is the stuff successful high-level briefings are made of. For

every field commander who raised his voice to worry about the obvious problems of ammunition and fuel resupply, command and control, the OMG's extreme vulnerability, should it prove incapable of retaining the initiative, and the enormous problems of targeting and intelligence support, there must have been a dozen other high-ranking Soviets who were captivated by this artist's vision of modern cossacks (or Tartars/Mongols/dark mythic horsemen) with electronic swords, galloping across the rich North German Plain.

Given his cultural predisposition, the myths and totems to which the mature Soviet is heir, the mental image of the OMG must have an irresistible appeal. Now this in itself does not completely degrade the concept's potential value. The emotional strength transferred from such cultural confluences can often overpower enormous practical problems. Just as the cold defenders of Bastogne were heirs to the "non-battle battle" traditions of Valley Forge, the OMG conjures up a succession of powerful warfighting images for the Russian, from raging nomadic tribes through cossacks raiding a swollen Poland, to Czarist cavalymen interdicting Napoleon's line of retreat and wrecking his support infrastructure. Even strictly Soviet myth-history offers an OMG grandfather in the First Cavalry Army of the Civil War, and an immediate parent in the World War II mobile group.

And Tuchatschewski's ambitious maneuvers of the mid-nineteen thirties, staged just before other ambitions brought about his end, sound awfully OMG-like in eye witness accounts. When the Soviets introduce an OMG into their war games, its commitment must elicit an emotional response similar to that which a Fort Knox graduate feels upon hearing Garry Owen's sudden cascade.

Yet there remains one supremely critical area in which the OMG, actuality and mystique, presents a direct threat to the accepted Soviet way of war. There is an implied independence of action, reminiscent of Peter the Great's cossack auxiliaries, that actually threatens the functional structure as well as the philosophical foundation of the Soviet military. As noted above, the Russians have

always been obsessed with autocratic control, and never more so than in imperial Russia's Soviet incarnation. The Soviets have a Newtonian clockwork conception of the operational battlefield, in which the tactical parts only matter to the extent that they interact to support an overarching plan. All of the cogs, from platoon through army, must interlock perfectly to drive the front machine. And fronts are merely tools of the theater. At all times, the activities of subunits are, ideally, directed efforts. Whether in the mists clutching at the Pratzen Heights, or at the gates of Warsaw in August, 1920, independent decision-making by subordinate Russian commanders has led to embarrassment on the battlefield. This historical experience, coupled with the cultural predisposition to an autocratic sociopolitical model, has led to a situation where the General Staff would probably like to exercise direct control of OMG subunits, if the C³I infrastructure could be made to effectively support it.

It is unlikely that such extreme micro-management can be reliably executed over the requisite span of time in contemporary warfare. While the future of battlefield electronics undoubtedly holds surprises we cannot yet imagine, at present the commanders of OMG-subordinated combined arms formations would be forced to make genuinely independent decisions at least some of the time. And this is where the unmatched spurs become entangled, where the powerful stimuli come into direct conflict. Only if the OMG can be infused with wild cossack energy and then, without dissipating that energy, if it can be applied with surgical accuracy, might it meet the implied standard of performance. Yet, in reality as opposed to myth, the average Soviet is no better suited to the demands of soldiering in an OMG than the average American is suited to be a cowboy. In fact, the OMG makes demands that are peculiarly antithetical within the Soviet system. The concept takes a natural defensive soldier, who expects and responds well to exacting orders, and implicitly expects him to operate according to commander's intent on a battlefield of unparalleled confusion. And he must do this within an uncompromising battlefield autoc-

racy. Behind the dynamic concept that has so terrorized Western analysts lies a special Russian schizophrenia. The OMG would have a much better chance of success if it were manned by Americans.

Given the actual qualities of the Soviet soldier and the relative fallibility of the myth of the Russian as bold horseman, it is likely that the autocratic system of command and control will continue to be the prime constant of applied Soviet doctrine, even with its many weaknesses. Iron orders from on high, though imperfect, continue to be the engine that best drives the Soviet war machine. Intermittent calls for more initiative from junior personnel, such as those that have lately appeared in Soviet military journals, are about as likely to yield rapid and meaningful results as would a series of articles in U.S. Army publications calling for absolute subservience to higher authority in all things. What the Soviets require is not merely a superficial change in behavior, but a profounder change in national character. And this is not simply for the asking, but must be bred into men over tens of decades, if not centuries.



In the end, the Soviet military will realize this, and they will continue to rely heavily on methods and techniques of warfighting that are well-suited to their national character. They will stress simplicity and control, although their enormous bureaucracy will undoubtedly produce many a whacky aberration along the way. Their present confusion is partly the result of the electronics/information revolution that threatens to either pass them by or subvert their system of governing, or both, and partly the result of the most ambitious attempt to revise a national military doctrine that has ever been undertaken by a major power. Today, for the first time, the Soviet military has an essentially free hand to overhaul its doctrine without significant political interference. The changes, at least those on paper or currently in evidence, are so dramatic that they have often dazzled Western analysts, who have only

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The Kremlin's Russian Superiority Complex

by Dr. Albert L. Weeks




In his 1914 essay, "On the National Pride of the Great Russians," Vladimir Lenin claimed that whatever is good for the Great Russian people is "automatically" good for the toilers of the whole world.¹ The "national pride of the Great Russians," Lenin said, "coincides with the Socialist interests of all other proletarians [in the world]." After the Bolshevik coup d'etat against the Provisional Government in November 1917, Lenin updated his views about the superior revolutionism of the Russian working class. This took the form of his insistence that the Bolshevik Revolution "model" should be imitated by national movements elsewhere. Soviet-like dictatorships of the proletariat were to be exported via the global apparatus of the Third Communist International (Comintern), which was Lenin's special creation and a reflection of his personal pan-Russism.

Leninist pan-Russism also lay at the heart of the Lenin-Stalin policy of reorganizing the non-Russian borderland nations and ethnic groups around the Great Russian center. The celebration of the 60th anniversary of the culmination of this Russian-led empire-building occurred in 1982 marking the establishment of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics by decree of the All-Union Congress of Soviets on Dec. 30, 1922. The USSR, formed in 1922, included over a dozen major nations and/or ethnic groups (White Russians, Ukrainians, peoples in the Transcaucasus, or others composing the forerunner of the new "federated" union, the Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic [RSFSR]). These peoples were forcibly incorporated.²

Marx and Engels on the Phenomenon

"Russia's policy is changeless," Karl Marx once observed. "Its methods, its tactics, its maneuvers may change, but the Pole Star of its policy—world domination—is a fixed star." Marx also said, "The Russian bear is certainly capable of anything, so long as he knows the other animals he has to deal with are capable of nothing."³

Frederick Engels echoed Karl Marx when he warned in 1894 that the Russian socialists viewed themselves as the "Chosen People" who would lead



the world social revolution. In his warning, he declared, "The time for Chosen People is forever past."⁴ Engels' statement was somewhat premature as both Hitler and Mussolini would prove with

their own biases toward leading classes, peoples, or races. Both these 20th-century dictators freely admitted to having learned a great deal from the Russian "Marxists." Though Engels died in 1895, Lenin's pan-Russist Comintern, founded in 1919, provoked its mirror image in the Nazi-Fascist anti-Comintern alliance.

Lenin on "Great-Russian Chauvinism"

Lenin had once said, in speaking of the messianic (the sense of "world-historical mission") role of the Russian proletariat, that "we [Russians] had fought a monster [as the result of which] history has confronted us with the immediate task which is the *most revolutionary* of any country." (emphasis is Lenin's own).⁵ The Russians, he said on another occasion, had "undergone immeasurably graver trials than those of any other countries."⁶ Then and now, a recurring Russian adjective for

this idea of "superlatively tested" in immeasurably



severe trials is *zakalyonnii* a word related to "tempered" (as of steel) used by the Soviets to characterize the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) in flattering comparison to other parties or

movements abroad. In other words, Lenin was one of the first to establish this Russian-superiority motif within Bolshevism. Yet he was also one of the first to deplore the way the Russian superiority complex could get out of hand. Thus, Lenin could complain: "Scratch some Communists and you will find Great Russian chauvinists."⁷ In complaining, Lenin seemed to suggest that his own fellow Bolsheviks were guiltier of such feelings of Russian superiority than the anti-Bolshevik parties!

It seems odd that followers of the creed of Marxism should be guilty of super-patriotism! Didn't Marx say that the world's proletarians know no boundaries and that their interests, grievances, and revolutionary calling take the form of an *international workers' movement*? Wasn't Lenin himself contemptuous of those Russian socialists who, in World War I, supported the Russian Tsarist state and its national war aims in alliance with the capitalist West? All this is true.

But Lenin was a *Russian*, despite his internationalist protestations. In his somewhat contradictory and stressed temperament, Vladimir Ilyich Ulyanov (Lenin) could combine feelings of personal superiority with appearances of disarming modesty. His insistence on what he called the role of "dictators" played at crucial times in history by outstanding leaders could be crossed with notions of decentralized, autonomous rulership by localities, factories, ethnic groups, and so on. Whether from outright hypocrisy or more likely from contradictions within his complex personality (maybe even partial insanity in his later years, when the effects of alleged advanced syphilis may have affected his mind), Lenin displayed the "split personality" (*dvoinik*) syndrome so common in Russian characters—fictitious or real. Likewise, there was tension in his mind between the notion of the Russian proletariat as the vanguard, or chosen class, and the old Marxist notion of international solidarity without any national predominance, domination, racism, or "Chosen People" label.

Another force playing upon Lenin, besides his Russian-ness, can be found deeply imbedded within orthodox Marxism: the notion of large economic units and large states as vehicles for realizing "socialism"—in the Marxist sense of dictatorship supposedly ushering in its opposite, the "withered" non-state of a society of freewheeling toilers. Unlike "utopian socialists," so called by the Marxist-Leninists, main-line Marxism, its claimants insisted, *opposed* small, autonomous "communes" and *avored* large, highly-centralized and mechanized (today, computerized) economic, administrative, and political units. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics represented the culmination, Soviet officials have always maintained, of such centralization and "gigantism." Likewise, the huge state and collective farms, and the industrial syndicates and trusts, all developed in the USSR as the five-year plans unfolded, are equated with Marx's own instructions on ushering in socialism.

At the same time, in contradictory fashion, Lenin deplored the mushrooming of "bureaucratism" within the young Soviet republic (Lenin died in 1924 before the Frankenstein monster of Soviet bureaucratism had begun to take on its current form under Stalin and the plans of the early 1930s). On the other hand, Lenin boldly envisioned what he called a "single Worldwide Soviet Republic."⁸ The Russian Marxist simply relied on the essentials of Marx and Engels—the latter of whom once said, "The proletariat can use only the form of the one, indivisible (world) republic."⁹ "The amalgamation of all nations in a supreme unity," to quote Lenin, is the socialist counterpart of what Marxist-Leninists call the "internationalization of the world capital." The "fusion of all nations," said Lenin, is based upon "economic considerations as well as the instinct and consciousness of internationalism and democracy."¹⁰

Lest we ourselves appear to be guilty of "racism," the obvious must be admitted here—that a sense of

national pride is probably not monopolized by any single nation-state in the world! Russians are no less guilty, in their 1,000-year history, of patriotism and its hyperbolized form, chauvinism, than a

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number of other countries. But as Russian emigres sometimes point out, Bolshevik-Communist ideol-

ogy legitimizes, supports, and encourages an inordinate amount of expansionistic chauvinism that goes far beyond the mean of Russian historical and cultural experience. Lenin implicitly recognized what he called the Bolshevik penchant to go to such extremes—in his declaration, for example, to “wage war on Great Russian chauvinism.” Lenin made his declaration precisely at the time (1922) when the first USSR was being formed, under the nationalities policy administered so brutally by Lenin’s choice as General Secretary of the party, Josef Stalin!

Stalin on the Phenomenon

Like Mussolini and Hitler, and a number of other earlier dictators (such as Napoleon), Stalin was not a native of the land that he later dominated (in Mussolini’s case, he had been long absent from his native land before his triumphant return). Hitler was an Austrian; Napoleon, dictator of France, was born on the island of Corsica. Stalin, too, was an outlander, a Georgian, and like so many of the early leaders of Russia, had been “imported” from abroad. Even today, the top Soviet leaders, associated with Brezhnev, were born at some distance from the capital of central Great Russia—Brezhnev, although a Great Russian, grew up in the Ukraine; ditto most of his closest allies in the Politburo; Khrushchev also was born away from the center, on the Russo-Ukrainian border. Ditto Chernenko, Andropov, and now Gorbachev.

Such out-of-area additions to the central leadership of their adopted or readopted countries soon become ardent nationalists. This was particularly true of Stalin. In fact, Stalin carried further, to unparalleled heights, Lenin’s intimations about Russian claims to world leadership. Under Stalin, the phenomenon acquired outright racist, emotional, and therefore dangerous overtones.

The first form of it was the reglorification of Tsarist heroes and their exploits in the name of ancient “Rus’.” Sergei Eisenstein, the film producer, was rallied to the cause in the 1930s and produced at times saccharine tributes to Great Russian superiority. Ivan the Terrible was transformed into a wise and humane leader, for example, despite the fact that he is known to have dispatched “provocateur” critics of his regime by impaling them with his pikestaff in front of the Kremlin! The composer Sergei Prokofiev was recruited, among other things, to glorify the Russian fighting spirit in the 13-scene opera, “War and Peace,” written in 1941-2. Words are put into the mouths of various characters from Leo Tolstoy’s novel, **War and Peace**, which the Russian writer never had them speak.

At the end of World War II, Stalin became rapturous about his adopted people: “I would like to drink a toast to the health of our Soviet people and above all, to the Great Russian people, because it is the most outstanding nation of all the nations located in the Soviet Union . . . It deserves universal recognition in the war as the leading force in the Soviet Union among all the peoples of our coun-

try . . . It is the leading people, because it has a clear mind, firm character, and endurance.”¹¹ Note here: “it” has a “clear mind,” as though the Great Russian *Herrenvolk* of the multi-national union were a gigantic, collective personality.

Recent Outbreaks of the Phenomenon

The ascending power of Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev saw the escalation of the phenomenon of Great Russian super-patriotism as well as pan-Russism in



the international sense. This reached an apex of sorts on the occasion of Brezhnev’s 75th birthday commemorations, which were prolonged for a week, from December 15 through December 22, 1981.

Print and broadcast media, as well as ruling-party leaders throughout the Soviet Bloc, all voiced their sentiments concerning the “greatest statesman of our times,” Leonid Brezhnev. Significantly, there was a bold assertion of Russian chauvinism in what some Soviet leaders close to Brezhnev had to say on his birthday itself (December 19). One such example was a statement by E. A. Shevardnadze, First Secretary of the Georgian Communist Party, now Soviet Foreign Minister: “The Russian people is the stand and bearer of Socialist civilization. The Russian people, by their nature, is revolutionary. And the outstanding revolutionary of our times is Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev . . . The penetrating intellect, the generous nature, and the kind heart of the Russian people—these constitute a phenomenon that is obvious to everyone . . . The Russian people is a terrifying presence and is inexhaustible in combat with an enemy . . . The Russian people has become the Elder Brother among the fraternal peoples. Likewise, Leonid Ilyich is the great son of the Russian people and has become the flesh and blood of all nations of the world.”¹²

Reading this, some people of the generation who lived through the dictatorships of Mussolini and Hitler, and the wartime propaganda of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, may be hard-pressed to find even *il Duce* and *der Fuehrer* claiming that each was the leader of the whole world. They, indeed, sought such global domination, but this writer does not recall that either claimed that he was more than the autocratic embodiment of his own *populi* or *Volk*, and that was dangerous

enough! However, in the shower of accolades bestowed upon Brezhnev, who was the most honored and decorated leader in all of Soviet history, the world-hegemonist note, with its clear Russian-racial overtones, was sounded clearly, unmistakably.

Many are reluctant to concede outright racism to the Soviet regime. After all, they protest, Lenin, Stalin, Khrushchev, Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko and Gorbachev have never hauled out an "Aryan race" myth. And the term *Herrenvolk* (Master Race) does not appear in Soviet Communist ideology and propaganda. All these statements, of course, are true. But this is not the whole story.

First, Lenin, leaning heavily on Marx and Engels, endowed the "working class," or "proletariat," with the superior traits of a ruling class. In its name, a "dictatorship of the proletariat" would be established. In Lenin's case, the Russian leader added the pan-Russist note that the "Russian proletariat [is] the vanguard of the international proletariat."¹³

Second, under Stalin and his successors, up to the present day, including the regime of Mikhail Gorbachev, Soviet ideology, none to subtly, has developed the idea that the Russian people possesses certain superlative characteristics. To Stalin, "it has a clear mind"; to latterday neo-Stalinists of the type who eulogized Brezhnev on his 75th birthday in December 1981, "it"—the Russian people—again is described as having superior characteristics, as "Elder Brother" of the world's peoples, no less. Finally, one leader, Leonid Ilyich Brezhnev, was described as one of these superior Russians, since he was the "great (*velikii*) son of the Russian people."

Ergo, from Brezhnev on down to that brave Russian soldier, who is "terrifying in combat," all of Soviet Russia today is presented in Marxist-Leninist ideology, as construed in Moscow, as a multi-national entity which has a special *Staatsvolk* (leading governmental core of people) at the summit of power, a single leader (*Vozhd'*—equivalent to "Duce," "Fuehrer," or "Caudillo"), and which asserts its Soviet-Russian leadership of the "world-revolutionary movement" and "process" on this basis, as in the Brezhnev claim so often repeated throughout his "Collected Works," that the USSR is "in the vanguard" of the world movement.¹⁴

A recent example of the latter was the resounding rebuke, delivered shortly after party ideologist Mikhail Suslov's mortal stroke, and by elements believed to be associated closely with Brezhnev, against the Italian Communist Party (PCI). In the January 24, 1982 nearly full-page *Pravda* condemnation of the PCI, the Russians addressed the Italian people directly, over the heads of the PCI. They thus indicated that Moscow would become responsible for the Italian working class and respond to its "demand" for a truly "representative" Communist party.

Successive October Revolution holiday greetings, 1982 through 1985, from admiring Communist parties and fronts worldwide continue specifically to single out the *Russian* proletariat, the *Russian* people, and so on, for praise. Likewise, anniversaries of non-Russian republics, into the present Gorbachev period, use the expression "elder-brother people" for the Great Russians while attributing "progressive influence" to the Russian core centered about Moscow over the non-Russian borderlands, under both Tsars and commissars.

In the military press, too, into the current period, the Brezhnev tradition of harking back to Tsarist army victories as "progressive" for the given conquered non-Russian peoples has been continued and updated. One example of this, among many, can be found in the June 1985 *Kommunist Vooruzhennikh Sil* (*Communist of the Armed Forces*). The article is replete with tributes to the heroic, as well as "progressive," exploits of the Tsarist army, including even late 19th-century interventions (but notably excluding the Russo-Japanese War of the next century).

Gorbachev has personally lent his rhetorical support to the Great Russian line—however, not always smoothly. A notorious *lapsus-lingua* was



committed by the General Secretary during his June 25, 1985 street conversation with a throng gathered around him and Ukrainian First Secretary Valdimir Shcherbitsky in Kiev. According to the Moscow TV transcript, the talking went like this:

Gorbachev: "Listen we coped after the imperialist war, when the country was in ruins."

Shcherbitsky: "After that . . ."

Gorbachev: "Nothing was left after that, but we coped. We coped. They predicted that Russia would never rise again after the war. [World War II] But we rose again. They were predicting that it would take 50 to 100 years . . ."

Shcherbitsky: "Fifty years, 100 years . . ."

Gorbachev: "For all people who are striving for good, Russia—the Soviet Union, I mean—that is what we call it now, and what it is in fact—for them it is a bulwark."¹⁵

For Gorbachev to have used interchangeably "Russia" and the "Soviet Union" was a revealing slip-of-the-tongue which his apologetic "I mean" did little to rectify.

In a sense, this was Gorbachev's perhaps unconscious way of continuing the line he himself had voiced at the 40th anniversary celebrations of V-E Day, May 8, 1985, which appeared in *Pravda* the following day. Echoing the famous postwar toast of Josef Stalin (whom, by the way, Gorbachev singled out for praise), Mikhail Gorbachev proclaimed: "Soviet people of the various nationalities . . . were rallied and inspired by the Great Russian people, whose courage, perseverance, and unconquerable spirit were an inspiring example of unbending will for victory."

Taken together, the Lenin-Stalin sovietization program of the lands formerly under the old Tsarist empire, the Bolshevik "model" concept tailored into Lenin's Comintern, and the Stalinist and lately "neo-Stalinist" recrudescence of Great Russian chauvinism in today's USSR add up to a contemporary phenomenon that is of enormous importance in world affairs, world peace, and if it comes to it, the waging of a war in the name of the Great Russian "mission." It remains for the reader to decide whether the world now is faced with what some Russian emigres call "Red Fascism," what some could call Red racism, and whether U.S. based information and orientation officers, civilian or military, should take notice of the phenomenon in their lectures and discussions of Soviet expansionism and the Soviet military threat. Up to now, the subject has been neglected. ★



Footnotes

1. Elliot R. Goodman, *The Soviet Design for a World State* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1960), p.52.
2. Richard Pipes, *The Formation of the Soviet Union Communism and Nationalism* (New York: Atheneum, 1980).
3. Paul W. Blackstock and Bert F. Hoselitz, *The Russian Menace to Europe by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels* (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1952), p. 106, p. 162. See also Hans Kohn, *Pan-Slavism Its History and Ideology* (New York: Vintage Books, Random House, 1960, 2nd ed.).

4. Ibid., p. 230, p.239.

5. V. I. Lenin, *What Is To Be Done?* (New York: International Publishers, 1969), p. 29.

6. Ibid.

7. Goodman, p. 68.

8. V. I. Lenin, *Sochineniya* (Works) 4th ed., Moscow, Vol 24, p.656.

9. Julian Towster, *Political Power in the USSR* (New York: Oxford).

10. Ibid., pp. 55-56.

11. *Bolshevik* (CPSU journal, forerunner of contemporary *Kommunist*), No. 10, May 1945, pp. 1-2.

12. *Pravda*, December 20, 1981, p. 2.

13. Lenin, *What Is to be Done?*, p. 29.

14. *Vozhd'* was used in a speech by party secretary Andrei Kirilenko, *Pravda*, Oct. 15, 1976.

This is the only time, to the author's best knowledge, that Brezhnev has been so described. In addition to *Vozhd'*, Brezhnev has been called *bol'shoi strateg* (great military strategist) and *bol'shoi teoretik* (great theoretician). *Velikii* (great, but a few decibels higher than *bol'shoi*) is customarily applied to Lenin as it once was to Stalin—as in *velikii myslitel'* (great thinker), etc. Brezhnev apparently has not earned this level of greatness.

15. "Gorbachev's Slip of the Tongue," *Radio Free Europe—Radio Liberty Research*, July 3, 1985.

Dr. Albert Weeks teaches politics at New York University. He holds an M.A. in Russian History from the University of Chicago and a Ph.D. in Political Theory/Soviet Government from Columbia University. Weeks has written numerous books and articles on the Soviet Union. He will soon publish a definitive, comprehensive compilation of Soviet quotations, indexed by topic, including statements by the latest leaders, under the title *The Kremlin Speaks*.

American Intervention in Russia



1918-1920

by Capt. Richard Groller

Part II. The Siberian Intervention

As the first American troops began arriving at Murmansk, negotiations between America and Japan were drawing to a close on the issue of intervention in Siberia. On July 17, 1918, President Wilson's final plans for intervention in Russia were disclosed to a select few. Two days later, it was announced to the American people that the Japanese government had reached a decision in favor of joint American-Japanese intervention in Siberia.¹ The plan involved military assistance to the Czechs and general economic aid to Russia. The Czechs had rebelled against Austria-Hungary and were eager to establish their own nation. With guidance and support from France, they fought Germans and Austrians within Russia and were eager to be reunited with other Czech forces in France. For these reasons, the United States decided to help them by dispatching enough forces to leave the Czechs free to ensure the safe arrival of their comrades from the interior.²

The American public did not learn of President Wilson's Russian intervention policy until August 4, when it was announced by acting Secretary of State Frank L. Polk. This policy was put forth in the famous "Aide

Memoire" which outlined the future course of American military action in Russia. The following excerpt reveals the crux of American concern toward Russia at that time: "It is the clear and fixed judgment of the government of the United States, that military intervention there would add to the present confusion in Russia rather than cure it, injure her rather than help her, and that it would be of no advantage in the prosecution of our main design, to win the war against Germany. It cannot, therefore, take part in such intervention or sanction in principle . . . Military action is admissible in Russia, only to help the Czecho-Slovaks consolidate their forces and get into successful cooperation with their Slavic kinsmen and to steady any efforts at self-government or self-defense in which the Russians themselves may be willing to accept assistance. Whether from Vladivostok or from Murmansk and Archangel, the only legitimate object for which American and Allied troops can be employed is to guard military stores . . . needed by the Russian forces and to render such aid as may be acceptable to the Russians in the organization of their own self-defense."³

Along with the disclosure of the Russian intervention policy, the United States announced that it and Japan would send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok to occupy that area and to safeguard the Czechs' rear area as they moved westward through Siberia toward the border of European Russia.⁴

During this same period, hostilities between the Bolsheviks and Czech forces erupted. Originally, these two groups were allied against the Germans but a rift, resulting from Soviet agitation, ultimately developed into an armed struggle. On July 6, the **New York Times** reported that Czech forces had defeated the Bolsheviks in the first battle along the Trans-Siberian Railroad in Irkutsk, just as the first U.S. Marines landed in Vladivostok to "protect foreign interests during the fight between Czech and Bolshevik forces."⁵

The Main Force

On August 3, 1918, Allied troops began to land at Vladivostok. Among them were British troops from Hong Kong followed by French troops from Indochina. Although the sending in of other than American and Japanese troops was not proposed directly in

the Aide Memoire, both the British and French governments were anxious to be represented, and they understood that there would be no objection to them sending troops.⁶

Maj. Gen. William S. Graves was chosen to command the American Expeditionary Force (AEF). This contingent was sent to Vladivostok to cooperate with a Japanese military force in assisting the Czechs to clear Siberia of German and Austrian prisoners of war who had organized a small army and were trying to get control of that part of Russian territory.⁷ The entire American military expedition was comprised of approximately 7,000 men. Japan sent a similar number under the terms of the United States-Japanese Joint Operations Agreement.

The AEF was made up of the following units: The 27th and 31st Infantry regiments, one field hospital, one ambulance company, and Company D of the 53rd Telegraph Battalion, all from U.S. forces in the Philippines, and 5,000 men from the 8th Division at Camp Fremont, Calif.⁸

On August 14, Graves set sail from San Francisco on Transport Thomas, which carried 40 officers and 1,889 enlisted men. Initially escorted by the old U.S. battleship Oregon and the gunboat Vicksburg, the Transport Thomas was faster than both of these ships. By noon on August 15, Graves, impatient at having to stop and wait for his escort, directed that the Thomas proceed alone.

Immediately upon Graves' arrival at Vladivostok his problems began. The senior ranking Allied commander in Russia, Japanese Gen. Kikuza Otani, asked that the American troops be placed under his jurisdiction. Graves refused, stating that he had no orders to place American troops under Japanese jurisdiction.⁹

Unfortunately, relations between Japan and the United States, however cordial, were based upon mutual distrust. American involvement in Russia was the direct result of U.S. fears that Japan would colonize those areas of Russia that came under its influence, thereby doing more harm than good. The scars left by the Russo-Japanese War obviously had not entirely disappeared. The Allies were certain that every class of Russian would prefer the Germans to the Japanese.¹⁰

As for the American soldiers, they were unsure as to what they were supposed to accomplish in Russia. Graves decided to strictly adhere to the Aide Memoire. As a result, disagreements arose among the Americans, their allies, and the White Russian Military Provisional Government, led by Adm. A.V. Kolchak. "Some American soldiers believed that their purpose was to aid the Czechoslovaks, who were supposedly fighting their way out of Siberia. Others believed that American troops were to be used to recapture the German and Austrian prisoners who were running loose in Siberia and were reported to be gathering arms and moving back toward Germany. Still others thought that the American Army was to lend its assistance in the establishment of an Eastern Front against Germany. Lastly, many believed that the American Army had been sent to Siberia to crusade against Bolshevism. Graves found that this last idea had been generally accepted among American officers and men."¹¹ He, therefore, set a policy at the outset regarding the Bolsheviks as *potential* enemies rather than enemies *per se*.

Graves, however, did not share the State Department's benevolent attitude toward the regime of Adm. Kolchak. In fact, he came to regard it as an ineffective tyranny. After the autumn of 1918, he forbade American soldiers to engage in any military operations against the partisan bands which were beginning to harass Kolchak's lines of communication. The Americans, therefore, confined themselves to policing those sections of the Trans-Siberian Railroad which were entrusted to their care.¹²

Aside from these troubles and those resulting from chronically strained relations between the Americans and two local cossack chieftains, Semenov in Chita, and Kalmikoff in Khabarovsk, who governed the regions under their control with a good deal of brutality, and who were openly supported by Japan, America's duties were largely without incident while World War I continued.¹³ In fact, American troops cooperated with the Japanese in the occupation of Blagoveschensk where 15,000 Teuton prisoners were disarmed.¹⁴ They also secured lines of communication, maintained the railroad, and protected

and transported military stores under their jurisdiction. Meanwhile, Graves spent his time on diplomatic tasks and inspected the American fronts along the Ussuri River and elsewhere. It was after the Armistice that most of the problems among the American troops began.

Although the Armistice ended hostilities on the western front, it had no effect on the strife that existed between the various Russian factions. It also changed the status of Allied troops in Siberia whose presence could no longer be justified on grounds relating to the war against Germany. American troops did not understand why they remained in Siberia, or why they had been sent there in the first place. While England, France, and Japan were already committed to an anti-Bolshevik policy, Graves' strict interpretation of the Aide Memoire resulted in the withdrawal of American troops to the vicinity of Vladivostok.

Secretary of War Newton Baker had his own solution to the problem: "My own judgment is that we ought simply to order our forces home by the first boat and notify the Japanese that in our judgment our mission is fully accomplished and that nothing more can be done there which will be acceptable to or beneficial to the Russian people by force of arms."¹⁵

The State Department disagreed amidst U.S. protests to the Japanese government concerning its monopoly of control in Siberia. The Japanese troops in Siberia had been increased to 72,400. This they reduced to 58,000 in an attempt to appease the United States. Even so, the State Department was unconvinced by the Japanese claims that the 58,000 troops were absolutely necessary for the protection of 3,400 miles of railway. Hence, the State Department feared that American withdrawal would be welcomed by Japanese military authorities and would be interpreted as an end to American efforts to assist in the reconstruction of Siberia.

Meanwhile, discontent grew among American troops. On April 6, 1919, Graves publicly expressed regret over the destruction of a Russian flag by American soldiers. As time went on, there were reports of drunkenness and disorderly conduct among American soldiers. By May 21, a resolution was introduced into the U.S. Senate demanding an explanation for the

continued presence of U.S. troops in Siberia. On the same day, the first American casualties were sustained when three men were wounded while chasing a band of Bolsheviks that had fired on a train. On June 23, the first American was killed by Bolsheviks, and two others were captured in another encounter with Bolshevik forces. With the war now over and American soldiers dying before a "sometime" enemy, morale continued to deteriorate, and a new situation arose which compounded the problem.

The Cossacks

As early as December 14, 1918, Maj. Gen. Graves and Gen. Otani warned cossack chieftain Kalmikoff that his cruelty to inhabitants of Khabarovsk must cease.¹⁶ However, Kalmikoff's actions and those of other cossack chieftains grew more and more brazen. Japan had stirred up such an antagonism toward the American military that, in a September 17 cable to Washington, Graves noted that the cossacks under the leadership of Kalmikoff were threatening to commence action against Americans. Such action against Americans was supported by cossack chieftain Semenoff as well. As a result, Graves requested one support battalion of

three-inch artillery be sent to augment his forces.¹⁷

Semenoff, meanwhile, decided to withdraw his support of Kolchak's White Russian Military Provisional Government and to conduct independent action in the Trans-Baikal region, destroying railroad transportation, interrupting telegraphic communications and terrorizing the eastern regions. Kolchak wrote Russia's ambassador in America: "By reason of such activities of Semenoff, I have dismissed him from his offices and have ordered that he be brought to subordination by force so as to check his arbitrary actions and the ensuing anarchy."¹⁸

At the same time, Japanese Gen. Otani ordered that no troops be dispatched to suppress Semenoff's bands. Kolchak suggested that such acts represented a direct interference in the internal affairs of Russia. And since the dispute between Kolchak and Semenoff had resulted in the suspension of communications on the Trans-Siberian Railway, Great Britain requested Japan to urge Semenoff to cease his activities. Although Japan promised its support, conditions grew worse.

Once Japanese and Czech campaigns had driven the Bolsheviks into hiding, cossack military leaders began

a campaign of their own, attacking peasant villages, beating women, killing workers and peasants with alleged Bolshevik sympathies, and arresting officials whose only fault consisted of trying to establish a form of representative government. Although the Kolchak government did not actually support this campaign, it was unable to prevent it.

These unfortunate conditions could be traced almost completely to the Japanese military authorities who were disappointed over the results of the railroad negotiations, and who feared their plans in eastern Siberia would be interfered with. There was no doubt in Graves' mind that as long as Japan continued to equip and finance unscrupulous cossack leaders there could be no such thing as the security of life and property in eastern Siberia.

The question at hand was whether or not the United States could remain in Siberia and permit reactionary groups to inaugurate a campaign, the purpose of which was the suppression of all local representative institutions. After considerable discussion with Adm. William L. Rodgers, commander of the Asiatic Fleet, it was agreed that since the United States had initiated the expedition and had acquiesced in the actions of both the



Czechs and Japanese in restoring order along the railways, American troops would have to remain in Siberia for the present. Furthermore, they agreed that the population in the cities and towns along the railways, where Allied troops were quartered, should be protected from arbitrary actions of any faction.

Relations with the Kolchak regime steadily deteriorated. On October 1, 1919, two Americans were arrested in Priamur Province by troops under the command of Gen. Rozanoff, and one was flogged. Graves received an immediate apology from Rozanoff who "promised to punish troops guilty of mistreatment of Americans."¹⁹ However, by the time November rolled around, no official apology had been issued and the Cossacks announced their support of Gen. Rozanoff.

Things finally reached a breaking point when the Americans sheltered deserters from Kalmikoff's forces and helped leaders of an uprising against the Kolchak authorities in Vladivostok escape in the autumn of 1919. The Kolchak authorities accused the Americans of supporting the Bolsheviks, and the admiral himself called for the removal of American forces from Russia, writing: "I consider their removal from Russian territory necessary, because their further presence will lead only to a final discrediting of America and to extremely serious consequences . . ."²⁰ Adm. Kolchak ignored the American demand for the removal of Kalmikoff and accused further that "General Graves had delayed the sending to us of arms, for which we paid in gold."²¹

Graves did indeed delay a shipment of arms to Kolchak in retaliation for anti-American articles printed in Vladivostok and the hostile acts of the Cossack chiefs. Graves became even more opposed to the Kolchak regime after the murder of an American soldier by a Russian officer in Vladivostok on October 11.²² By this time, American forces in Siberia were on the verge of wholesale mutiny.

Withdrawal

It was under this tense situation that the first 1,500 American troops were withdrawn from Siberia on October 18, 1919. By January 1920, the United States announced the withdrawal of all troops and termi-

nated the Inter-Allied Railway Agreement, an agreement Japan had used to monopolize control of the Siberian railways. Japan expressed regret that the United States did not consult her prior to making the decision to withdraw. However, Japan accepted the American explanation that conditions in the United States had warranted an immediate decision, leaving no time for discussion with the Japanese government. Japan was mollified by U.S. assurances that it had no objection to Japan's continued maintenance of troops in Siberia, or to the sending of reinforcements to the Trans-Siberian and Chinese Eastern railways. On January 30, the American government formally affirmed its declaration to the Japanese government.

On the home front, voices called for American withdrawal. The most forceful and persuasive voice was none other than that of Secretary of War Baker who stated, "The number of our troops remaining in Siberia is something like 5,000 and it is obvious that their assistance is not necessary to some 72,000 Czecho-Slovaks who are withdrawing toward Vladivostok."²³

In keeping with the intent of the Aide Memoire, American troops remained in Vladivostok until a substantial portion of the Czech forces were afloat. The last contingent of Americans left Vladivostok on April 1, 1920.²⁴ The nominal British and French detachments had already been withdrawn in the late summer and early fall of 1919. Graves with his staff and 300 men arrived in Manila from Vladivostok on April 8, 1920. So ended American intervention in Siberia. ★

11. Unterberger, p. 90.
12. W. H. Chamberlain, **The Russian Revolution: 1917-1920**, Vol II (New York City: The Macmillan Company, 1952), p. 163.
13. Ibid.
14. **New York Times**, October 1, 1918.
15. Ibid., pp. 104-105.
16. **New York Times**, December 14, 1918.
17. Unterberger, p. 120.
18. Ibid., pp. 120-121.
19. Graves, p. 261.
20. **New York Times**, October 2, 1919.
21. Chamberlain, pp. 163-164.
22. **New York Times**, October 11, 1919.
23. Unterberger, p. 180.
24. Ibid., p. 183.

Capt. Richard Groller is an intelligence officer currently assigned as the signals intelligence requirements officer, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Ga. He is a recent graduate of the MI Officer Advanced Course and the Advanced Imagery Interpretation Orientation Course. Groller has a master's degree in Electronic Warfare Systems Technology from the Naval Postgraduate School, as well as a master's degree in Business Administration from Western New England College. His previous assignments include the U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, Mass., where he was chief, Advanced Electronic Maintenance Division; and the 7th Infantry Division, Fort Ord, Calif., where he was the assistant chief of staff, G2 operations officer.

Footnotes

1. **New York Times**, July 19, 1918.
2. Ibid.
3. Betty M. Unterberger, **America's Siberian Expedition, 1918-1920: A Study of National Policy** (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press), pp. 236-7.
4. **New York Times**, August 4, 1918.
5. **New York Times**, July 8, 1918.
6. **New York Times**, August 8, 1918.
7. Ibid.
8. William S. Graves, **America's Siberian Adventure: 1918-1920** (Salem, N.Y.: Ayer Company, 1971), p. 34.
9. Unterberger, p. 90.
10. Graves, p. 21.

The Defense Intelligence College Winning the Silent War



Located in Washington, D.C., the DIC provides a variety of courses to a diverse student population.

by Dr. Hugo A. Keesing

"National level strategic intelligence provides a basis for plans and strategy and is a functioning component of foreign policy. [Intelligence professionals] are engaged in fighting the 'silent war' of intelligence . . . and are truly operational as an effective deterrent to actual hostilities." (U.S. Army publication.)

Service members who have never heard of the Defense Intelligence College (DIC) may be surprised to learn that there is a fully accredited educational institution in the nation's capital devoted exclusively to teaching strategic intelligence and related subjects. Besides a one-year graduate degree program, the DIC offers a variety of long, short, credit, and non-credit courses at the graduate and undergraduate levels.

Background

For the better part of two decades, the Defense Intelligence College, a joint educational institution operated and controlled by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was one of the military's best kept secrets. Established in 1962 through the merger of the Naval Intelligence

School's postgraduate intelligence curriculum with the Army's Strategic Intelligence School, the Defense Intelligence School found a home in some World War II temporary buildings in the Anacostia section of Washington, D.C. There it proceeded to carry out its mission of conducting courses of instruction related to Department of Defense (DoD) intelligence functions. The courses were designed to enhance the preparation of selected military officers and key DoD civilian personnel for important command, staff, and policymaking positions in the national and international security structure; prepare DoD military and civilian personnel for duty in the military attache system; and assist the broad career development of DoD military and civilian personnel assigned to jobs within the intelligence field.

While there are several other service or agency-operated intelligence schools, the DIC is the only one with a general defense intelligence community-wide mission. In general, it provides national- or strategic-level instruction which is geared toward mid-level intelligence professionals.

The DIC is presently located in DIA's new Defense Intelligence Anal-

ysis Center on the grounds of Bolling Air Force Base. Its location places it at the hub of the national security arena, providing faculty and students ready access to outstanding experts and to other national intelligence centers.

Resident students (some 3350 in 1985) represent the four military services, the Defense Intelligence Agency, CIA, NSA, various unified and specified commands, and other government agencies, such as the FBI and Library of Congress. They attend classes ranging in length from two days to 12 months, including special weekend "refresher" courses. Weekend courses, which attract more than 650 students, are primarily taught by Reserve officers associated with Air Force Training Detachment 50. Among the resident student enrollments were 391 part-time students made up of intelligence personnel in the greater Washington area taking one or more graduate courses during duty hours. Nearly 370 more students participated in some part of the college curriculum, thanks to mobile training teams (MTTs) which delivered courses as far away as Japan and Germany.

Programs and Courses

The range of education and training programs available at the DIC is extensive. More than two dozen programs exist, covering topical areas such as indications and warning, collection management, intelligence systems, terrorism, scientific and technical intelligence, and other areas. All courses are governed by a combination of security clearance/need to know/military grade requirements. These requirements are spelled out in the DIC Catalog.

Faculty

The DIC faculty members are drawn from a variety of sources. Some 50 military officers and civilians make up the resident faculty. Eighty percent have earned one or more graduate degrees. The faculty is augmented by a distinguished group of adjunct professors, comprising some of the foremost names in the intelligence field, and by more than 500 guest speakers.

Recent History

In 1980, the 96th Congress passed legislation authorizing the school to award the Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) degree. The MSSI degree is unique in the United States and represents the educational capstone for intelligence professionals. Since 1981, when it was first conferred, more than 130 students have successfully completed all degree requirements.

Degree granting status enabled the school to pursue regional accreditation for all of its programs. The first milestone was achieved in June 1981, when the DIC was accepted as a candidate for accreditation by the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools. An 18-month long, comprehensive self-study led to a number of significant changes and new efforts. For example, to support its graduate educational programs, particularly the Postgraduate Intelligence Program, the school launched a vigorous research effort through a new academic research center.

Research

The track record for research is already impressive. Three regional conferences, on Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia, have each drawn more than 200 scholars, intel-

ligence professionals, foreign dignitaries, and members of government and industry. Proceedings from the first two conferences have been widely disseminated, with limited copies still available from the Director of Research, Defense Intelligence College, Washington, D.C. 20301-6111. The school also co-hosted a major conference on artificial intelligence and will soon co-sponsor one on terrorism.

Faculty and student research resulting in publications has also been stimulated. Articles and book reviews are being placed in journals such as *Air University Review*, *U.S. Naval War College Review*, *American Intelligence Journal*, *U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings*, *Orbis*, *Armed Forces Journal International*, and *Military Intelligence*. Among the recent faculty and staff full-length books are titles on the Soviet navy, military lessons of the Falkland Islands war, U.S. intervention in Grenada, and the relationship between military intelligence and the universities. The first two volumes of a four-volume set on the law and intelligence have been completed. Additional topics include a guide to Middle East studies, political and military applications of Bayesian analysis, and mercenary troops in Africa. A comprehensive list of publications, and how they may be obtained, is also available from the director of research.

Another publication, the *Bibliography of Intelligence Literature*, is out in its eighth edition. Edited by Dr. Walter Pforzheimer, the leading expert in his field and an adjunct professor at the DIC, this 90-page monograph is available free of charge. It has become so well known that requests for it come from as far away as Europe and Africa.

Management of the Defense Academic Research Support Program (DARSP) is another important part of the DIC research effort. The DARSP is part of an overall program aimed at promoting contact and discussion with scholarly experts on the Third World in an effort to improve defense analysis of Third World topics, trends, and developments. Among the DARSP by-products are highly relevant, topical, and brief studies focusing on specific Third World issues, as well as longer-range, in-depth studies involving extensive data collection, analysis, and/or the application of

more innovative research approaches. A list of completed studies may be obtained by writing the DARSP manager. Individual copies may be obtained free of charge upon request.

Recognition of program quality by the academic community, new vitality within the school's faculty, and leadership committed to upgrading every aspect of the institution to high military and civilian standards all contributed to the Department of Defense's decision to re-charter the school as the Defense Intelligence College. The new name became effective in January 1983. Exactly six months later, the Middle States Association of Colleges and School's Commission on Higher Education awarded the college full accreditation. Accredited status assures, among other things, that the MSSI degree is recognized by the military services as well as academia, and that transfer of individual course credits to other institutions can be easily accomplished.

Outlook

As the DIC looks toward the future, it will strive to be even more responsive to student and user needs in intelligence education and training. Resident course offerings are being expanded and refined in response to new requirements. Class times now include late afternoon/early evening sessions to accommodate part-time students. The DIC's overall goal is to assure the highest degree of professionalism for one of this country's most vital tasks: winning the silent war of intelligence.

For more information, write to the Defense Intelligence College, ATTN: DIC-1B, Washington, D.C. 20301-6111. You may also call (202) 373-3302 or Autovon 243-3302. ★

Dr. Hugo A. Keesing is the Defense Intelligence College's Director of Institutional Analysis and Planning. He came to the DIC from the University of Maryland in 1980 to organize and coordinate the self-study for accreditation. Keesing holds a B.S. degree from Duke University, an M.A. from George Washington University, and a Ph.D. from Adelphi University, all in Psychology. Keesing is a graduate of the DIC's Joint Intelligence and Indications & Warning courses.

GSR Mobility:

The 105th MI Battalion's Answer

by Capt. Patrick M. Madden

Combat survivability has always been of special concern to ground surveillance radar (GSR) operators. Depending on the terrain and tactical situation, GSR sites are normally placed far in front or to the flanks of supported units and are equipped with relatively light weaponry. There is also the time-consuming task of dismounting armored personnel carriers (APC) in order to ground-mount the radar on a tripod. This all makes for a very vulnerable and precarious situation. This became painfully apparent to the soldiers of B Company, 105th MI Battalion (CEWI), during their past rotations through the National Training Center (NTC). Many times, GSR teams were overrun by the opposing forces (OPFOR) because of the time it took (15 minutes by ARTEP standards) to displace and pack the motion-sensitive AN/PPS-5 radar.

An earlier solution to the problem was to remove the .50 caliber machine gun and make use of its mount. However, once this was done, the GSR team sacrificed its only crew-served weapon. The GSR operators knew the solution lay in mounting the radar on the APC, enabling the radar team to be much more mobile and less likely to get caught dismounted during an artillery strike. The only problem was the Army did not possess a device which would enable the radar to be mounted on the APC without dismounting the machine gun.

Not to be stumped, the soldiers of B Company put their collective ideas together and came up with an innovative solution. Enlisting the help of the 5th Infantry Division's Industrial Operations Machine Shop, a radar

mount was designed which was simple and which did not require a modification work order for installation. The radar mount (see diagram) consists of a top plate (see item 1) which is fabricated from a piece of 3-inch rolled stock and inserted in a 12-inch steel pipe (see item 2). The 12-inch steel pipe is then connected to a steel





plate, five and one-half inches in diameter (see item 3). A modification work order is not needed because the mount's bottom plate was designed with the same bolt pattern as the matching unit cover plate. All that is needed for installation is to unbolt the matching unit cover plate and install the mount using the existing bolts.

The top plate was machined so that the base of the radar set/mount adapter could be securely fastened to it (see 3-dimensional drawing), allowing the receiver-transmitter portion


**“... in less
than 30
seconds the
radar team is
ready to move...”**

RADAR MOUNT FOR AN/PPS5B ON AN M113





2" I D x 12" STEEL
PIPE WITH TOP AND
BOTTOM PIECES
ATTACHED
SHOWN 1/2 SCALE

WELD TOP AND
BOTTOM PLATES




ITEM 2






**TOP PART IS
MACHINED FROM A
SOLID PIECE OF 3"
ROLLED STOCK
ITEM 1**

ITEM 1



ITEM 3

1/2" HOLE



of the radar to be attached. The power cable is then run through the cargo hatch and connected to the battery. Next, the control indicator box (the device the operator looks at to read



distance and azimuth to the target) is hooked up inside the track. The radar team is now ready to collect combat information for the commander. Once the order has been given to displace,

all the operator has to do is unfasten the receiver-transmitter from the mount adapter—in less than 30 seconds the radar team is ready to move, instead of taking the normal 10-15 minute break-down time.

The radar mount was tested during two NTC rotations; it passed with flying colors. Several times, the precious minutes saved by this mount made the difference between staying alive or being captured and/or overrun. The mount allows the radar team to:

- Displace in a matter of seconds, as opposed to 15 minutes.
- Keep the .50 caliber machine gun mounted.
- Become more mobile and therefore more survivable in combat.

The soldiers of B Company have demonstrated great initiative, providing a more effective and safer means of increasing mobility and, consequently, an opportunity to better serve the commander in his accomplishment of the mission. It is their hope that this innovation may some day be fielded in GSR units throughout the U.S. Army. ★



Capt. Patrick M. Madden served as commander of B Company, 105th MI Battalion (CEWI), from November 1984 to November 1985. He holds a B.A. degree in International Studies from Whitworth College. Madden is a 1981 graduate of the 35A Staff Intelligence Officer Course. Prior to his current assignment, Madden served in the 105th MI Battalion as an EW platoon leader, GSR platoon leader and company executive officer. He is currently a student at the Defense Intelligence College in Washington, D.C.

Operation Barbarossa:

◆ The Failure of German Intelligence ◆

by 1st Lt. Matthew H. Adams

While history can never provide all the answers, a proper study of past doctrine, methods, and campaigns will often bring to light some stunning similarities to our present situation. A case in point is the German invasion of the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941. The similarities between the German methodology and our own, and the intelligence failures they experienced, provide a surprising lesson for students of military history.

Prior to the war, Stalin had purged the Red Army of thousands of officers, thus ousting most of the innovative and progressive spirits in the Soviet officer corps.¹ This ensured Stalin's unchallenged control over the Soviet military, its philosophy, and its doctrine. The military was shattered, and it gave a poor showing against the Finns in the 1939-1940 Winter War. Despite an overwhelming numerical superiority, the Soviets took more than four months to bring the Finns to terms. [See *Military Intelligence*, April-June 1985]

That the Soviet armed forces were beset by the purges did not escape the notice of Adolf Hitler. However, Hitler's basic contempt for Slavs in general, and the Soviets in particular, led to an overconfidence which eventually would prove fatal. Based on his World War I experiences, Hitler felt

that any hint of caution was construed as pessimism and defeatism. The German officers had always advocated caution, predicting doom and defeat for Germany, and been proven wrong. Thus, although some good intelligence was produced, that which did not fit Hitler's preconceived notions was simply ignored. Some of the more courageous officers, such as Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, head of the *Abwehr*, the Armed Forces Intelligence Service, dared to question Hitler's reasoning.² Usually, however, the intelligence officers, and everyone else in Hitler's entourage, merely accepted his orders and made the necessary plans to carry them out. As a result, Hitler had little appreciation of the qualitative improvements the Soviets brought about in the eighteen months prior to the invasion.

As the German invasion was launched, geographical considerations came into play almost immediately. As had been the case historically, the Russian steppes simply swallowed armies; in some situations, the endless vistas did not even allow army groups to maintain more than tenuous contact with neighboring units. Gaps were accepted as part of the elements beyond the control of the commanders. Although a "line" existed, never was it possible to state with certainty whether particular territory was on one side of the line or the other. Units often operated on their own for extended periods without contact with higher units. Even today, as AirLand Battle doctrine stipulates, in the event of a major conflict, communications on the battlefield will be uncertain. Command and control, therefore, will largely depend on the initiative of subordinate commanders.³

Apart from the political and geographical considerations, there were some stunning intelligence failures on the part of the Germans during Operation Barbarossa, failures which were based on a poor assessment of

enemy capabilities. A good intelligence estimate should always represent the best assessment of enemy capabilities. This estimate, or educated guess, can be based on prior experience, POW information, imagery, or a host of other sources. Whatever the source, the intelligence officer must be as accurate as possible, for if the estimate is wrong, the commander's decision is likely to be a poor one. Within the context of AirLand Battle, such estimates are likely to have greater consequences than ever before, for we face a threat more menacing than any previously encountered.

The German estimate of Soviet capabilities fell short on several counts. The first of these was the German failure to note the truly awesome manpower potential of the Soviet Union. Just prior to the invasion, German intelligence placed Soviet strength at a maximum of 200 divisions.⁴ In 1942 alone, the Soviets raised and armed 1.5 to 1.75 million fresh troops, something totally unforeseen by the Germans.⁵ By May 1945, the Soviets could afford to use approximately 2 million troops in the assault on Berlin alone.⁶ This was not just a minor mistake for Germany; rather, it was a catastrophe the likes of which had never been experienced



Soviet Order of the Patriotic War

that the Soviet armed forces, deprived of their progressive leadership, would never be a match for German troops.

By 1941, Hitler had gained such a large moral ascendancy over his generals, through his politico-military victories in the Rhineland, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Norway, and France,



German Knight's Cross

by the German nation. German intelligence believed that the Soviets would never move their forces out of Eastern Siberia, where they faced the Japanese in Manchuria, or at most would do so too late, after the campaign had already been decided in Germany's favor.⁷ This was the mis-

take of underestimating the enemy.

The Soviet use of their eastern reserves in the Battle of Moscow probably kept the Germans from taking the city once they turned to it. Had German intelligence expected the onset of fresh troops, Germany might well have tried to interdict them in some way, thereby reducing the Soviet ability to cope with the crisis. As it was, Germany was unable to execute such interdiction because of poor intelligence on the one hand, and the lack of a means (i.e. long-range heavy bombers or rockets) on the other.

German intelligence made another basic mistake in believing its own biases. Based on previous campaigns, the Germans felt that a lightning-like campaign, characterized by sledgehammer blows and massive encirclements, would cause Soviet resistance to crumble. This bias, the belief that the Soviets would react as the French and Poles had, was yet another flaw that is virtually unforgivable in any intelligence service. This failing resulted from cultural bias, something which can affect the perceptions of any intelligence organization, including our own. In the case of the Germans, this bias led to the false assumption that, since the Germans had been outnumbered in the West in 1940 and won handily, the same would hold true in relation to the Soviets. This obviously was not the case.

Many of these inflated German expectations were rooted in the notion of *Blitzkrieg*, which capitalizes on speed and surprise, resulting in a shock effect which destroys the enemy's will to fight and leaves him paralyzed. Current AirLand Battle doctrine states that properly handled

even the most well-conceived plan of attack is almost useless without the intelligence to back it up.

One of the keys to the AirLand Battle is combined arms. The Germans used combined arms to overcome numerical inferiority in the West in 1940. The combination of thrusting *Panzer* columns and "flying artillery"—the *Luftwaffe* close air support aircraft—was a novel and terrifying one. In Russia, it was the speeding *Panzers*, closely followed by as much infantry as possible, pushing along routes softened by *Luftwaffe* bombing, which allowed the massive encirclements that destroyed the Soviet first line of defense and spread the illusion of German victory and Soviet collapse. No single arm could have accomplished as much, something both the U.S. and Soviet military establishments have been quick to note and use in their doctrines.

Despite the initial success of the German attack, German intelligence had failed to appreciate the quality of Soviet equipment. The Germans believed Soviet equipment was of poor quality and no match for its German counterparts. Reality came as a rude surprise for the troops in the field.⁹ Examples abound in which German troops were deeply shocked and depressed by their experiences against the Soviet equipment they had been told could not stand up to their own. For example, the Soviet T-34 tank was completely unknown to the Germans until they met it on the battlefield, despite the fact that the T-34 was one of the best tanks produced during the war.¹⁰ The Germans themselves entered the campaign with more than 50 percent of their armored forces equipped with the PzKw Mark 1, PzKw Mark 2, and the Czechoslovakian PzKw 38(t), vehicles primarily armed with machine guns, or 20mm guns.¹¹ These vehicles were already long obsolete, and the *Panzer* commanders knew it. The Soviet 76mm antitank gun was so much better than any German antitank gun that the Germans made use of any captured 76mm they could lay their hands on. The primary German antitank weapon was the 37mm PAK (antitank cannon) which the troops nicknamed the "doorknocker."¹² As the name implies, it was not overly effective, while the 88mm gun, which

gained great fame as an antitank gun, was actually an anti-aircraft weapon adapted to an antitank role.

Another serious deficiency was the poor quality of maps supplied to front-line units. German maps showed improved roads which did not exist and failed to show improved areas in which the Germans found themselves fighting. Of course, this was also a partial by-product of the Soviet fanaticism for secrecy which was so prevalent during the Stalin era. This made information-gathering difficult, but does not excuse the blatant errors which appeared on German maps.¹³

Another facet of a modern intelligence estimate concerns the economic sector. Supply and logistics can often be a telling factor in war. In 1941, the German economy was not on a war footing. Factories continued to work day shifts only, and women were not allowed to work in war plants, forcing men who could have been serving in the armed forces to remain in Germany as laborers. In addition, German production was very small for a nation entering its third year of war. During the first six months of 1941, Germany built only 212 of the PzKw Mark IV, its main battle tank, which was already inferior to the T-34.¹⁴ A national intelligence service should have been prepared to point out the effects of such an economic policy on the war effort.

Conclusion

Much has been written about Hitler's deficiencies as a commander during the Eastern campaign, deficiencies which plagued him throughout the war, as he continually denied correct assessments of Soviet strength.¹⁵



German 88mm

forces fighting outnumbered can strike the head and heart of a larger enemy and confuse, demoralize, and paralyze him, making him easy prey for later destruction.⁸ The idea of speed and violence is found in both U.S. and Soviet doctrine; however,



Russian T-34

Hitler's responsibility as a commander was to accept the best information the intelligence services could provide, with the option of refusing it and accepting the consequences—whether good or bad. In Hitler's case, poor
(Continued on page 38)

KEEPING TRACK OF THE BATTLE AT THE NTC:



U. S. Army photo by SFC Armando Carrasco

U. S. Army photo by SFC Armando Carrasco



The following article is based on first-hand observations made by the author while assigned to the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif.

First and foremost, the tactical operations center (TOC) must be able to maintain communications with the task force and brigade. The environment at the NTC is not always conducive to good communications. Often, terrain and distance will cause problems, not to mention the heat, cold and occasional thunderstorms. Site selection becomes extremely important, planning movement even more so. The trick is to make sure communications are possible from the TOC site and all future sites planned for a particular mission. Some reliable individual must pick the site and then perform communications checks from

that site. Often the S3 and communications officer are simply too busy to do this, so they must delegate the responsibility to someone else—make sure that individual is reliable. Line of sight is often hard to maintain because of the washes and high terrain features. One unit prepared a line-of-sight overlay prior to deployment and used it extensively to identify dead space for communications. This line-of-sight overlay was prepared by the unit's engineer detachment. It was developed by taking each prominent terrain feature showing line of sight and dead space 360 degrees around the terrain feature. A thin solid line showed line of sight and a thick solid line showed dead space.

TOCs must be prepared to keep up with the task force on offensive operations. Many TOCs were unable to

THE TACTICAL OPERATIONS CENTER

by Capt. David M. McQueen

do this and soon found themselves out of communications range—they simply moved too late. Be ready to move at line of departure time, plan to echelon the TOC M577s, keep one to three terrain features behind the task force, have an S2/S3 representative in the lead 577, and plan for continuous movement, sharing information each time all vehicles are together. Tracking the battle is extremely difficult if the TOC is continually moving. Soldiers in the TOC may think they track well on the move, but all too often one or two critical messages are missed and the TOC is unable to assist the commander. Journals are difficult to maintain on the move. Information is not accurately passed because critical words are missed, thanks to engine noise and bouncing around in the back of the 577. If



moves are properly planned, the TOC does a better job of aiding the commander and tracking the battle.


The TOC has to keep track of both the friendly and enemy situations as well as the combat strength of the enemy and friendly forces. Keeping up with an ever-changing situation is not easy. The main problem is getting information from the company teams in a timely manner. SOPs that cover reporting requirements help if they are followed. One of the most efficient, productive and responsive TOCs I observed used the following method to keep track of the battle. The TOC 577s were positioned ramp to ramp. An S3 and S2 representative used the same situation map to post their data. The map was located in the S3's 577 (some units have placed the S2/S3 sitmap outside the 577s which also works). They used store-bought circular stickum cutouts to follow the situation—blue circles for friendly units and red circles for opposing forces (OPFOR). The assistant S3 acted as TOC traffic controller, ensuring that all traffic the S3, S2 and fire support officer (FSO) received was passed on immediately to all sections. The reason this is so important is that all too often the S3, S2 and FSO fail to share important information. All elements become so involved in their own area of interest that they fail to talk with one another. Never assume that the other elements have received the information—always double check. One unit failed to get the S2 involved in a change of mission. The S3 assumed the S2 had heard the

change of mission message when in fact he was unaware that the task force's mission had been changed. Double check to make sure that messages have been passed on and that the information is accurate. To ensure this, one assistant S3 required each section (S3, S2 and FSO) to write all messages on 3" X 5" cards and then hand all the cards to him. If all three elements copied the same message, they threw the cards away. If one or more sections missed the message he ensured the correct information was passed out. What made this process worthwhile was the excellent reporting from the company teams. They constantly updated their combat status and reported the enemy situation using the SALUTE (size, activity, location, unit, time, equipment) format. Enemy loss reporting, although initially poor, improved greatly after a few missions. The TOC was therefore able to respond quickly and accurately to the commander's questions. This TOC anticipated the needs of the commander and updated him accordingly. Another TOC was able to function well due to the efforts of one of the best senior NCOs I observed at the NTC. Because of his efforts, the TOC ran very efficiently. Don't forget the NCOs. Make them do NCO business.

The nightmare for most TOC operations is order preparation and reproduction. For many soldiers, it is the first time they have had to deal with Air Defense Artillery assets, smoke assets, engineers, attack helicopters, close air support, and

intelligence assets. All these elements come together at the NTC. They are consumers of the operations order (OPORD) and key players in developing the OPORD. Everyone must be aware of the what they can and cannot do for the commander. The commander must know what to expect from each element supporting him and what its needs are in order to provide the necessary support. Prior to going to the NTC, the commander should get a briefing from the staff and attachments which outlines what they can do for him and, in turn, what they need from him. Numerous commanders have made very interesting comments about the attachments working for them at the NTC. The engineers and smoke elements are usually the ones which provoke the more colorful comments, some justified, some not.


In training for an NTC rotation, unit personnel should receive instruction on the preparation of orders at least once a week. Plan to go through the troop leading procedures and the decisionmaking process. Make the staff sections produce staff estimates, then prepare the operations order. Identify weak areas and then put



more emphasis on them. Try to come up with generic orders for the various missions a task force may be given. This will save a great deal of time at the NTC, and time is a very precious commodity.

The best method of reproducing the order requires the following equipment: a reproduction machine with thermofax capability, a computer or word processor with printer, and a power source (store-purchased generator). One unit had generic orders stored in the computer. When a specific mission was given, they recalled the order and printed it, made corrections, additions or deletions,

fed the changes into the computer, and printed the new order. Reproduction was easy on the copier. Graphics were made and reproduced on the thermofax plastic (usually two or three sheets per mission to get all the graphics). The graphics were clear and readable. Everyone had the same control measures. Worrying about a team to make up the graphics was not necessary. No grease pencil drill was necessary. And the entire process was quick. The only problem is that thermofax plastic darkens in direct sunlight. Most of this equipment consisted mainly of off-the-shelf, store-bought items which were extremely



reliable. The unit stored them in their original containers and secured them well during transport. Jelly roles work if people have used them before but generally jelly roles and stencils are difficult to read. Hand reproduction requires a good quality control system.

Planning the security of the TOC is like planning for any other defensive mission. Enemy mounted and dismounted avenues into the TOC site must be identified, then watched. The TOC has very limited assets with which to secure the site, so they must be used wisely. Make sure everyone understands the mission if being attacked. Everyone should know where his assigned position is, how to get there, and what to do once in position. Designate a rallying point in case people get separated. If your plan includes moving the 577s immediately upon being attacked, make sure the driver knows which route to take, that the route is clear of dismounted troops, then move slowly but deliberately so no one gets hurt.

Ensure all people at the TOC are alert. This requires a regular check of the TOC listening posts/observation

posts (LP/OPs). One soldier manning an LP/OP was on his back looking at the stars as the unconventional warfare team walked by his location. Make sure the LP/OPs have a means of alerting the people in the TOC—landline, starcluster, airhorn, or some other means. It must be loud so all can hear it and react. Check all weapons so personnel can return fire. Challenge everyone in and around the TOC site all the time. Too often, the unconventional warfare team will walk by a group of soldiers without anyone saying a thing—and then it's too late. I have watched the unconventional warfare team walk into the TOC area, into the S2 and S3 577s, wake everyone up, and silently take the TOC without a sound being made. If the commander's and S3's tanks are located at the TOC, make sure they know where to fire. I have seen a number of TOC 577s die to friendly tank fire.

When soldiers in the TOC take the initiative, share information, plan their movement, maintain communications, and produce good and legible orders, they will stay alive and be able to assist the commander. With this approach, the unit is more successful and positive training results.

The NTC provides the best training in the world. It is an environment in which new ways of running the TOC can be tried, or old ways improved. Planning TOC operations for a rotation to the NTC should focus on two main areas: how the TOC can best

track the battle and how the TOC can save commanders TIME. ★


Capt. David M. McQueen enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1970 and was assigned to the Army Security Agency. He was trained as a Vietnamese linguist and served in the 138th Aviation Company, 224th Aviation Battalion, Vietnam, from 1972 to 1973. McQueen attended the University of Utah and was commissioned in 1975. He is a graduate of the MI Officer Basic Course and Officer Advanced Course. Previous assignments include: officer in charge, Communications Security Detachment, 201st ASA Company, Augsburg, Germany; deputy G2 for security, 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colo.; and S4 and Headquarters and Headquarters Company commander, 104th MI Battalion (CEWI), 4th Infantry Division, Fort Carson, Colo. McQueen recently served as a member of the plans and operations scenario writing team and the armor task force observer/controller team at the National Training Center, Fort Irwin, Calif. He is currently assigned as an instructor and as chief, Tactical Intelligence Task Group, at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Ariz.



U.S. Army photo by SFC Armando Carrasco



Military Justice



Legal Section of Counterintelligence Division, Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

Barbarossa

(Continued from page 34)

intelligence further complicated his own inability to face reality.

As intelligence personnel, we have a similar relationship today with our own commanders; we can neither escape the quirks of certain commanders, nor the responsibility we bear to do the best job we can in terms of the estimate of enemy capabilities. Though it may be difficult on some occasions to loyally accept the decision of the commander to use or

refuse our best product, the authority and responsibility of command ultimately rests in the hands of the commander. That does not, however, release the Military Intelligence Branch from its responsibility to provide timely, accurate intelligence, and to earn the commander's confidence. Like the Germans in 1941, we face an enemy who outnumbers us, has excellent equipment, and is highly motivated to win on the modern battlefield. If we can tell the commander when and where the enemy will

appear, and in what strength, he will have an edge in the application of AirLand Battle doctrine, and we can rest assured of a job well done. ★

Footnotes

1. Matthew Cooper, **The German Army, 1933-45** (New York: Bonanza Books, 1978), p. 283. Cooper mentions, for example, that 13 out of 15 army commanders were executed during the purges.
2. Lauren Paine, **German Military Intelligence in World War II: The Abwehr** (New

ACROSS

- 1 The wrongful taking of property from another with the intent to permanently deprive
- 8 In criminal law the answer of the accused to a charge or indictment
- 10 What one party does to the opposing party at trial
- 12 Captured enemy (abbreviation)
- 14 Hitler's infamous troops (abbreviation)
- 16 The absence from one's unit without authority, with the intent to remain away permanently
- 17 The defense of being elsewhere at the time of the crime
- 18 Lawyer
- 19 An agreement between the defense and prosecution as to the existence or non-existence of a fact
- 20 The breaking and entry of a dwelling of another at night with the intent to commit a felony
- 22 The military's supreme court (abbreviation)
- 23 Guideline for operations in a military unit (abbreviation)
- 25 Distinct military offense; to refuse or disregard
- 26 Attorney for the accused (abbreviation)
- 27 Lesser included offense of 16 across
- 28 Controlled substance the possession of which is illegal (abbreviation)
- 29 Criminal word for help
- 33 The most intelligent branch in the Army (abbreviation)
- 34 Lawful
- 37 A defense where the criminal design originates with the government, is then implanted in the mind of an innocent person, inducing him to commit the offense
- 39 Pyromaniac's delight
- 43 Indirect proof (two words)
- 44 Term given by judge to convict
- 46 Stolen goods
- 48 The highest trial court in the military (abbreviation)
- 51 Method used to safeguard the integrity of physical evidence (three words)
- 53 Minor theft
- 55 A fourth amendment requirement in obtaining a search warrant in the civilian community (three words)
- 57 A statement which is offered by a witness in evidence to prove the truth of the matter but which was originally stated by another
- 60 A national security crime; what Tokyo Rose and Benedict Arnold have in common
- 62 To take a person into custody
- 63 A punitive discharge from the military (abbreviation)
- 64 Protector of Army Security; Army 007 (abbreviation)
- 66 Summary courts can give 30 days of this to E4s and lower (abbreviation)
- 67 A national security crime involving damage or destruction
- 68 Counterintelligence is primarily interested in making a damage assessment. In order to do so the defendant may not be prosecuted in exchange for his cooperation which is verified by the polygraph. He becomes _____ and can't plead the fifth
- 69 A search for the truth; reconstruction of a past event; judicial proceeding

DOWN

- 2 Police officer
- 3 Air Force criminal investigators (abbreviation)
- 4 Head of Military Police in a command (abbreviation)
- 5 Mental condition that must be proved in most criminal cases
- 6 An act done with specific intent to commit an offense even though failing to effect its commission
- 7 A commander (abbreviation)
- 9 To invest with legal validity; to prove or verify as genuine
- 11 A sworn statement
- 12 One who aids, abets, counsels, procures or commits the crime
- 13 Intentional relinquishment of a known right
- 14 Subject matter of the fourth amendment
- 15 Course of conduct in court that may land the offender in jail
- 17 A person who, knowing that an offense has been committed, receives, comforts, or assists the offender in order to prevent his trial, apprehension, or punishment
- 20 The predecessor of Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) (abbreviation)
- 21 Any offense punishable by death or more than a year in prison
- 22 An acknowledgement of guilt; the strongest form of proof known under the law
- 24 Army lawyer (abbreviation)
- 25 Another name for one who loses classified documents
- 30 Duress
- 31 An agreement between two or more people to commit an offense with an overt act in the furtherance of the agreement
- 32 Peace officer in the Army (abbreviation)
- 35 The transfer of a case from a lower to a higher court for a new hearing
- 36 An attempt or offer with unlawful force or violence to do bodily harm to another, whether or not the attempt or offer is consummated
- 38 A crime for which one can receive one year or less confinement
- 40 To _____ trial
- 41 Jury decision
- 42 Oral evidence
- 45 Title of courtesy conferred upon lawyers and other gentlemen
- 47 Title 21 to the criminal code does not need this act to prove the crime
- 48 A Saturday night special used by hoods
- 49 A self-incriminating statement falling short of an acknowledgement of guilt
- 50 Challenges, discredits, attacks, or degrades; as attempted with President Nixon
- 51 A burglar who is specifically adept at entering and leaving the place he burglarizes without attracting notice
- 52 Crime
- 53 A jury consisting of 12 persons
- 54 A civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for which the court awards money damages
- 55 A cloak and dagger agency during World War II
- 56 Lt. Gen. Weinstein
- 57 Used among German speaking people as a title equivalent to Mr.
- 58 The place in which alleged events from which a legal action arises takes place
- 59 A public official authorized to decide questions brought before a court
- 61 A building for the confinement of persons
- 63 A combat uniform (abbreviation)
- 64 A military court (abbreviation)
- 65 Title of the military prosecutor (abbreviation)

York: Stein and Day, 1984), p. 29.

3. FM 100-5, *Operations*, August 20, 1982, p. 7-3.

4. Paine, p. 150. See also C. L. Sulzberger and the Editors of American Heritage, **The American Heritage Picture History of World War II** (United States: American Heritage, 1966), p. 250.

5. William L. Shirer, **The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich** (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1960), p. 917.

6. Peter Young, ed., **The World Almanac Book of World War II** (New York: World Almanac Publications, 1981), p. 340.

7. Cooper, pp. 282, 340. See also Alan Clark, **Barbarossa** (New York: William Morrow and Co., 1965), pp. 149-150.

8. FM 100-5, pp. 2-3, 2-4.

9. Cooper, p. 409.

10. Sulzberger, et al., p. 265.

11. Cooper, p. 276.

12. Cooper, p. 279.

13. Seymour Freiden and William Richardson, eds., **The Fatal Decisions** (New York: William Sloane Associates, Inc., 1956), p. 54. See also Clark, p. 88.

14. Cooper, p. 276.

15. Sulzberger, et al., p. 252.

1st Lt. Matthew H. Adams is a 1984 graduate of the United States Military Academy at West Point, where he majored in Military History and German. Adams is a 1982 graduate of the Air Assault course at Fort Campbell, Kentucky, and a 1985 graduate of the NBC Defense Course at the Seventh Army Combined Arms Training Center, Vilseck, Federal Republic of Germany. Adams is currently serving as the executive officer, Detachment Woback, 502d MI Battalion, located in the Federal Republic of Germany.

RC CEWI

(Continued from page 13)

annual training at Golden Sabre XI and XII in support of the III Corps TCAE in lieu of annual training at the Starburst exercise; in retrospect, they could have spent the training time just as productively at Starburst 85—and they were sorely needed. Nearly all core 98C/TCAE collective and individual tasks were exercised fully.

Future training needed to sustain and improve the readiness of the battalion includes increased emphasis on staff and line leadership training, the NCO development program, and on the junior officer development program. Battalion staff training which focuses on conducting field operations is the first order of importance. This training should also include the development of field and classified SOPs. Overall, during Starburst 85 the leadership at any given level was partly limited by its lack of experience in field operations. This weakness is best corrected with performance-oriented training and by the development of clear doctrine in divisional IEW operations (this issue is being addressed at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School).

Another area which needs more emphasis is maintenance training. Since there is at least one major end item for every three soldiers on site, maintenance is even more important than it would be in an armor unit. Maintenance must be performed with the book at the operators' level and within the system at the organizational level using the appropriate channels. It is most effective when the operator, the equipment and the first-line supervisor are in the same place at the same time.

Finally, steps must be taken in the area of communications, including OPSEC/SIGSEC, to ensure that responsive and relatively secure command, control and communications can be sustained. Communications personnel from platoon/section level, who were allocated to operate the assigned AN/TSC-58 teletypewriter (TTY) terminals, acted as FM radio-telephone operators (also MOS 72E) at section, company and battalion levels. Full use of the TSC-58 terminals was not realized because of the lack of a microwave connection between company and battalion. Considerable emphasis is needed in

this area. The importance of communications cannot be understated; neither can the critical role of the resources required to sustain 24-hour-a-day communications be ignored.

Starburst 85 was a demonstration of the efficacy and effectiveness of standard Army training doctrine applied to military intelligence/electronic warfare units. The members of TF 304 drove themselves to reach out to do the job they had signed on to do. Once on the move, they were hard to keep up with. The veterans who knew, but had forgotten, remembered when exposed to realistic training conditions. They, in turn, taught those who did not know. Starburst 85 forms a solid base of experience that will serve all who participated in it for the remainder of their military careers.

Exercises like Starburst 85 prove that CEWI can work within the Reserve Component. Realistic training with maximal unit participation is what will guarantee a CEWI capability within the reserve structure which will be ready to assume its responsibilities on the AirLand battlefield. On the other hand, the consolidated training facilities approach robs units of valuable training time. Before Starburst 85, IEW personnel were only available for unit training involving mission essential technical skills during three weekend drills per year. This was only recently increased to six drills per year. The requirement to send IEW personnel to the consolidated training facilities is understandably designed to provide a common base of technical skills, but at what cost?

Unfortunately, a few in high places have decided that the RC MI unit chain of command has "failed disastrously" and must be replaced by a network of consolidated training facilities which tends to drain off the cream of the MI crop of MOS-qualified RC MI soldiers for half the training year. Training is focused on unvalidated requirements not related to either the unit mission or the Skill Qualification Test (SQT). The costs of this system have and will continue to have a devastating effect on the tactical and technical competence, morale, cohesion, and combat effectiveness of the RC MI units. It's hard to run a unit with your best people gone and with a competing power structure in charge of your technical training.

As a postscript, TF 304 is at present reorganizing to do the mission of the RC tactical exploitation battalion (corps) with three of its companies separating to form a divisional CEWI battalion.

Lt. Col. Gordon S. Fowkes is the commander of the 304th ASA Battalion, Pasadena, Texas. Fowkes' previous intelligence assignments include assistant G2, 1st Cavalry Division, Vietnam, and aerial surveillance instructor at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

Clarification

That "RC CEWI is not doable" does not reflect the policy of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School on the question of RC CEWI.

As deputy chief of staff for intelligence (DCSI) at FORSCOM, then Brig. Gen. Parker was in the forefront of the development of the FORSCOM plan for activation of the CEWI force structure within the Reserve Component.

Now, as the MI Proponent and chief of the MI Corps, Maj. Gen. Parker is pressing forward in his support of the activation of CEWI units within the reserve structure.



FEEDBACK

(Continued from page 5)

ligence officer. When intelligence fails to provide all variables, gaps in one's assessment of a situation can be adversely affected by one's predisposition or past experience. President Carter and Secretary of State Vance failed to realize that the Soviets would invade Afghanistan despite evidence pointing to the encroachment.

From a slightly different perspective, those working with strategic intelligence face another danger. One may unconsciously ignore some variables or emphasize others in order to rationalize some preconception. Those within the U.S. intelligence community who argued against a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan assumed that Soviet decisionmakers had learned their lesson from the American experience in Vietnam. Therefore, the Soviets would not become involved in a Vietnam-like war. Similarities were speciously isolated from the countervailing dissimilarity of events.

During the Vietnam War, some combat arms soldiers lamented about the "Green Door Syndrome." Much intelligence was seemingly amassed for the benefit of the intelligence community itself but not for consumption by front line units. The validity of this perception is not argued here. Rather, an analogy is drawn between the Vietnam experience and the flow of information on Soviet troop movements prior to the 1979 invasion. Embassy officials in Kabul, responsible for assessing the significance of internal events in Afghanistan, were apparently

not privy to intelligence concerning the Soviet massing of troops along the Soviet-Afghan border. Political and military decisionmakers can act in a manner most beneficial to U.S. interests only if there is a free flow of intelligence among responsible parties.

Hammond expertly addresses ambiguous areas of events and intelligence exhaustively by exploring a wide range of scenarios concerning the invasion. One weakness is the failure to hypothesize about how the crumbling of President Nixon's Twin Pillar Policy with the overthrow of the Iranian Shah may have led to the collapse of regional deterrence. Regardless of this minor negative point, this book is a must for strategic intelligence and foreign area officers with an interest in the Soviet Union or Central Asia.

Capt. Karl F. Wolfgang
SSO Redstone Arsenal, Ala.

Dear Editor:

To Ralph Peters and his article on writing (*Military Intelligence*, October-December 1985).

I hate writing. Thinking comes naturally and isn't the same thing as writing. We have too many writers masquerading as officers in the Army right now. We don't need them. We need soldiers who do things, not write about them.

General George S. Patton said it best, "In peace, the scholar flourishes. In war, the soldier dies. So it comes about that we view our soldiers through the eyes of

scholars and attribute to them scholarly virtues."

We have come to believe that being a good writer makes someone a soldier. The next thing we'll see is tactical doctrine on putting word processors in the attack.

No thank you to you writers. I'd rather be just a real soldier.

Stan Grzybala
Lawton, Ok.

Dear Editor:


Congratulations on the excellent recovery of *Military Intelligence* magazine from the criticism described in the *Armed Forces Journal*. The July-September issue of *Military Intelligence* was one of the best ever. I hope every one from private to general takes the time to read the articles "I Would's for Lieutenants" by Lt. Col. Riser and "Leadership In Retrospect" by Lt. Col. O'Connell. Keep up the good work.

Col. Don Gordon
U.S. Army, Retired

Editor's Note:

The January-March 1985 issue of *Military Intelligence* came under fire in the "Defense Forum" section of the September 1985 issue of *Armed Forces Journal*. The criticism focused on new intelligence terminology which, the author claims, stands in the category of "folderol and unintelligible, verbose language." He cites examples such as "stove-pipe," "green-door," and "vertical interconnectivity." In this editor's view, some of the criticism was well founded. If we in the intelligence field do not want to fall prey to the same woes of incomprehensibility as the legal, medical, and education fields (though it may be too late), we ought to follow our own prescriptions of simple, clear, and precise usage. English, after all, is one of the world's most flexible and precise languages.

Crossword Puzzle Solution



Answers

Across

12. POW (Prisoner of war)
14. SS (Schutzstaffel)
22. COMA (Court of Military Appeals)
23. SOP (Standing Operating Procedures)
26. DC (Defense Counsel)
27. AWOL (Absent Without Leave)
28. LSD (Lysergic acid Diethylamide)
33. MI (Military Intelligence)
48. GCM (General Court Martial)
64. CI (Counterintelligence)
66. CHL (Confinement at Hard Labor)

Down

3. OSI (Office of Special Investigations)
4. PM (Provost Marshal)
7. CO (Commanding Officer)
20. BNDD (Bureau of Narcotics and Drugs)
24. JAG (Judge Advocate General)
32. MP (Military Police)
55. OSS (Office of Special Services)
56. ACSI (Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence)
63. BDU (Battle Dress Uniform)
64. CMR (Court of Military Review)
65. TC (Trial Counsel)

MI

Captains as Mentors

THE
MENTOR

by Capt. Michael H. Bordell

In 1985, the Army theme was "Leadership." One of the major concerns of Army leadership is the education and training of its officers. By the time new MI lieutenants take their first assignments as platoon leaders, they have had some type of a pre-commissioning education and have completed the MI Officer's Basic Course (MIOBC). A platoon leader has a demanding job. An MI platoon leader is completely responsible for the lives of all the soldiers assigned to the platoon, as well as some complex and expensive equipment. Is the MI lieutenant really ready to take on the kind of responsibility that goes with leading a platoon? Army Military Intelligence is too complex and the stakes are too high to force a new MI lieutenant to carry out assigned duties without adequate training and instruction. Consequently, we, as captains, must institute unit certification programs which will ensure that we have prepared MI lieutenants for their immediate duty and for future leadership positions. The specific content of such programs is the responsibility of the immediate commander and is a function of the commander's evaluation of the unit.

Following graduation from MIOBC, most MI lieutenants are assigned to tactical MI units. Usually, the adjutant receives notification of the arrival of a new MI lieutenant early enough for the commander to be able to assign the lieutenant a sponsor. Key to integrating the lieutenant into the unit is assigning the lieutenant, if possible, an experienced captain who could act as a sponsor and as the lieutenant's secondary mentor. The primary mentor, by virtue of the pivotal position he or she occupies, would be the company commander. The company commander acts as a model and is charged with resolving all questions regarding the lieutenant's role in the company.

While many of the areas which need to be addressed in a mentoring program are taught in the MIOBC, it is still useful and important for each MI unit to develop a certification program for new MI lieutenants. The certification program should be directly tied to the mentoring strategy and designed to reinforce concepts taught at the MIOBC. A certification checklist of areas/tasks in which an MI lieutenant should be competent or technically proficient will assist the new officer to gain the self-confidence needed for future leadership positions. While by no means all-inclusive, the following lessons learned are presented in order to alert other captains to common errors (some of which I cite from firsthand experience) and to suggest ways we can begin contributing to the professional development of MI lieutenants.

The U.S. Army Medical Research Unit, Europe, completed a study of company grade officers.¹ It initially focused on how lieutenants were integrated and socialized into their units. The study involved twenty lieutenants and was based on observations and lengthy interviews conducted by the researchers. The officers cited in the study were all in their first assignments after completing their branch basic courses, and all had been in their positions for less than three months. Nine were infantry platoon leaders and eleven were armor platoon leaders. When the study began, these twenty officers constituted all the new infantry and armor platoon leaders in their division. The study concluded that company commanders frequently did not provide enough specific guidance or tell the new lieutenants where they could seek guidance, be it from other references or from subject matter experts. The study also noted that many lieutenants felt uncomfortable requesting assistance or guidance from their

company commanders and admitting uncertainty to their commander or to their peers. Additionally, many lieutenants felt that their commanders did not have the time to train them properly; thus, learning was a process of self-discovery.

In this writer's view, most MI lieutenants are anxious to apply the information they learned at MIOBC to their new responsibilities. However, some lieutenants, even after they are in place, are still uncertain as to what their responsibilities and roles in their units actually are. The mentor can make these clear to the new lieutenants by using a certification program.

The unit commander should develop a certification checklist, tailored to his specific type of MI unit, the type of standard tactical mission (general support or direct support), and the type of unit he supports (heavy or light). The following should be considered when developing the commander's certification checklist:

- **Welfare of Soldiers.** The soldiers' welfare is one of the most important responsibilities of the new lieutenant. Consequently, the new lieutenant must be taught to recognize the unsafe operation of equipment/weapons and to take immediate action to correct such situations and to prevent recurrence. Other basic responsibilities should also be stressed. For instance, during operations in cold weather or expected cold weather, lieutenants should be taught to inspect their soldiers, ensuring they have the proper cold-weather gear. This alone could prevent many unnecessary cold-weather injuries.
- **Maintenance.** MI units should initiate programs to develop the lieutenant's level of technical competence in operator-level preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS) of all organic vehicles, generators and radios, and electronic warfare, signals intelligence and surveillance

equipment. The new lieutenant should also be acquainted with unit procedures within the Army Maintenance Management System (TAMMS) and maintenance of platoon equipment and vehicles. To ensure that lieutenants are capable of supervising the maintenance program, the mentor should teach them how to properly inspect their vehicles and equipment.

- **Training.** Company commanders should be teaching lieutenants how to plan, conduct and evaluate training, using the Battalion Training Management System (BTMS). In addition, the commander should take the time to show the lieutenant what training support resources are available and how to request them. Planning for language training and efficient use of training time and resources should also be considered in the certification program for MI lieutenants. An especially important facet of training is the specific guidance company commanders must give to new lieutenants on their roles and responsibilities before, during and after training exercises.

- **Operations.** The mentor should teach lieutenants how to write a platoon operations order based on the company operations order. Also, the mentor should question the lieutenants to ensure they understand how to execute and support the order. The lieutenant must understand how and where his platoon will be resupplied. The commander should thoroughly instruct lieutenants on preparation for and execution of road and rail movements. Included in this instruction should be discussion of routes, halt points, command and control, and safety. The mentor must stress to the lieutenant that "getting off to a good start" greatly enhances the success of any training or intelligence mission. The lieutenant must be taught that conducting a thorough pre-combat inspection (PCI) before any major training mission is the only means of assuring everything and everyone is ready to accomplish the required mission. These inspections must be timed to allow for corrections of all deficiencies noted. Furthermore, company commanders must train intensively with lieutenants, using current MI doctrinal field manuals in professional development classes.

- **Personnel Administration.** Mentors should demonstrate to new lieuten-

ants effective methods for counseling subordinates. They should also provide lieutenants guidance in writing enlisted evaluation reports and awards, emphasizing the importance of their content and timeliness. The need for lieutenants to know how to use the UCMJ within the command climate, and how to conduct a legal search and seizure during room inspections, is equally important.

The company commander/mentor should use several approaches to mentoring new lieutenants. A lieutenant who has prior enlisted service may need no guidance in the technical aspects of his or her responsibilities. He or she may, however, need guidance from the mentor in areas of leadership. Certain responsibilities, such as sub-hand receipting equipment to the user, may be best learned through experience. Other areas, such as planning training schedules, should be taught in groups. Lieutenants should be able to practice the steps of iterative training (practice/immediate, precise critique/practice). Only then will they be able to mold effective soldiers and teams. Lieutenants should also be required to plan for and brief rehearsals of road/rail movements and site selections to the commander. Additionally, the lieutenant should be directed to unit experts in some areas (generally NCOs) for guided tours of their operations. In many functional areas of the unit (i.e. maintenance), the lieutenant will find that he or she is not the only officer involved in managing complex activities. The lieutenants' ability to integrate these functions is dependent upon their knowledge of the people and procedures which make things happen. Fundamental to mentoring lieutenants is providing them feedback on how they are progressing. Raters are required to review the OER Support Form thirty days after the beginning of the rating period. Thereafter, feedback should be provided to the lieutenant at a minimum of every ninety days.

As General John A. Wickham Jr., the Army Chief of Staff, noted, "Experience of wars past demonstrates that units with a high potential for success in battle are units that have a command climate. Those who are led feel that they can grow because they are part of a learning opportunity. Mistakes in learning are tolerated in order

to capitalize on the great potential of officers and soldiers."² General Omar Bradley once said, "The greatest leader in the world could never win a battle unless he understood the man he had to lead." An understanding of the men and women we lead is tied up with face-to-face teaching. We lead our units through the chain of command, thus one of our major training responsibilities must be the development of our lieutenants as leaders, tacticians and Military Intelligence officers.

In summary, the company commander should see that each new lieutenant is effectively integrated into the company. He can do this by helping the lieutenant overcome the fear of asking questions, giving him or her specific and detailed guidance, initiating a formal officer certification program, and providing feedback through counseling at least quarterly. Mentoring MI lieutenants is one of our most critical responsibilities and must begin at the company grade level if it is to be successful. Captains are charged with the responsibility to ensure that new lieutenants are prepared, through education and training, to assume increased levels of responsibility in the years ahead. ★

Footnotes:

1. Capt. Samuel K. Rock Jr., "Training New Lieutenants," *Infantry*, November-December 1984, pp. 35-37.
2. General John A. Wickham Jr., "Leading," *Eurarmy*, February 1985, pp. 10-11.

Capt. Michael Bordell has served as a company executive officer with A Company, 307th MI Battalion, VII Corps, and the 502d MI Company, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment. He has also served as the squadron S2, 2d Armored Cavalry Regiment, and the G2 operations officer, VII Corps. Bordell is currently attending the Military Intelligence Officer Advanced Course. Upon graduation, Bordell will join the staff of the Defense Intelligence Agency.

Reason and Emotion: The Leader's Dilemma

Essay

by Maj. Brian Raymond

"Our primary goal in Vietnam is to win the hearts and minds of the people."

"When you have them by the gonads, can their hearts and minds be far behind?"

Rarely has the radical dichotomy between leadership and management outlooks been as neatly encapsulated as it was in these statements describing the thrust of American policy in Vietnam during the waning years of the Vietnam War. The observations, probably unconsciously, distill and articulate as well as anything else the fundamental differences between the "touchy-feely" and the "kick-in-the-behind" schools of leadership. The tension created between the poles of this continuing argument provides both interest and frustration to the student of motivational theory: interest because the argument for the position at each pole focuses on basic tendencies of the human condition, frustration because too often the distinctions drawn between the positions are neither new nor substantial but only the response of too little thought.

At its core, the challenge today, for both theorists and practitioners, remains not to criticize members of the opposing camp or to deny that their position possesses any merit, but to look at the entire perplexing spectrum of motivational and leadership problems and to regard possible solutions inclusively instead of exclusively. Inasmuch as a composite motivational strategy seems to offer the greatest potential returns for managers and leaders, this essay seeks to investigate some historical justifications which support an argument for composite solutions in dealing with human beings and to suggest a strategy for arriving at such solutions.

Throughout the early cultural and religious history of the West (if those two can be separated), the intellectual tendency was to identify reason and emotion as the dual components of the human condition and to recognize the intractability of the "baser," emotional component. Only mortification and denial could subdue the flesh and make it manageable, if not holy. Management, if it could be called that, occurred through force; the body and its concerns could be denied without fear of reproof.

Dante highlighted mainstream thirteenth century theology and cultural thought by separating the sinners in the *Inferno* according to the nature of their sins. Those guilty of sins of emotion, such as lust and anger, suffered far less than those who, like the fraudulent, the simoniacs, and traitors, sinned against reason, the higher faculty.

As Freud notes of the human condition, the totem and the taboo frequently inhabit the same form, the former providing a positive motivation, the latter a prohibition and threat. The insight that Freud provided, however, was that the two could not and

should not be separated if one intended to approach life with a holistic, and not a schizophrenic, attitude.

The tradition's origin and development notwithstanding, more than its antiquity merits our attention. The overwhelming burden of this cultural heritage has succeeded in affecting the fundamental ways in which people think about themselves and the attitudes with which they encounter and respond to their environments. The individual who wishes to lead and manage people sensitively but effectively cannot afford to neglect or to overlook the influence that this heritage has on subordinates.

Leadership training in the military has long paid tribute to both traditions. Cadets at the United States Military Academy at West Point encounter the problem early in their training. On the one hand, **Bugle Notes**, the Plebes' handbook and bible, confronts them with "Schofield's Definition of Discipline." It contends, "The discipline which makes the soldiers of a free country reliable in battle is not to be gained by harsh or tyrannical treatment. On the contrary, such treatment is far more likely to destroy than to make an Army." In contrast, the environment and the nearly mythic air within which the cadets live sometimes seem to counsel otherwise. Cadets and faculty remember Gen. George S. Patton, whose statue keeps watch on the library, much more for kicking behind and taking names, as the movie celebrated, than for his sensitivity to the human psyche. That sensibility becomes reinforced on occasion as when a well-known Vietnam commander admitted during a lecture in the late 1960s that one reason for relieving a commander in combat was to keep up one's credentials. That fear as well as inspiration could spur troops seemed to be his message. The cadets then, at least, seemed to be encouraged to pursue a pragmatic blend of leadership styles in order to accomplish the mission: appeal to the rational or appeal to the emotional, but get the job done.

Each of the forms of leadership, explicit and implicit in the quotations which introduced this essay, reflects the influence of either the rational or the emotional paradigm of human behavior. The very vocabulary of the quotations pays subconscious tribute to the dualism of the human condition. The promulgators of American policy verbalized (even if they did not realize it) that winning the hearts was not necessarily the same as winning the minds. Again, another commonplace of our cultural heritage rises to be counted. Traditionally, the head has been viewed as the seat of reason, and the heart has been characterized as the seat of emotion. Hence, whether purposefully or not, the policymakers acknowledged the need to accommodate both

components of the human condition if they intended to be successful. Therefore, because of the far-reaching philosophical and practical implications involved in attempting to practice the one form or the other of leadership and motivational theory, we should understand what *they* imply and what *we* are about before we attempt to embrace or to practice either of them.

Animated and sometimes bitter debate has often characterized discussions between these two schools of leadership. One group has portrayed the other as Neanderthal because of its lack of enlightenment in modern motivational theory; the other group has disparaged the efforts of the first as the "warm-fuzzy" school of management—everyone feels good about it, but the job doesn't get done. Each group has its heroes and standard bearers. The hard-core (kick them in the behind) school cites the generally excellent results of their methodology in the hands of executives like Harold Geneen at ITT and Gen. George Patton during World War II; the self-actualizers return ever more frequently to Japanese managers like Konosuke Matsushita, to generals like Bruce Clark in World War II, and to the Army's organizational effectiveness process as their guidon bearers. In championing either of the forms, however, many writers and leaders overlook some of the essential similarities of the two styles, and in doing so they impoverish rather than enrich their leadership styles.

John Naisbitt, in his book **Megatrends**, proclaims that today's societal and management imperatives demand inclusive thinking. He contends that while "either/or" choices in the basic areas of family and work have exploded into a multitude of highly individual arrangements and lifestyles, to cope with the complexities of managing and leading in the modern society, more than anything else one requires a comprehensive and synthetic approach to problems rather than an exclusive, analytically dissecting strategy. In short, one needs an ability to think in terms of "both/and" options as well as in terms of "either/or" possibilities. Each school of leadership has some positive offerings.

Some advocates of the hard-core approach suggest that an element of coercion is essential to the effective and efficient operation of any sizeable organization. They contend that, to understand life inside a complex organization, most of the touchy-feely management theory must be put aside. We have learned from their underlying supposition that man is most dependably alert when in trouble because trouble creates anxiety.

Axiomatic to this argument is the conviction that within any organization a pecking order will develop. Man's animal passion for the possession of power, they seem to imply, will overcome his altruistic sensibilities. Though the military has a built-in formal pecking order, its informal order varies. Moreover, the power play is often apparent.

While the existence of a pecking order seems intuitively correct, given the human propensity to

develop hierarchical organizations, Naisbitt contends that large numbers of organizations, including some of the larger and generally more traditional ones, are moving away from the pyramidal structure to a networking system. He sees the change as a move from the vertical to a horizontal distribution of power. Hence the move seems to be away from the hierarchy and vertical power distribution toward the network and horizontal information distribution.

We in the military see this trend more and more in the organizational effectiveness approach to leadership, goal setting, and irritant reduction. Even the senior service colleges seem to be getting on the bandwagon. The course of instruction at the Naval War College's Command and Staff course uses Hersey and Blanchard's "LEAD" profiles to sensitize tomorrow's senior leaders and staffers to the range of leader and follower styles that one might encounter. At the more junior level, Maj. Gen. Aubrey Newman's anecdotal book, **Follow Me: The Human Element in Leadership**, currently enjoys a spate of popularity in courses supporting junior officer and NCO training. Maj. Gen. Newman celebrates "the shining band that joins the hearts of the brave in war, and cements the esprit of good soldiers in peace." He sees throughout the need for a plan of leadership that accommodates and pays more than lip service to the needs and expectations of the followers if one is to be successful in either peace or war.

This last observation would appear to be encouraging evidence that reason is finally about to overtake emotion as the ruling component of human nature. However, before we celebrate the triumph of the rational individual prematurely, we need to recall that the school systems which moved to less formal structures during the 1960s and 1970s seem to be returning, by fits and starts, to more formal structures and systems (though by no means to systems as formal as the original). Evidence implies that the products of the less structured schools were less prepared to meet higher educational and business challenges than they should have been. A fairly recent report from one of California's higher education forums provided a clear focus on the problem in that state, which is generally considered a bellwether for change. The University of California at Los Angeles, according to this report, admits students from only the top 15-20 percent of high school graduates in California. Upon giving an English diagnostic exam to those students, during the mid-to-late seventies, the administrators discovered that some 50-60 percent of them could not perform at what was considered a basic level of proficiency for an incoming college student. Left to their own choices within the school system, students and parents did not always choose in their own best interests; rather, they more often chose to satisfy short-term goals. And every soldier, it seems, has his or her own war story recounting how some boss or other couldn't see the bigger picture because he was more concerned with

something in the short term: something important like an efficiency report, a body count, or a material readiness report. A purely rational approach doesn't carry the day yet.

The business world too supplies its examples of resistance toward any move away from the hard-core approach. In their engaging but troubling book, *Life and Death on the Corporate Battlefield*, Paul Solman and Thomas Friedman return again and again to the idea that the quest for power and money makes things happen in business. And, they note, "... the logic of competition is to screw the other guy before he (inevitably) screws you." They even cite evidence that indicates that friendship and normal altruism are quickly overcome by the desires to get ahead—either in the classroom, the boardroom, or the war room.

On the other side of the argument, however, several books and articles have been published recently which highlight the move within business toward an enlightened form of Japanese management. Quality circles come to mind immediately. In addition, managers like Ed Carlson at United Airlines and companies like TRW and Hewlett-Packard seem to have evolved toward a management style which emphasizes the individual and encourages excellence through self involvement with the entire "product."

The Army itself has not been immune from this cyclic trend. The Army's organizational effectiveness (OE) structure, which stresses the more cerebral and less physical motivation than was common in the Army of yesterday, was recently dismantled. The Army, once the bastion of the "hard-core" school of management, may now believe that the OE approach has been sufficiently inculcated in today's leaders. Or perhaps the Army, after experiencing both extremes, has discovered that a good manager must be prepared to attack the problem from both ends. Both the "warm fuzzy" school and "cold prickly" school seem to have their followers, and their detractors.

When there appears to be support for both an argument and its contrary, as seems to be the case here, it is time to look for a meta-system which can embrace both positions. That system, I suggest, should highlight the mutually complementary nature of reason and emotion within the context of the human condition. That style of leadership should rely on a dual-based approach to motivation: an approach that enjoys a long tradition in Western thought and the Judeo-Christian tradition. Such a "carrot and stick" approach can be traced to the earliest Hebrew scriptures: "See, I have set before you this day life and good, death and evil. If you obey the commandments of the Lord your God, by walking in his ways, and by keeping his commandments and his statutes and ordinances, then you shall live and multiply, and the Lord your God will bless you in the land which you are entering to take possession of it. But if your heart turns away, and you will not hear, but are drawn away to wor-

ship other gods and serve them, I declare to you this day, that you shall perish; you shall not live long in the land which you are going over the Jordan to enter and possess." (Deut. 30:15-18)

Whether or not one believes in the teachings contained in the Bible, one would be hard pressed to deny the effect that the text has had on the development of Western culture and thought. Hence, the concept of reward and punishment, both in fairly extreme doses, has been thoroughly woven into the fabric of Western consciousness. To neglect the need to deal with both components of the human condition woefully ignores the nature and heritage of those soldiers we in the Army manage and lead. It serves only to frustrate the management effort. The moral for the modern leader and manager is that a style of leadership which manifests an appreciation for the mutually complementary nature of man's rational and emotional natures offers the best hope for long-term success. For to stress one at the expense of the other, on a continuing basis, serves to ignore an essential component of the human psyche and will ultimately succeed in frustrating not only the leader but the team as well. ★

Maj. Brian L. Raymond is currently serving as the detachment commander of the United States Army Intelligence School, Devens Detachment at Pensacola, Florida. He has specialties in signals intelligence and public affairs. Raymond is a graduate of the United States Military Academy and holds an M.A. in English from the University of Virginia and an M.S. in Management from Salve Regina College. His military education includes the FA Officer Basic Course, the FA Officer Advanced Course, and the Naval War College. Previous assignments have included positions as an instructor, watch officer, battery commander, assistant brigade S4, company commander, S2, S3, aide-de-camp, and battery XO.

USAICS Notes

1st Brigade Change of Command



Col. J. Kemp Neill, incoming 1st Brigade commander accepts the unit flag from Maj. Gen. Julius Parker Jr., Intelligence Center and School commander. Col. Neill assumed command in a ceremony held December 17, 1985 at Fort Huachuca, Ariz. (U.S. Army photo by Billy R. Shepherd)

by Sp4 Mary Goodman

In an official ceremony at Brown Parade Field, Dec. 17, 1985, Col. J. Kemp Neill accepted command of the 1st School Brigade from Maj. Gen. Julius Parker, Jr., U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School commander.

Col. Neill replaced Col. Jo Ann De Lora who has been at the school since Dec. 16, 1983. Col. De Lora has assumed duties in the new Communication Skills Office at the Intelligence Center and School.

Col. Neill came to the 1st School Brigade from the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command, where he served initially as the assistant deputy chief of staff of operations for signals and imagery intelligence. He then served as deputy to the deputy chief of staff of operations. A native of Bessemer, Ala., Col. Neill received his commission through ROTC at the University of Alabama in 1961. He holds a bachelor's degree in Industrial Management.

Col. Neill is a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College and the National War College. Col. Neill has also attended the Defense Language Institute and has completed the Counterintelligence Investigator's Course, the Surveillance Officer's Course, and the MI Officer Advanced Course.

After attending the Defense Language Institute and the Counterintelligence Investigator's Course, Col. Neill became the operations officer for the CI Company of the 159th MI Battalion in 1962. He later commanded the company in 1964. Col. Neill has also served as detachment commander of the 3d MI Detachment, 3d Infantry Division; commander of Region III of the 109th MI Group; and battalion commander of the 2d School Battalion, U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School.

Accompanying Col. Neill to Fort Huachuca are his wife, Margaret, and their son, David. The Neills also have a daughter, Marci, who lives in Falls Church, Va., and a son, John, who is a senior at the University of South Florida, Tampa.

USAICS Instructor of the Year



U.S. Marine Corps MSgt. Michael T. Bianchino receives an Army Commendation Medal and certificate from Maj. Gen. Julius Parker Jr., U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School commander. (U.S. Army photo by Mary Goodman)

U.S. Marine Corps MSgt. Michael T. Bianchino, who is assigned to the Exploitation Division, Department of Human Intelligence, as an interrogator, author, and instructor, was chosen as the Distinguished Instructor of the Year for 1985 during the fifth annual banquet held in Sierra Vista, Ariz., on January 16, 1986.

Bianchino was presented with an Army Commendation Medal and a certificate of achievement by Maj. Gen. Julius Parker Jr., commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, during the ceremony.

In addition to honoring Bianchino, Maj. Gen. Parker presented certificates of distinction to eight instructors of the month for 1985. Each month, the Department of Tactics, Intelligence, and Military Science, the Department of Human Intelligence, and the Department of Surveillance and Systems Maintenance select one instructor of the month nominee for the competition. During December of each year, the instructors of the month are reevaluated by the Staff and Faculty Development Division of the Directorate of Training and Doctrine.

After the reevaluation, an instructor of the year is selected.

Bianchino has been assigned to Fort Huachuca since September of 1984. He is a graduate of the Intelligence Center and School's Basic Instructor Training Course. He has attended Chapman and East Carolina colleges. His previous assignments include Marine Corps Station, Kaneohe Bay, Hawaii; instructor, 2d Marine Division, NCO Leadership School, Camp Lejeune, N.C.; marksmanship instructor, Edson Range, Camp Pendleton, Calif.; and scout/sniper, 1st Battalion, 9th Marines, 3d Marine Division, Vietnam. His awards include the Purple Heart, Navy Achievement Medal with Valor, Combat Action Ribbon, Republic of Vietnam Campaign Medal with Palm, and the Meritorious Mast.

A native of New York, Bianchino presently resides in Sierra Vista, Ariz., with his wife Mary Ellen. He has three children: Thomas, a student at Arizona State University; Margaret, a senior at Buena High School in Sierra Vista; and Michael, who is married and lives in Chicago, Ill.

Intelligence and Security Board

by Maj. John D. Skelton

As the proponent for intelligence and electronic warfare, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School is continually developing new doctrine, force structure, and equipment requirements to support the Army in the field. Before a doctrine, organization, or type of intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) equipment is accepted by the Army, tests are normally conducted to evaluate the effectiveness of the doctrine, force structure, or equipment to be sure the needs of the Army are satisfied. This user-oriented IEW testing is conducted under the auspices of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Board (INSBD) at Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

Activated in 1977, and presently commanded by Col. John F. Phelps, INSBD, a subordinate command of the Intelligence Center and School, receives its mission tasking from Headquarters, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command. INSBD conducts several kinds of tests:

- Operational testing is the board's major mission. These tests are sequential, formalized evaluations conducted on new or modified equipment to determine operational effectiveness, the feasibility of logistics and personnel support, and the availability of training associated with the new or modified equipment. Operational testing is conducted under the most realistic conditions possible. Before operational testing, a system will normally undergo development testing to ensure compliance with technical requirements such as instrumental direction finding accuracy. Soldiers and units are usually provided by MI commands in the field to participate in operational testing. For example, the soldiers who recently conducted TRAILBLAZER direction finding System Operational Test III came from several organizations, including the 312th MI Battalion of the 1st Cavalry Division and the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command.

- Force development test and experimentation (FDTE) is conducted to examine the effectiveness of existing or proposed concepts related to training, logistics, doctrine, organization,

and materiel. In 1983, INSD conducted an FDTE to evaluate alternative divisional Military Intelligence battalion configurations. Currently, INSD is developing an FDTE to evaluate evasive maneuvers and tactics for special electronic mission aircraft equipped with aircraft survivability suites.

- Product improvement program (PIP) verification tests are conducted when a fielded system is modified (e.g., a frequency extension) or when the proponent determines that an improvement involves user-related issues which affect training, force structure or the operational and organizational concept. Testing of a PIP is limited to the specific improvement.

- Joint tests are conducted when the Army participates in tests with another branch of the Armed Forces to evaluate systems or concepts which interface with or require a test environment involving another service.

- Support to the U.S. Army Operational Test Agency (OTEA) is provided by INSD for testing in the IEW area which falls under the responsibility of OTEA, such as testing for the All Source Analysis System and testing the JSTARS Ground State Module.

- On-site user testing is conducted for low density of issue materiel at an operational site.

- A customer test is conducted for organizations external to TRADOC which provide funding and guidance for the test. Customer tests range from technical assessments of new equipment to gathering data from doctrinal innovations in field units. INSD is prepared to respond quickly to requests for customer tests. Recent customer tests have included evaluating off-the-shelf equipment for Headquarters, Forces Command as well as ARTEP evaluation support to various MI units in the field.

The Intelligence and Security Board is authorized a strength of 22 officers, three warrant officers, 59 enlisted soldiers, and 32 civilians. The civilian force includes scientists, technicians, engineers, and administrative personnel. For each test, a task organized team is formed to plan, coordinate, and execute the test. A typical test team will include a test officer, a test NCO, a statistician, a methodology engineer, an operations research specialist, and other support personnel.

Units and individuals selected to participate in the INSD tests are given a significant opportunity to learn about new technologies, doctrine, and training, as well as to contribute to defining future intelligence and electronic warfare capabilities for the Army. Readers desiring more information about an assignment to the Intelligence and Security Board are encouraged to contact Maj. John Skelton at AV 879-8820/8821.

REMBASS Training

Training on the new remote sensor system, Remotely Monitored Battle Area Surveillance System (REMBASS), is scheduled to begin during the 2nd quarter of Fiscal Year 1987. This training will become part of the current 96R10, Ground Surveillance Systems Operator Course; however, only those students who are scheduled to be assigned to a unit having REMBASS equipment will receive this training. This additional training will be two weeks in length and will cover such subjects as equipment operations, employment principles and techniques, and target analysis. Upon completion of this training the student will be awarded an additional skill identifier.

Special Security Officer Training

In early 1985, the Department of Human Intelligence developed an assignment specific module (ASM) to familiarize SSO-selectees with the fundamentals of the Department of Defense Special Security System. The first class commenced at the Fort Huachuca, Ariz., campus in April 1985.

Since that first session, the combination of comprehensive feedback from students drawn from major commands and tactical units and the assignment of a full-time SSO subject matter expert to the faculty has enabled the Directorate of Training and Doctrine (DOTD) and the Department of Human Intelligence to re-evaluate the objectives and training strategy for this assignment specific module with a view toward expansion and enhancement. The revised objectives, which have since been incorpo-

rated into the SSO assignment specific module, include a departure from mere familiarization toward a goal of providing commanders with technically proficient graduates. This new goal will be supported by the development of "hands-on" practical exercises in such critical areas as preparation of the Enclosure 5 to DIAM 50-3 (Physical Security Standards for Sensitive Compartmented Information Facilities), use and maintenance of the DIA consolidated SSO address book, sanitization and decompartmentation, and sensitive compartmented information billet management. Other planned improvements include providing the student with a complete issue of SSO-related operational publications for in-class use and the development of modules to provide a thorough grounding in the fundamentals of SIGINT and the tactical sensitive compartmented information communications architecture used to support the commander.

Although primary emphasis will be placed on the "here and now," this enhancement effort will not be limited to current SSO operations. The student will be introduced to the emerging doctrine supporting the All Source Analysis System (ASAS). The ASAS is by definition an "all source" system that will require extensive SSO involvement at echelons corps and below. As ASAS requirements are developed, the SSO assignment specific module will be expanded appropriately to include those critical tasks that affect SSO support within the ASAS environment.

The emerging doctrine in the area of modern battlefield communications will also be introduced as concepts are sufficiently developed to permit fusion into the SSO assignment specific module program of instruction. The introduction of new systems, such as Mobile Subscriber Equipment and the expansion of the TRI-TAC family of equipment that will be used to transmit sensitive compartmented information to commanders will require the SSO to have a solid foundation in the operational fundamentals of all automatic data processing and communications systems which embrace sensitive compartmented information.

The SSO has long been recognized as a key element of the intelligence and electronic warfare (IEW) system.

SSO training must keep pace with modern battlefield technology. Knowledge equates to strength—such strength can provide the self confidence, flexibility, and decisiveness that will translate into a "user friendly" SSO at all echelons of command.

Consumer feedback from commanders, G2s, and SSOs will continue to be a necessary ingredient for success in the SSO assignment specific module. Points of contact are Capt. Kathy Heaney, SSO assignment specific module course manager (ATSI-TD-IT), AV 879-5937, and Mr. Tom Reardon, SSO subject matter expert (ATSI-HI-CI), AV 879-3790.

Language Training

by SFC Robert W. Bulmer

In 1985, students scheduled to attend interrogation training at the Intelligence Center and School began attending the Defense Language Institute (DLI) prior to arriving at Fort Huachuca. Formerly, students completed training at the Intelligence School and then proceeded to DLI for language training.

As a result of this recent change, the Intelligence Center and School has developed a language sustainment program designed to help students maintain their language proficiency during the nine-week basic interrogation course. The language sustainment program attempts to mirror the training the students receive in English during the interrogation course. Interrogation concepts are not introduced in the target languages until the students have learned proper interrogation techniques in English and have practiced these new skills.

The students receive a minimum of 74 hours of language training which is broken down into blocks of classroom instruction (33 hours) and practical exercises (41 to 61 hours). The majority of classroom instruction is devoted to providing students with military terminology in their target languages. Classroom instruction also includes the introduction of approach terminology. The interrogation students are given research time to develop questions in their target languages in the areas of source assessment, missions, composition, organization, tactics and training, combat effectiveness, logistics and

other related areas. They are also given a class on the use of interpreters.

The interrogation/DLI-trained students participate in practical exercises in translation, approach, organization, interpreting, map tracking, logistics, and order of battle. The students also conduct two full in-language interrogations during the field training exercise. These practical exercises allow them the opportunity to use the questions they have developed during their research.

The pre- and post-course terminology proficiency evaluation is used to measure the amount of military terminology the students possess before taking the course and upon graduation. The terminology proficiency evaluation consists of two parts. Part I includes 44 interrogation questions in English which the students must translate into their target languages. In Part II, the students listen to a tape in their target languages which contains responses to the questions in Part I. Students must translate these responses into English. In those languages for which Professional Development Program Extension Course material exists, the evaluation has been extracted verbatim from the interrogation portions of the course material. If an extension course does not exist for a language, the Russian evaluation is modified to fit it.

The students are administered the pre-course evaluation the first day of class. They take the same evaluation on the last day of class so the results between the two can be compared. The Intelligence Center and School has been evaluating students since the start of Fiscal Year 1985. Up to this point, only one student has not shown improvement in the final evaluation.

Overall, most DLI-trained students have received language training while assigned to the Intelligence Center and School. Since a great deal of MOS-specific in-language terminology has been presented to them, this training should better prepare the students for their next assignment. Because materials are not available for some languages, there have been some problems in providing language training to all DLI-trained students. There have also been times when qualified instructors were not available.

The language sustainment program

is also available to personnel in the field through REDTRAIN. In this case, personnel will not only have the opportunity to improve their language proficiency but they will also receive an update on methodology and doctrine. For more information, contact Training Development Exploitation Division, Department of Human Intelligence, United States Army Intelligence Center and School, (602) 538-2566/3837, AV 879-2566/3837.

Tactical Proficiency Week

As part of the combined arms phase of instruction in the Military Intelligence Officer Basic Course, the Intelligence Center and School has incorporated a training event called Tactical Proficiency Week. Tactical Proficiency Week is designed to train Officer Basic Course students in the fundamentals of map reading, land navigation, rifle marksmanship, applied leadership skills, and patrolling.

Tactical Proficiency Week is the last training event of the combined arms phase of instruction. It reinforces many of the fundamentals learned during the first nine weeks of the course, as well as the skills learned during the precommissioning training, based upon the Military Qualification Standards Manual I.

Tactical Proficiency Week is a scenario-driven five-day field training exercise which is organized into two phases: the preparation for combat and the combat phases. During the preparation for combat phase, the students are presented map reading/land navigation, marksmanship, and patrolling instruction. The map reading/land navigation training consists of diagnostic testing, refresher training, a map reading examination, and graded day and night land navigation courses. Marksmanship training includes the fundamentals of rifle marksmanship, zeroing, qualifying, and field firing the M-16 rifle. To further prepare students for the combat phase, they are instructed in the basics of patrolling by the NCO cadre. This includes training in field craft, patrol planning, organization, and movement techniques.

To evaluate students and give them an opportunity to apply their skills,



Completing the challenging combat phase of Tactical Proficiency Week, these lieutenants are directed by a crew chief to board one of the helicopters that will take them home. (U.S. Army photo by David Sawyer Jr.)

the students move into the combat phase. The combat phase consists of extensive patrol planning, air assault operations, area and zone squad-sized reconnaissance missions, and platoon-sized raids and ambushes against targets located during the reconnaissance patrols. During this phase, the students learn by tackling the problems associated with planning, leading, organizing, and executing combat and reconnaissance patrols. The lessons learned during this phase will assist them with their integration into the active force as Military Intelligence professionals. The point of contact for more information on Tactical Proficiency Week at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School is Capt. Gorbitz, ATSI-TI-MS, AV 879-1931.

Surveillance System Sensor Repairer Reclassification

by Larry Mix

Historically, the Mohawk sensor repair field has seen constant change. Additionally, the move to combine sensor repair duties has travelled a long and rocky road.

In 1974, three separate MOSs were dedicated to repairing Mohawk surveillance systems. The 26N took care of the infra-red (IR) system while the 41G repaired the camera systems. The 26M maintained the side looking airborne radar (SLAR). At that time, there were less than 100 soldiers in each of these specialized repair fields.

These MOSs were combined in 1977 to form one MOS, the 26E Aerial Sensor Repair Specialist. However, even with the increased manning in the newly consolidated MOS, training still required nearly 44 weeks, so it took a year or more to get a repairman from the street to the field. Because of the length of the course, the school could not supply enough soldiers to do the job required of them. Moreover, once a soldier arrived at a unit, the nature of the mission dictated that he or she be dedicated to either SLAR or the Camera/IR repair. Because of this situation, a proposed split was sought in order to shorten the length of training and to focus each soldier toward one of the two main specialty areas. Five years passed before the actual split of the MOS took place. In 1982, two MOSs were created—Aerial Radar Sensor Repairer, 26E, and the Aerial Photoactive Sensor Repairer, 26F.

However, this change did not last long. As a result of recent develop-

ments, another reorganization is planned to take place between July 1986 and March 1987. The Mohawk Surveillance Sensor Repair field will now become part of the Military Intelligence Branch under a newly created 33V MOS, Electronic Warfare/Intercept Aerial Sensor Repairer. Five MOSs will be affected by the establishment of the 33V MOS: 35P, Avionic Equipment Maintenance Supervisor; 33T, Electronic Warfare/Intercept Tactical Systems Repairer; 33R, Electronic Warfare/Intercept Aviation Systems Repairer; 26E, Aerial Radar Sensor Repairer; and 26F, Aerial Photoactive Sensor Repairer.

The 35P and the 33T fields at the E-7 level will lose some allocations, creating slots for the 33R40 MOS. The 35P soldiers at the E-7 level with aerial sensor background will be identified by Headquarters, Department of the Army and the Intelligence Center and School. Once they have been identified, they will be invited to reclassify into the 33R40 career field. Some 33T40 NCOs with 33R background will be involuntarily reclassified to 33R40 slots. The 33R40 field will now be used to cap 33V and 33R NCOs at the E-7 level.

Reclassifying 26E/F soldiers will be more complicated. All of the 26E (Aerial Radar Sensor Repairer) soldiers who attended the combined 44 week MOS course from 1977 to 1982 will be reclassified. They will hold the 33V MOS with an additional skill identifier of "W1," which will indicate they have taken all of the MOS training available for the 33V MOS. Soldiers who hold the 26E MOS, and who attended the shortened course since 1982, will be awarded the 33V MOS without an additional skill identifier.

The other MOS, 26F (Aerial Photoactive Sensor Repairer), which was developed in 1982, will be reclassified as 33V with an additional skill identifier of "Y2." This identifies soldiers as having the skills associated with the 26F (Camera/IR) MOS. The "Y2" designator will only be used for a transition period until these soldiers are rescheduled for the basic 33V MOS course. Once the 33V course is completed, each soldier will be awarded the "W1" additional skill identifier. Placing soldiers into the above three categories is the responsibility of the Intelligence Center and School and the branch manager for

the 26E and 26F MOSs.

For soldiers just entering the field, the new 33V (Electronic Warfare/Intercept Aerial Sensor Repairer) basic course will be 40 weeks in length and be taught at two campuses, Fort Devens, Mass., and Fort Huachuca, Ariz. The first 22 weeks of the course will be taught at Fort Devens, focusing on Basic Electronics. Once that phase is completed, soldiers will travel to Fort Huachuca to attend 18 weeks of Phase II Equipment training. After graduation from the 33V course, soldiers who are identified for an assignment requiring the additional skill identifier of "W1" will attend an additional 14 weeks of training.

As a result of the restructure, soldiers will hold the 33V MOS from the grades of E-1 through E-6. After reaching the grade of E-7, a soldier will be assigned as a 33R, Electronic Warfare/Intercept Aviator Systems Repairer, while soldiers who reach the grade of E-8 and E-9 will be assigned the 33Z MOS, Electronic Warfare/Intercept Systems Maintenance Supervisor.

A major consideration for reclassifying soldiers will be the security clearance requirement. The requirement for the 33 career management field (CMF) is Top Secret with eligibility for access to Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI). It takes six to eight months to process this kind of background investigation. Soldiers who want to reclassify must submit the necessary paperwork as soon as possible to receive the clearance in time for the reclassification process. Guidelines published by the Department of the Army state that if a Top Secret clearance with eligibility for SCI access cannot be granted within one year of reclassification, the soldier will then again be reclassified to another MOS not requiring that level of clearance.

The newly created 33V CMF will continue to be an integral part of the Military Intelligence community. The intermediate-level maintenance on the JSTARS ground station module will be integrated into the 33V MOS, as well as any requirements for the repair of any sensor packages that are developed for the Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (RPV/UAV). Point of contact for more information is Larry Mix, ATSI-SM-SM, AV 879-5766.

Introduction of the Military Intelligence Writer's Award Program

In an effort to encourage professional writing within the Military Intelligence community, as well as recognize outstanding professional contributions to the branch journal, **Military Intelligence** magazine is initiating an Annual Writer's Award.

Each quarter, the magazine's editorial staff will nominate one article it considers to be the most outstanding in the issue. The author will be notified that he or she is under consideration for the annual award. Besides the quarterly nominations, a 5th "at-large" nomination will be made in the 4th quarter to cover a case where two articles stand out in the same issue. Nominations will be based not only on the professional judgment of the editorial staff, but also on readership feedback.

The five nominated articles will be submitted to a panel of five senior officers from the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Fort Huachuca, Ariz., and Fort Devens, Mass. The selection panel will use the following categories as a broad framework for making their selections: originality, content and style, scholarship, and overall appeal. The principal criterion, however, will be the experience and professional judgment which the panel brings to the task at hand.

The author selected for the annual award will receive recognition from **Military Intelligence** magazine and the Intelligence Center and School. He or she will be given a certificate of appreciation signed by the commanding general for being named the "Military Intelligence Professional Writer of the Year." A plaque will be presented to the writer which will include the **Military Intelligence** logo and the dateline of the issue in which the article appeared. The author's name will also be engraved on a master plaque at the Intelligence Center and School. The first award will be presented in January 1987 for the article selected for calendar year 1986.

Battlefield Deception

On Jan. 6, 1986, the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School assumed proponentcy for battlefield deception doctrine. In April, the Intelligence Center and School will start to develop a new field manual, FM 90-2, *Battlefield Deception*. The goal of this field manual is to provide doctrine that can be applied to tactical and operational echelons in the AirLand Battle en-

vironment.

To assist in this development, the Army-wide Training and Doctrinal Literature Program (ATDLP) Branch is requesting that any combat arms, combat support, or combat service support units which have developed their own deception measures contact the ATDLP Branch of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and School, Directorate of Training and Doctrine. ATDLP Branch is interested in any and all types of developments in this area, including SOPs, OPORD an-

nexes, and lesson plans. After-action reports, lessons learned, and comments concerning various deception methods that work well, or do not work, are of special interest to ATDLP. Input from field units of all branches is essential to the development of doctrine applicable to the total force. Please forward all materials to: Commander, USAICS, Attn: ATSI-TD-PAL, Fort Huachuca, Ariz., 85613-7000. USAICS doctrinal literature point of contact for this action is Arlan Adams, AV 879-2676/3266.

USAISD Notes

Individual Training Records

by SFC Bront Geisler

"Train to Fight-Fight to Win." The training aspect of this phrase is a difficult task to accomplish at any level. This is especially true in today's Army, considering the volume and variety of state-of-the-art equipment which cannot be operated without necessary technical skills. At all levels, accomplishing the mission requires dedicated professionals who are technically proficient and can apply the latest in training methods. Supporting these professionals in the field requires teamwork between the field and school. Teamwork has existed for a long time through highly visible means, such as Branch Training Team visits, and through less visible means, such as Soldier Training Publications (formerly the Soldier's Manual and Trainer's Guide).

To further improve teamwork between the field and the school, Individual Training Records are being introduced so that a commander, S3, or first line supervisor can tell what a soldier was trained on while attending a resident course of instruction, or what the soldier was not trained on. While the U.S. Army Formal Schools Catalog (DA PAM 351-4) or an MOS-specific Soldier Training Publication provides an overview of training provided and/or fairly detailed documentation of the tasks involved in the training, these documents do not provide information concerning the latest course changes as a result

of new equipment or new missions/tasks, details concerning specific course standards, or the standards a soldier achieved at the time of graduation.

This is where the Individual Training Record is integrated into the teamwork concept to support the trainer. The Individual Training Record (DA Form 5286-R) and Individual Training Record Continuation Sheet (DA Form 5286-1-R) provide the unit trainer information on all the critical data on a soldier's level of training. The ITR reflects the standards established and the level obtained by the soldier in each area as well as information concerning other subjects presented to the soldier that are not specifically part of the course. Finally, the ITR shows the amount of time the soldier required to complete the course, to include any problems the soldier may have had.

At the time a soldier reports to a theater area from resident training for in-processing, a Training Records Transmittal Jacket (TRTJ) (DA Form 5287-R) will be enclosed as a transfer document within the soldier's field 201 file. This TRTJ should be removed at in-processing and provided to the gaining unit commander or first sergeant for review and subsequent filing within the unit's training record files. The TRTJ will include the soldier's Individual Training Record reflecting training received at Basic

Training along with any related training records. It will also include an Individual Training Record listing training received during Advanced Individual Training (AIT) along with any related training records. If the soldier attended any functional courses after AIT, an Individual Training Record reflecting this training would also be included.

With this information available to the trainer, he or she should be able to determine exactly what training the soldier received as compared to the Soldier Training Publication, and what type of training shortfalls the soldier had that require reinforcement at the unit. This information allows the trainer to effectively, quickly, and objectively integrate the new soldier into the unit's existing training program, thereby eliminating many on-the-job training hours.

For further information concerning the Individual Training Record, refer to AR 351-1, Individual Military Education and Training, Feb. 15, 1984. If you have questions or comments concerning Individual Training Records, please write Commander, U.S. Army Intelligence School, Fort Devens, ATTN: ATSI-EES, Fort Devens, MA 01433-6301 or phone AV 256-2297. (*This article was adapted from a similar version which appeared in Intelligence Training Notes, Vol. III, issue 4-85.*)

THE OFFICIAL HISTORY OF THE VIETNAM WAR

The authoritative history of the Vietnam War is currently being published as a multi-volume series by the U.S. Army Center of Military History. These books will be the Army's official account of the war and will vividly record the rising and the falling tides of America's involvement in Vietnam.

The books in this series will tell the real story about military decisions made at the highest level: decisions that helped to shape the war's conduct and ultimate outcome—and the effect they had on each American soldier. The series of some 20 books, to be published over a period of 10 years, includes the Army's involvement from its early advisory years to 1973 when the American troops left Vietnam.

Illustrations, maps, charts, and photographs are featured throughout the series. Each book in the series will include a comprehensive index covering personal names, military titles, geographic locations, major Army functions, and commands down to the division level.

Special books will focus on the massive logistical support of the war, its pioneering technologies, Vietnamization, intelligence, and communications.

All of these books will be sold by the U.S. Government Printing Office. To receive timely announcements of each volume's publication (as well as notices of new military history books from all of the armed services), send your name and address to the Superintendent of Documents, Mail Stop: MK, Washington, D.C., 20401, and ask to be put on Priority Announcement List N-534.



Book Review Policy

Book reviews are considered to be an integral part of the presentation of information of professional interest to the MI community. The normal policy of *Military Intelligence* is to publish reviews of books which have appeared in print over the previous year. Book reviews which are more than one year old are only published in cases where useful subject matter might not otherwise have been brought to the attention of our readers. Such reviews are considered on a case-by-case basis. Reviews of current books are more likely to be published. A limited number of books are received directly from publishers and are available for review. If you are interested in reviewing one of these books, please contact the editorial staff. Unsolicited reviews are also welcome and encouraged.

"Feedback" is the readers' column, *your* column. Letters printed in "Feedback" can be on any subject that relates to intelligence, electronic warfare, doctrine, tactics, innovations from the field, suggestions, criticism, even praise, or anything else the readers of *Military Intelligence* may find of interest. Letters *do not* have to refer to a previously printed article or letter from the magazine to be used in **FEEDBACK.**

Letter Policy: All letters to the editor must be signed. Names may be withheld if requested. Letters should be type-written and double spaced. The editor reserves the right to shorten letters. Letters are normally edited for style, grammar, spelling and punctuation. Please include a phone number (Autovon preferred) and a complete return address on the letter itself (envelopes tend to get separated from the letters).

Military Intelligence Writer's Guide

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE is oriented toward active Army, reserve and civilian intelligence personnel throughout the Army and Defense intelligence communities. When writing an article, consider the readers. They range from privates to general officers to civilians, and they all have one thing in common: they work in, or have interest in, military intelligence.

SUBJECTS: We are interested in all subjects relating to the diverse fields of military intelligence including Army doctrine and policies relating to intelligence; tactical and strategic intelligence; organization; weapons and equipment; foreign forces; electronic warfare, and intelligence collection (SIGINT, HUMINT, IMINT, etc.). Historical articles should have contemporary value. If you have an idea for an article, contact us and explain your theme, scope and organization. It will save both of us time and will facilitate our planning.

STYLE: *Military Intelligence* prefers concise and direct wording in the active voice. Every article should have a beginning that catches the readers' attention, a body containing the crux of the article, and an ending which concludes or summarizes. Keep the article as simple as possible. Avoid unfamiliar terms, unexplained abbreviations, and poorly constructed sentences. Don't submit a manuscript unless you are completely satisfied with it. Read it over three or four times and then let a friend read it. It is not uncommon to revise an article several times before submitting a finished manuscript. Don't waste the readers' time with meaningless or repetitive phrases or words. We edit all articles. However, a polished article is more likely to be accepted than a hurried mistake-riddled effort. Save yourself time and effort; be your own editor. We do not normally allow writers to review how their articles have been edited.

ACCEPTANCE: We make no prior commitments on acceptance until we have thoroughly studied each manuscript. All manuscripts must be original, previously unpublished works. Authors submitting articles are responsible for informing the staff of *Military Intelligence* of simultaneous submission and/or acceptance by other publications.

FORMAT: We prefer articles from 1,000 to 2,500 words in length. We will publish shorter or longer articles depending on quality. Develop your ideas and stop. Send clean, double-spaced manuscripts typed on one side of the sheet. Your name, length of manuscript, address, and phone number (Autovon preferred) should be typed on the first page. We prefer one original and one copy. Cite your references and enclose all quoted material in quotation marks. If possible, credit should be given within the article as footnotes are burdensome and use valuable space.

GRAPHICS: Artwork in the form of black and white glossy photographs, maps, sketches or line drawings can enhance the attractiveness and effectiveness of your article. If you have an idea for artwork or know where we can get it, let us know.

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BIOGRAPHY: Enclose a brief biographical sketch, including important positions and assignments, experience or education which establishes your knowledge of the subject, and your current position and title. Photos of authors are no longer used in *Military Intelligence*.

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Branch Notes

Senior Rater Profile

When officers reach the rank of major, they become eligible to be senior raters in the Officer Evaluation Reporting System, and MILPERCEN sends them a letter explaining senior rater responsibilities.

Evaluation of the performance and potential of junior officers is one of the most critical professional responsibilities of field grade officers. The officer evaluation report (OER) measures the quality of the officer corps and largely determines the selection of the Army's future leadership. Accurate, meaningful OERs are therefore vital to the Army's long-term success.

The senior rater focuses on potential more than performance and provides the capstone evaluation of an officer. Three components make up the senior rater's portion of the OER:

the box check, the profile, and the narrative. All three elements must be considered together to correctly interpret the senior rater's portion of the OER.

Senior raters must realize that the narrative and the box check-profile send messages to the boards which review them. And both messages must be consistent and mutually supportive. The most prevalent method for selection board analysis of the senior rater box check is to look at the box check in relation to the senior rater profile's "center of mass." The center of mass is more often than not the senior rater's most frequently used box in the profile. Those marked in the center of mass are clearly considered to be successful, competitive officers. Other officers rated above or below are then judged in relation to

the center of mass.

Senior raters are encouraged to plan ahead or they will lose control of their profiles. As soon as possible after assuming the role of senior rater, they should note exactly where in the profile they would place all the officers they rate if they had to rate them right away. In this way, as the senior rater becomes more familiar with rated officers, his or her list can be adjusted accordingly.

The ability to communicate rated officers' potential to selection boards distinguishes a "good" profile from a non-credible profile. Senior raters should examine each grade or grouping within their profiles. If more than 50 percent of the ratings are in the top box, or the top box is unmistakably the most frequently used, then serious consideration should be given to re-starting the profile in that grade and adopting a more credible senior rating philosophy.

Senior raters may discuss their responsibilities or their profiles with the Evaluation Systems Office, AV 221-9659/9570, or commercial (703) 325-9659/9570.

MI Branch Enlisted Assignments

AUTOVON 221- _____
Civ (202) 325- _____

Branch Chief
LTC Swift
x0141/9290

Secretary
Mrs. Ott
x0141/9290

SR. ASSIGN. SUPER.
Ms. Robinson
x0180/6434

SR. PROF. DEV. NCO
SGM Ouellette
x9290/0141

Assignment Section MI Assignments

Supervisor

Mr. Showalter (x0180/0181)
Mrs. Foster (x0181) 96B/D/H E1-E5
Ms. Fields (x9363) 96B/D/C E6, E8
Ms. Mc Ginnis (x9363) 97B/C 96R

EW/ CRYPTO Assignments

Supervisor

MSG Dronsfield (x0329) 98Z
SGT Barone (x0076) 05K, 98J
SFC Robinson (x0329) 05D/H
SSG Smith (x0413) 97E, 98C
SFC Kern (x9542) 33S, 97G
SSG Negrette (x0329) 98G

Professional Development Section MI Professional Development

Senior NCO

MSG Fletcher (x9363) 97B/C E8
SFC Bruss (x9363) 97B/C, 97E, E1/7
MSG Razalan (x9363) 96B/F/H
SFC Harper (x0329) 97G, 96R, 96D

EW/CRYPTO Professional Development

Senior NCO

MSG Callahan (x0076) 98Z
SFC Meyers (x0413) 05K, 98J
SFC Howell (x0413) 05D/H
SFC Lane (x0329) 98C
MSG Hefner (x9542) 33 CMF
SFC Marrandette (x0413) 98G

Administration/ Reclassification

Senior NCO

SSG Chaloupka (x6435)

Leadership Notes

MI Soldier Excels



Sgt. Judith Lynn Haworth was selected FORSCOM NCO of 1985 in addition to being chosen 5th Infantry Division NCO of the year. (U.S. Army photo)

The noncommissioned officer wearing the chevron is supposed to be the best soldier in the platoon and he is supposed to know how to perform all the duties expected of him.

General Omar N. Bradley

by Sgt. Doreen Kees

Sgt. Judith Lynn Haworth knows what "excel" means. In addition to being a platoon sergeant in the Collection and Jamming Company of the 105th Military Intelligence Battalion (CEWI), she was selected as the 5th Infantry Division's NCO of the year for 1985. It didn't stop there. Haworth was also chosen as the top FORSCOM NCO for 1985.

Haworth's significant achievements include finishing in the top five percent of her Russian language graduating class at the Defense Language Institute. She then earned honor graduate at her follow-on SIGINT Voice Interceptor course at Goodfellow Air Force Base, Texas.

Her first duty assignment brought her to the 103d MI Battalion (CEWI) in Germany, where she spent two and one-half years. Her tactical experience in the unit helped her with other assignments.

Haworth attended the Primary Leadership Development Course at the NCO Academy at Fort Polk, La., and walked away as the Distinguished Honor Graduate. Later, she earned NCO of the year titles.

Haworth's plans include becoming a Command Sergeant Major of the Army. "At the very least a command sergeant major of an MI battalion. That's a personal goal that I think I'm capable of reaching," she says.

In the more immediate future, Haworth intends to return to the Defense Language Institute for an intermediate Russian course. That could be followed by her first assignment to a strategic unit and a chance to look at the other side of Military Intelligence.

Toujours en avant—Always Out Front!

Organizational Notes

525th MI Brigade

On June 17, 1985, Military Intelligence took another step in its move to align itself structurally with the tactical Army as the 525th Military Intelligence Group, Fort Bragg, N.C., was designated a brigade, thus becoming the Army's first Military Intelligence brigade. During a ceremony which took place July 17, 1985, Lt. Gen. James J. Lindsay, XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg commander, presented the unit with its own patch.

The 525th was organized in 1946. During its 39-year history, the 525th has provided critical intelligence support to Army commanders. Units of the 525th MI Group served in combat during the Korean Conflict, Vietnam War, and the Grenada rescue operation. Today, the 525th MI Brigade provides the most modern array of intelligence capabilities available to ground forces anywhere in the world. The most recent addition to the brigade was the 224th Military Intelligence Battalion (Aerial Exploitation), which provides organic airborne intelligence collection assets in support of the XVIII Airborne Corps and national level subscribers. The other units which make up the brigade include the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment, the 319th Military Intelligence Battalion (Operations), and the 519th Military Intelligence Battalion (Tactical Exploitation). These units provide signals intelligence, interrogation, linguistic capabilities, counterintelligence, imagery interpretation, and all source intelligence analysis capabilities in support of airborne, air assault, and mechanized forces. The brigade is also the home of the Forces Command Intelligence Training Detachment. The detachment provides mobile training teams in support of FORSCOM's active and reserve forces.

Today, members of the 525th MI Brigade serve in Central America, the Caribbean Basin, and the Middle East.

Second U.S. Army Military Intelligence Command

The Second U.S. Army began forming a Military Intelligence Command Transition Team to develop and organize the Second Army MI Command (MICOM) in March 1985. The MICOM is a major subordinate command directly assigned to Second Army, functioning as an Army Reserve Command (ARCOM). The MICOM is commanded by a colonel with a staff of 10 Active Guard Reserve personnel and 22 Reserve personnel. Its organization consists of a command section, S1 section, S2/3 section (consisting of operations/intelligence and plans/readiness branches) and an S4 section.

The S1 and S2/3 sections have assumed approximately 98 percent of the existing functions from the Major U.S. Army Reserve Command/Major Subordinate Commands. Due to funding and manpower constraints, the S4 section has only been able to assume approximately five percent of the MUSARC/MSC workload. Based on a detailed memorandum of understanding, the responsibility for a substantial part of the workload in three MUSARCs was transferred to the MICOM.

On Oct. 16, 1985, 20 Second Army MI units were reassigned from their MUSARCs/MSCs to the Second Army MICOM for peacetime command and control. The MICOM focuses on improving unit readiness, solving MI unique problems, and improving unit training and mobilization. The MI units in the Second U.S. Army's geographical area represent all aspects of the intelligence arena.

Plans for the MICOM include: the command transfer of the Second U.S. Army Intelligence Training Army Area School to the MICOM in 1987; devel-

opment and command of the Fort Gillem Consolidated Training Facility in 1988; and the implementation of a Tactical Exploitation Battalion (Airborne) to be located in the Second Army geographical area in 1988.

Since the implementation of the MICOM, the individual USAR MI soldier within Second Army has seen drastic improvements. The goals of the MI Command include:

- Opening training doors—obtaining quotas for hard-to-get courses and getting active duty orders to soldiers with rapid turnaround times.
- Increasing MOS/SSI qualification—through increased command emphasis using resident training, Intelligence Training Army Area Schools, USAR schools and correspondence courses.
- Increasing professional development—through maximum use of NCO Professional Development and junior officer leadership programs.
- Increasing Readiness Training opportunities—through increased dissemination and use of Consolidated Training Facilities/OCONUS missions.

Additional information pertaining to the Second Army MICOM can be obtained by contacting the MICOM Headquarters at AV 797-3272 or commercial (404) 362-3272 or by writing Commander, Second Army MICOM, Bldg. 817, Fort Gillem, Forest Park, Ga., 30050-7000.

Technical Surveillance Countermeasures Program

There are openings within the ranks of the Technical Surveillance Countermeasures (TSCM) Program. The Army needs dedicated, hard-working, 97B/971A counterintelligence special agents to fill these positions and serve as TSCM special agents. Volunteers must be able to perform the intensive duties of a TSCM special agent, including briefing detailed subjects to senior officials, writing comprehensive technical reports, and traveling (usually not more than 120 days per year).

The TSCM Survey Program is a counterintelligence investigative discipline which involves the use of specialized electronic equipment to ensure that areas where discussions of extremely sensitive information take place are free of clandestine monitoring devices. The TSCM mission includes the detection and neutralization of clandestine surveillance devices employed by hostile intelligence services against sensitive U.S. facilities worldwide as well as the identification of weaknesses that could permit the employment of such devices. Because of the complex equipment employed, high standards are applied in the selection and training of TSCM soldiers. Extensive technical training is provided at military and civilian institutions. The basic TSCM course consists of three phases: Phase I—16 weeks of fundamental electronics; Phase II—six weeks of audio countermeasures and equipment techniques; and Phase III—six weeks of advanced TSCM techniques. Phase I is taught at Fort Devens, Mass., Phase II at Fort Meade, Md., and Phase III in Washington, D.C. Upon successful completion of the required training, the individual is then assigned to a TSCM position. The individual, until certified, works under the supervision of a certified technical surveillance countermeasures special agent. The individual must complete a minimum of six months of on-the-job training before being eligible to undergo certification testing, which consists of practical and written tests. Once certified, the technical surveillance countermeasures special agent must attend

annual refresher training in order to enhance proficiency and remain abreast of the ever-changing state-of-the-art. Those agents who make major contributions to the field, and have served in the TSCM field for a minimum of five years, may be designated as master technical surveillance countermeasures special agents.

Applicants for TSCM duties must meet the following minimum standards:

- Normal hearing. Hearing acuity test results per audio-meter test not to exceed plus 15 decibels at frequencies of 250, 500, 1000, 2000 and 4000 hertz.
- Both eyes must have 20/20 distant vision and near vision J-1. Correction of vision through glasses to achieve these results is acceptable.
- Color perception test results, employing the pseudoisochromatic plates for testing color perception, not to exceed four incorrect identifications out of 14 test plates.
- Free from any physical defects which materially hinder manual dexterity.
- TSCM special agents must have a favorable SBI within the past five years for access to sensitive compartmented information (SCI).
- Warrant officers must be CI technicians (971A) in the active Army with a minimum of four years, but not more than 16 years, active military duty.
- Enlisted personnel must be CI agents (97B) in the grade of E5 or above in the active Army with a minimum of four years, but not more than 16 years, active military duty.
- Should have credit for high school level algebra and have a standard score of 120 or higher in aptitude area EL.
- In addition to the above standards, a minimum of one year CI experience is highly desirable.

Volunteers for training and entry into the TSCM Program should sub-

mit a DA Form 4187 (Personnel Action), in accordance with procedure 3-10, DA Pamphlet 600-8, to: DA, MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-EPLM for enlisted personnel, and DA, MILPERCEN, ATTN: DAPC-OPW-II for warrant officers. After an application is submitted, the applicant must undergo an interview by a certified TSCM special agent who will explain TSCM duties and responsibilities. Upon successful completion of training, assignment to a TSCM position is required. For further information, contact the Office of the TSCM Program Director, HQ, USAINSCOM, Fort Meade, Md., 20755, AV 923-5341/5267.

Unmatched Spurs

(Continued from page 17)

managed to describe bits and pieces that are often in seeming contradiction to one another.

When we finally get a snapshot of the whole beast of remolded Soviet doctrine, of which OMGs and widespread restructuring are merely individual aspects, we will likely be astonished at its conceptual grandeur, if not necessarily impressed with its operational efficacy. For the Russians have always liked to do things in a big way—and their grand successes have never fully eclipsed their remarkable aptitude for failure. ★

Capt. Ralph Peters is the author of numerous published articles on military subjects, as well as one novel which received favorable national reviews. He entered the Army as a private in 1976, was commissioned through OCS in 1980, and has served extended tours with both the 8th Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 1st Armored Division in USAREUR. Peters is a tactical intelligence officer and a native-rated German linguist. He is a recent graduate of the MI Officer Advanced Course and is currently assigned to the III Corps G2 staff at Fort Hood, Texas.

PROFESSIONAL READER

Great Battlefields of the World by John MacDonald, with an introduction by General Sir John Hackett, New York: MacMillan Publishing Company, 1985, \$35.00.

Great Battlefields of the World is an annoyingly disappointing book. It annoys because of its price and relative popularity, and it disappoints because it misses its worthy mark so widely. Promoting itself as a means for the military historian to gain new insight into the logic of the battlefield, it is in actuality a careless coffee table book for the sort of character who would rather collect military miniatures than analyze operations. And yet . . . it could have been so much more.

The gimmick of this book is the use of "three-dimensional" computer graphics to "re-create" two-dimensional models of thirty interesting battles. Over the computer-delivered terrain base, a designer colors in troop dispositions, buildings, foliage, and other details, theoretically enabling the buyer to "see" these great battles he or she has so long studied. The cover blurb, from Len Deighton, calls this "a brilliant new concept." And there is no doubt that computer mapping is an idea whose time has come.

The failure lies in the realization of this appealing concept. Mr. MacDonald was apparently so confident of his gimmick's success that he failed to think through the sense of the battles he selected. Many of the choices seem to have been derived from a perceived level of current interest in certain battles, rather than from their suitability to such a project. Worst of all, from the discriminating reader's or military professional's point of view, the compiler seems more concerned with providing colorful and dramatic pictures than with accuracy.

At its worst, this book gives us a little slice of evergreen forest and marsh, with blurry little figures dabbed in, and implies we are all eyewitnesses to the battle of Tannenberg. The area portrayed is about one hundred by two hundred meters. No matter that you do not need computer graphics to understand the effects of terrain on this battle, or that the glory of Tannenberg lay at the operational level—where Ludendorff's adoption of a Napoleonic strategy of the central position behind the Masurian lakes was the place where risk intersected genius. El Alamein, Arnhem, Kohima, Balacava (perhaps the just-plain dumbest—a sort of "Charge of the Light Computer"), The Hook, and others get a similar myopic treatment.

The book is at its most annoying, however, when it comes closest to success. Austerlitz is a battle which should lend itself to dramatic and illuminating computer graphics. Here Napoleon faced and ingeniously solved a tantalizingly complex terrain problem. His baiting use of his initial dispositions, his use of terrain for deception, and the masterly style in which he shaped the allied penetration beg comprehensive graphics. How did Napoleon's forces appear to the allies from the commanding Pratzen Heights? We know, of course, that visibility was less than perfect. Yet what could Napoleon see from his station of command when the French counter-attack was unleashed? Unfortunately, MacDonald elected to pick up the battle *after* all these events had occurred. He chose moments

of high drama—the crisis on the Pratzen Heights, the flight over the frozen lakes—but the buyer of the book is offered only the least interesting—and least complex—slices of the terrain. The French appear on the Pratzen as if by magic, and this treatment is typical of how the other events of the battle are covered.

Overall, the book exhibits a miserable lack of attention to detail. But, for me, at least, the acid test lies in how successfully the computer is exploited to visually describe battlefields I have walked in person. And, in each instance, the graphics, though colorful, prove genuinely awful. The tableaux of Blenheim (now Blindheim) fails to properly account for the shift of over 1,000 meters in the flow of the Danube over the past three centuries, so that Lord Cutt's action against the French right fails to make the crucial sense it should. Prince Eugene's flanking march on the extreme allied right is virtually ignored. Further, Blenheim was fought on a flood plain between a river and wooded bluffs. But the graphics make it look like the head-on smack of two armies on a prairie.

The attempts to visually resurrect Gettysburg are careless, at best. Here MacDonald combines all of his tendencies to err, selecting terrain slices that neglect the most interesting aspects of the battle, and that never show how it all hangs together. In MacDonald's military vision, armies never have lines of communication, or reserves, or any of that mundane sort of thing. This is a child's vision of history, one step above finger painting. And then the dismembered slices of the battle that are offered are simply inaccurate. Perhaps the programmer just couldn't read contour lines very well and didn't understand what the bar scale was for, but the poor victim of this book who attempted to study Gettysburg with its help would spend more time scratching his head than learning.

Superficially, of course, the book seems to have everything—even an introduction by General Sir John Hackett, who is rapidly becoming to military literature what Joan Collins is to serious acting. But this is a truly bad book—and no less so because it pretends to be so ambitious while settling for being good-looking. It is not even a tiny step forward—American Heritage did a vastly superior graphic series on U.S. Civil War battles twenty-five years ago—without benefit of a computer. Avoid this one!

Capt. Ralph Peters
III Corps G2
Fort Hood, Texas

October 1973 (The Arab-Israeli War) by Frank Aker, Hamden, Connecticut: Archon Books, 1985, 178 pages, \$19.50.

In the United States Army, the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, often called the "Yom Kippur" war or the "Ramadan" war, provided a startling glimpse of what we now, with a sense of professional detachment, call mid-intensity warfare. In this conflict the Arabs, armed predominately with Soviet-supplied equipment, and the Israelis, armed predominately with American-supplied equipment, fought a conventional non-nuclear war. In nineteen days of intense combat, over seven thousand soldiers were killed, with thousands of other soldiers suffering non-fatal

wounds. Four hundred and eighty-five aircraft and over sixteen hundred tanks were destroyed. These losses greatly exceeded those losses experienced in the historic Battle of Alamein between Axis and British forces in November of 1942.

Author Frank Aker's brief, but comprehensive, account of the 1973 war offers a good summary for the reader. In "an executive summary" style, he lays out the implications of that tragic and violent war, providing valuable lessons for the student of military science. The experience gained in the war re-emphasized the need for combined arms operations integrated with aviation support. For the Military Intelligence professional, Aker consistently stresses the theme that "the modern Army requires the very best intelligence that can be provided at every level."

In the United States Army, the battalion S2 is the first intelligence staff officer in the intelligence chain. His planning and staff supervision of the battlefield reconnaissance effort in the main battle area is essential for the close-in battle component of AirLand Battle doctrine. The U.S. Army's experience at the National Training Center validates the importance of the role played by the battalion S2. Likewise, according to Aker, battlefield reconnaissance allowed the Israelis to discover an exploitable gap which existed between the Egyptian Second and Third armies.

During the mid- to late 1970s, I observed firsthand the U.S. Army's efforts to capture the lessons learned from the 1973 war and to develop a force structure to fight and win on the mid-intensity battlefield. This book can provide insight into the scope and effect of those lessons as viewed some thirteen years later. I recommend it to the student of military science in general and to the student of military intelligence in particular.

Maj. John Skelton
U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Board
Fort Huachuca, Ariz.

In and Out of Stalin's GRU: A Tartar's Escape from Red Army Intelligence by Ismail Akhmedov, Frederick, Maryland: University Publications of America, Inc., 1984.

Ismail Akhmedov, former Soviet army staff officer and officer-agent of the GRU, the Main Intelligence Directorate of the Soviet army, has produced an excellent, easy to read, memoir of his life in Russia and, specifically, his career in Soviet military intelligence. Although this book is one man's story, it touches on many Soviet military topics of interest which will appeal to a wide variety of readers.

Akhmedov, a Tartar raised in the foothills of the Urals by Muslim parents, was a young man during the first years of the Russian Revolution. Joining the Komsomol, the Soviet youth organization, and later the Communist party, Akhmedov was involved in many activities before being accepted as a "Kursant" (Cadet) at the Leningrad Military Signal School. Commissioned into the Signal troops, his scientific and language interest, coupled with high academic standings, brought him to the attention of the GRU, which he later joined in 1930.

Akhmedov's first superior in the GRU, Colonel Kuzyuberdin, explains the GRU mission in a chilling way, even by today's standards. "Our intelligence must be more active, stronger,"

Kuzyuberdin tells Akhmedov, "we are revolutionaries yet the most important thing to remember is that our purpose is to destroy the world as it is now and rebuild a new one . . . we must use the sum total of active clandestine actions towards the destruction of the capitalist world, especially the most hated enemy, the USA." Akhmedov's basic training in the GRU involved the usual ciphering and radio techniques, before successfully moving on to the espionage area. He was also given reports of forced collectivization to read which included descriptions of "burning villages, women and children put to death." Such reports led the author to experience his first misgivings about his chosen career.

Akhmedov became a skilled GRU operative, including service at a Soviet border station recruiting new agents. Here he writes of the rivalry between the OGPU (predecessor of the KGB) and the GRU: "We were told the OGPU were the trusted, the elite with the right to control everything whereas we in GRU were the military professionals." This rivalry not only deepens but figures heavily in his eventual defection. Akhmedov's talents in electrical engineering propelled him through the prestigious Soviet Engineering School and, finally, through the Soviet War College where he further comments on both the curriculum and Stalin's purges: "While we studied tactics, operational art, general staff work, and the great battles of the past . . . comrades and seniors were being arrested by the NKVD during midnight raids, either to be shot or sent to Siberia." This portion of the book is both fascinating and informative, since it is one of the few published Western accounts of the purges from an insider's view.

Reclaimed by the GRU after his War College graduation, he served with distinction during the Russo-Finnish war and was on assignment in Berlin when the Germans invaded in 1941! Repatriated to Turkey, he was ordered to stay there and develop a GRU network, but defected after an NKVD assassination attempt on the German ambassador failed and he was left to take the blame. His debriefer in the intelligence community was none other than Kim Philby, himself a Soviet double agent.

This small book should appeal to many in the military and the intelligence community. The author is to be commended for placing a "human face" on the GRU and revealing both the longevity of its goals and the seriousness of its purpose. This is the story of one soldier's struggle that eventually cost him his home, career, and country. But as Akhmedov writes, "The real fighters . . . for the cause of freedom, democracy, and human dignity are the Soviet officers who defected to the West and revealed the ugly reality of the Soviet Police State."

Capt. Rick Ugino
1/209th FA NYARNG
Rochester, N.Y.

Division-Level Communications, 1962-1973 by Lt. Gen. Charles R. Myer, Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, 1982, 109 pages.

Division-Level Communications, 1962-1973, is a compact monograph which serves as an interim report on the performance of the Signal Corps in the Vietnam War. The author, Lt. Gen. Charles R. Myer, writes from firsthand experience, having served in Vietnam for nearly 12 months as a

battalion commander. His book is also based on numerous after-action reports, interviews, and official reports.

The main theme of the book deals with challenges faced by the Signal Corps in Vietnam's widely varied terrain. While long-range communications equipment proved adequate to the task at hand, FM communications posed a major problem. "The FM command net was the life line," writes Myer, "often one that had to be sustained despite the staggering obstacles of extended distance, extended net congestion, and near-impenetrable vegetation" (p. 45). Overcoming these obstacles taxed the ingenuity and resourcefulness of the Signal corpsmen. Their solutions differed from region to region. Some divisions utilized airborne command posts in UH-1H helicopters to get above the dense jungle and mountainous terrain. Other units set up fixed communications sites on dominating terrain. Still others, such as units operating in the Mekong Delta region, created their own high points by erecting antenna towers at the base camps from battalion through division level. Communications had to be maintained in spite of the weather, which often caused signal equipment to overheat, a high personnel turnover rate, and the lack of any great technological leap in the type of radios used in the war. While several new series of radios were introduced during the 11-year period in question, the improvements in performance were modest. As a result, Vietnam proved to be "more a war of individual improvisation than of equipment modernization, at least for the tactical communicator" (p. 99).

The most interesting chapters in the book from an intelligence standpoint address the enemy's signal intercept capability and the American response to it. It should be noted that the Army did not go into Vietnam totally unprepared to deal with a hostile electronic environment. Indeed, the equipment necessary to make tactical FM communications secure was issued to some units in the summer of 1965. The secure communications gear was not always used, however, because it was cumbersome and too much of a bother for operators and commanders to use. Besides, few people believed that the enemy had the capability to exploit the Army's tactical communications.

The belated discovery, in 1969, of the North Vietnamese/Viet Cong radio intercept threat is now well-known. Our enemies had been "reading our mail," as Gen. Creighton Adams put it, for some time. Myer notes that establishing and maintaining secure tactical communications remain vexing problems facing all tactical communicators. It is also a topic that should be accorded high priority in any future American operation. We cannot afford to assume, as many did in Vietnam, that the enemy will be unable to take advantage of American operational weaknesses, no matter how unsophisticated that enemy may appear.

Division-Level Communications satisfactorily introduces the reader to the problems faced by the Signal Corps in Vietnam. The tone of the book is uncritical, for the author found few complaints about communications in the after-action reports of senior officers. One wonders if this would hold true for the after-action reports of junior officers and non-commissioned officers. In any event, those desiring a more comprehensive treatment of Army tactical communications during the Vietnam War should consult the forthcoming Center of Military History work on the subject.

Capt. Robert E. Kells Jr.
174th MI Company
Fort Monmouth, N.J.

Breaking With Moscow by Arkady N. Shevchenko, New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1985, 378 pages, \$18.95.

Dr. Shevchenko's memoirs provide the reader with rare and valuable insights into the inner workings and outlook of Soviet foreign policy-makers. All too often, memoirs by Soviet defectors are either in the form of vitriolic diatribes against the evils of the Soviet system or they are self-serving apologia calculated to present the author in the most favorable light. The former, while probably true and emotionally satisfying, are not very useful for intelligence analysis, and the latter are practically worthless.

Shevchenko has managed, for the most part, to avoid both pitfalls while sticking to his stated purpose, which, in his words, is "to share with the reader my experiences under the Soviet system; to tell the truth about it as I lived it; to inform the public of Soviet designs, and to warn of the dangers they present to the world." His lucid writing style makes for pleasant reading and easy comprehension of his main points. Shevchenko takes the reader through a concise account of his early years prior to becoming a student at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations (MGIMO is the Soviet acronym). He then devotes considerably more attention to his training and experience as a Soviet diplomat from 1954 through the period surrounding his defection in April of 1978 after having acted as a "reluctant spy" for the CIA.

Shevchenko's narrative is laced with personal observations and appraisals of his diplomatic colleagues as well as of Soviet leaders Krushchev and Brezhnev. His most important diplomatic contribution, however, lies in his analysis of how the Soviet diplomatic and political leadership perceives both U.S. intentions and the nature of the American political system. He demonstrates how the Soviets consistently projected their own value system and logic onto the American system, thus proving that the "mirror-imaging" tendency displayed by Soviet analysis in their writings on U.S. strategy and foreign policy is characteristic of the Soviet leadership as well. The significance which this has for strategic analysis is great. Shevchenko's observations "from the inside," as it were, confirm the value of Soviet military and political periodicals as a reasonably reliable indicator of Soviet perceptions and probable intentions, at least in the strategic sense. If nothing else, Dr. Shevchenko has provided the intelligence community with a useful corroboration of the value of Soviet open source literature.

This book is highly recommended for those who are looking for insight into the Soviet mindset without having to pay the price of wading through the usually dull official Soviet prose.

Capt. Jonathan S. Lockwood
HBB, 10th ADA Bde (Hawk/Patriot)
Darmstadt, FRG

470th Military Intelligence Group



SYMBOLISM

Oriental blue and silver represent the colors used for Military Intelligence. The key, a symbol for authority, secrecy and wardenship refers to the basic mission of the organization. The double wards allude to "intelligence" and "counterintelligence." The seven rays of the bow represent the "revealing light," and the numeral seven is a symbolic reference to intelligence, security, and wisdom. The torch portrays the idea of guidance with the flame representing an ever active state. The color blue is used for truth and red for zeal and valor.

The 470th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment began its history on July 12, 1944, when it was constituted into the United States Army. The 470th was activated at Quarry Heights, Canal Zone and assigned to the Caribbean Defense Command on July 31, 1944 with an authorized strength of 10 officers, five warrant officers, and 62 enlisted men. The creation of the detachment resulted from an effort to centralize counterintelligence assets which had been increased as the CI mission was expanded

from its original role of counterintelligence protection dating back to 1922.

On July 25, 1949, the detachment moved to Fort Amador, and then on Nov. 23, 1951, the 470th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment was allotted to the Regular Army. An augmentation unit was assigned to the 470th on Jan. 1, 1957, later redesignated as the Security Service Detachment on April 1, 1958.

After several redesignations, the detachment was finally christened

the 470th Military Intelligence Group on Oct. 15, 1966. In 1974, the 470th was reassigned to the U.S. Forces Command and on Jan. 1, 1977 to the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command. On April 1, 1977, the INSCOM Detachment, U.S. Southern Command, located at Fort Clayton, Canal Zone, was assigned to the 470th MI Group and subsequently relocated to Fort Amador on Oct. 1, 1977. Its mission was integrated into the 470th's overall responsibilities. This integration represented

the first significant attempt among INSCOM units to fulfill the parent organization's charter of providing multidisciplinary support. For its efforts, the 470th was named the 1977 recipient of the Travis Trophy, awarded annually to the outstanding service cryptologic unit.

As the terms of the Panama Canal Treaties were implemented on Oct. 1, 1977, all U.S. offices were transferred from Fort Amador. The 470th completed its move to its present location at Fort Clayton, Panama, on Oct. 1, 1979.


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